As Caribbean countries accelerate their energy transition, China is steadily expanding its presence in the region’s renewable energy sector, particularly in solar power. Between 2020 and 2024, Chinese exports of green technologies to the Caribbean grew by more than 570 percent. At the same time, this expansion has raised concerns about project transparency, growing technological dependence, and the possibility that economic influence could translate into strategic advantages and political leverage for Beijing.
From Jamaica and Guyana to the Bahamas and Cuba, Beijing finances and builds solar parks, supplies photovoltaic panels and energy storage systems, and provides technical training programs, expanding its influence in a sector that is critical to regional economic development and energy security.
Beyond economic interests, this expansion also serves broader geopolitical objectives.
“This is not only a strategy to alleviate China’s domestic overproduction challenges, but also a way to promote the adoption of Chinese technological standards by other countries,” Mexican analyst César Eduardo Santos, who specializes in Chinese influence in Latin America, told Diálogo.
The Caribbean also represents an area of considerable strategic value for Beijing. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) includes countries that collectively hold 14 votes in the United Nations General Assembly and includes five of the 12 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The region is also a vital corridor for global maritime trade and lies only a few hundred kilometers from the United States, a combination of factors that significantly increases its geopolitical relevance for China’s leadership.
Beijing’s strategy
According to a report by the Inter-American Dialogue think tank, China has developed at least 139 climate-related projects in 13 Caribbean countries over the past decade, with a particular concentration in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. This expansion is consistent with China’s policy framework for Latin America and the Caribbean, published in December 2025, which calls for cooperation across the entire clean-energy supply chain and specific support for smaller island states.
As Santos notes, Beijing has increasingly favored what Chinese officials describe as “small but beautiful” projects in recent years — smaller, targeted investments focused on high-value sectors such as renewable energy. At the same time, industrial initiatives such as Made in China 2025 and China Standards 2035 seek to expand the international adoption of technologies, technical standards, and supply chains linked to Chinese companies.
Examples can be found throughout the region. In Barbados, Chinese company BYD helped establish the Caribbean’s largest electric bus fleet. In Jamaica, Beijing trained more than 140 photovoltaic-sector technicians. In Guyana and Suriname, state-owned firms such as PowerChina and SUMEC are developing solar plants and microgrids in remote areas, while the Dominican Republic imported more than 4 million solar panels from China between 2017 and 2023.
In Cuba, China-backed solar expansion has failed to reverse an energy crisis marked by years of deteriorating critical infrastructure and structural problems within the electricity sector. Although dozens of Chinese-supported solar parks have been connected to the grid, Cuba continues to experience widespread blackouts, highlighting that the rapid addition of generation capacity alone cannot compensate for decades of inadequate maintenance, obsolete infrastructure, and systemic deficiencies in the management of the national electrical system.
Governance and dependency concerns
According to experts, one of the main concerns involves the governance standards associated with these projects. Chinese companies often deliver and install energy infrastructure quickly, but transparency regarding financing arrangements, contracts, and investment conditions remains limited.
A frequently cited regional example is the Choloma solar project in northern Honduras, developed by DanaSun Energy, a company affiliated with the Chinese Texhong International Group. The project has faced criticism due to the lack of publicly available information regarding signed agreements, investment terms, and the ultimate destination of the electricity produced.
“The greatest risk is the combination of contractual opacity, institutional weakness, and high financial costs that ultimately fall on recipient states,” Santos said.
These concerns are compounded by the issue of technological dependence. In the solar sector, control of the supply chain extends beyond photovoltaic panels to include inverters, batteries, management software, firmware, and maintenance services. In many cases, these components continue to rely on original manufacturers for updates, technical support, and remote monitoring, raising concerns that technological control could be used as a tool of economic and strategic influence.
Cybersecurity risks
A recent report by the United Kingdom–based Loom Strategy Centre described the risks associated with dependence on Chinese green technology as “serious,” citing among the potential threats the existence of remote-access capabilities that could allow the disruption of energy systems, as well as the possible use of certain infrastructure for surveillance activities.
Particular attention has focused on inverters, often described as the brains of photovoltaic installations because they regulate the flow of electricity into the power grid. Multiple cybersecurity investigations have reported the presence of undocumented communication modules in some Chinese-manufactured devices and energy-storage systems, including cellular radio equipment that does not appear in technical specifications.
For the Caribbean, these risks could be amplified by the limited cybersecurity capabilities of many island states. Santos warns that the challenge extends beyond electricity generation to the digital systems that manage it. In countries with limited cyber defense capabilities, heavy reliance on external suppliers for software, updates, and maintenance could increase exposure to operational and security risks.
Necessary measures
Experts warn that China’s growing presence in the Caribbean solar sector requires greater attention to procurement transparency, rigorous cybersecurity standards, and effective oversight of the digital systems that manage critical energy infrastructure. Reducing technological vulnerabilities and diversifying supply chains are considered essential for strengthening energy resilience and limiting long-term strategic risks.
For Santos, however, the response cannot be purely technical. It also requires credible alternatives to Chinese financing and stronger democratic institutions in recipient countries.
“Promoting transparency, accountability, and independent oversight of infrastructure contracts is just as important as providing alternative sources of financing. Without strong institutions, any external actor will have incentives to perpetuate practices that are unfavorable to the public interest,” he concluded.
