China has increased its presence in the Caribbean through loans, infrastructure, and technology, creating growing economic and political dependence in the region. This expansion affects national sovereignty, particularly in strategic sectors such as ports and telecommunications, and carries environmental risks. These developments pose a significant challenge to the region’s autonomy and stability.
China’s strategic interests in the Caribbean
Beijing considers the Caribbean a key region for several reasons. Countries such as Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Its location, as a maritime gateway and a logistics and financial hub mirrors the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, which reinforces China’s military, political, and economic interest.
According to Euclides Tapia, professor of international relations at the University of Panama, “due to the small size of Caribbean countries, external influence is more effective, and it cannot be ruled out that practices such as bribery are used to secure political support.”
China, Tapia says, is advancing from the economic front, the greatest vulnerability of these countries. “Beijing’s penetration is gradual, economic, and methodical, in a slow but sure process of domination.”
Investments in key sectors
Chinese investments in the Caribbean have expanded over the last two decades in areas such as tourism, ports, energy, telecommunications, and agriculture, often following diplomatic recognition of China and accompanied by symbolic donations.
Chinese companies are involved in sectors that are essential to the economy and energy security. For example, state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, is present in the Stabroek block in Guyana, and in the Greater Angostura field in Trinidad and Tobago. Huawei and other firms have installed submarine cables, digital infrastructure, and smart city projects in the region.
In the area of agriculture and natural resources, companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invest in timber, sugar, and bauxite, mainly in Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica, although they face local challenges. In energy, they finance both solar and hydroelectric plants.
According to Tapia, China’s assertive posture in the Caribbean is reminiscent of its firm stance in the South China Sea, where it illegally claims areas. “This attitude is reflected in the Caribbean, where the CCP seeks to consolidate its influence under a similar approach.”
Financial dependence and debt trap
According to the Caribbean Investigative Journalism Network, between 2005 and 2018, Chinese banks, more particularly the Export-Import bank of China (CHEXIM) and the China Development Bank, were the largest lenders in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the Caribbean receiving a substantial portion of this funding.
This substantial lending has given rise to a model often criticized as the “debt trap diplomacy.” In the Caribbean, this strategy involves some 10 countries, and carries the risk that, in the event of default, China could take control of strategic assets, as happened in Sri Lanka with the port of Hambantota in 2017.
Similar outcomes have been observed in other countries struggling with Chinese debt. For example, in Pakistan, much of the revenue goes to paying off debt to China, causing power cuts and massive layoffs in the textile industry. In Zambia, pressure from Beijing has contributed to inflation of close to 50 percent, Spanish news site La Sexta reported.
Chinese loans often have opaque terms and conditions and guarantees tied to natural resources or strategic infrastructure, making them predatory lending practices. In addition, Chinese construction companies enjoy tax exemptions and employ mainly Chinese labor, limiting local employment and technology transfer, as well as causing environmental damage.
Control of critical infrastructure and intelligence risks
Chinese companies’ control of strategic infrastructure such as ports and telecommunications networks facilitates political influence and potential intelligence activities. This is particularly concerning as many projects are part of Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy, which blurs the lines between civilian commerce and military objectives.
For example, Hutchison Ports, a company with close ties to the CCP, operates the Port of Freeport in the Bahamas, a vital logistics hub. This presence enables intelligence gathering, surveillance, and electronic operations, and could support dual-use activities in regional crisis situations. A Chinese state-owned enterprise also controls 49 percent of a key port in Jamaica, raising similar security concerns about Beijing’s ability to disrupt trade or monitor naval activity.
Huawei and digital security challenges
Huawei has increased its presence in the Caribbean by leveraging China’s foreign policy and diplomatic ties. International experts have consistently warned of espionage risks, as Huawei, founded by a former Chinese military officer, maintains close ties to the CCP and is seen as a high-risk supplier to democracies due to the potential for state-mandated data access and surveillance.
Huawei’s presence is particularly strong in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, and the company has signed agreements to promote digital transformation across most Caribbean countries. This expansion of China’s technological influence is not just through physical infrastructure, but also in the cyber realm, Tapia pointed out.
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has also warned that dependence on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure increases economic, national security, and foreign political influence risks.
Strategies to strengthen regional resilience
To counter Chinese influence, experts recommend strengthening technological and economic cooperation with trusted allies. The Atlantic Council highlights the importance of promoting infrastructure alternatives and encouraging transparent investments. Experts also suggest developing local capabilities to resist coercive pressures and diversify exports, and for the need to invest in human capital by supporting scholarships and educational programs that promote democratic values and ethical leadership.
Tapia stresses that responsibility is shared and advocates for a joint strategy to strengthen security, investment, and trade. Finally, he warns that, to limit China’s presence, “a security area covering the entire Caribbean must be created, with health and military controls,” replicating mutual assistance agreements to contain external influences.
China’s growing influence in the Caribbean poses economic, political, strategic, and environmental risks. The region faces the difficult task of strengthening its resilience, diversifying alliances, and developing local capacities to avoid excessive dependence and preserve its sovereignty. A multilateral approach, with international support and strengthened regional governance, is essential to meet this enormous challenge.
