Organized crime has evolved from a public security challenge into a strategic threat to democratic governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Driven by increasingly lucrative illicit markets, criminal organizations have expanded their influence over territories, economies, and institutions, eroding state authority and weakening democracies’ ability to respond.
Such is the warning issued by Laura Chinchilla, former president of Costa Rica, in an exclusive interview with Diálogo during Florida International University’s (FIU) Hemispheric Security Conference, held May 5–8, 2026.
From the expansion of illicit markets and the infiltration of public institutions to the emergence of a new form of “criminal governance,” Chinchilla examines how criminal organizations have evolved into one of the principal threats to regional stability.
“Criminals are sitting at the table governing our countries,” the former president says in one of the interview’s most striking observations.
Throughout the conversation, Chinchilla examines the challenges states face in regaining control of their territories, combating impunity, strengthening the rule of law, and improving their ability to respond to criminal networks that increasingly operate beyond national borders.
Diálogo: In recent years, Latin America has experienced a significant expansion of organized crime and greater territorial control by criminal groups. Based on your experience as a former head of state and observer of these issues across the region, how has the relationship between governance, state authority, and security outcomes evolved?
Laura Chinchilla, former president of Costa Rica: I would begin by saying, perhaps somewhat categorically, but supported by the indicators, that organized crime has become the principal threat to the institutional stability of our hemisphere, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Why do I say that so categorically? First, because of the growth of illicit markets. Today, the region is home to nearly 10 well-established illicit-market hubs, including some of the most profitable criminal economies, such as the cocaine trade.
This has enabled these organizations to diversify their operations and deepen their penetration into legitimate economies through the laundering of proceeds generated by illicit activities.
Added to this is the growing co-optation of public officials and institutions, as well as the expansion of territorial control by criminal groups, including in urban areas across many Latin American countries. Increasingly, homicide rates are fundamentally linked to organized crime.
Finally, I would say that no country escapes this phenomenon. We have seen historically stable countries such as Ecuador, Costa Rica, and even Chile register troubling increases in homicide rates.
There is clearly a close interrelationship between the operations of organized crime and what we observe at both the territorial and institutional levels.
Diálogo: In your most recent work, Citizen Security and Peaceful Coexistence, you introduce the concept of criminal governance to describe emerging dynamics in the region. How should we understand this phenomenon, and what does it reveal about the presence, capabilities, and limitations of the state in different territories? And based on that, which approaches have proven most effective in restoring the state’s legitimate authority?
Chinchilla: The phenomenon of criminal governance is essentially associated with the growing control that transnational organized crime groups exert over the economy, territory, and institutions, accompanied by the gradual encroachment or infiltration of public authorities.
At its core, what is happening — and something we are often reluctant to acknowledge — is that criminals are sitting at the table governing our countries.
In most cases, this does not necessarily occur with the explicit consent of authorities. However, throughout Latin America we have also seen attempts to establish often opaque arrangements in which political actors seek certain benefits from organized crime groups in exchange for greater political power, territorial control for illicit activities, or even functions that ultimately replace the presence and authority of the state in specific areas.
How do we confront such a delicate phenomenon? I must acknowledge that it is not easy. We are facing a new stage in the region’s security challenges. While organized crime is not new, just one or two decades ago we were primarily dealing with common criminality. In that context, it was much easier to design effective response strategies.
Today, everything must involve strengthening the capabilities of police agencies, judicial institutions, and criminal prosecution bodies. It also requires recognizing that just as criminal organizations operate transnationally, international cooperation must do the same.
And there is one component without which organized crime cannot be defeated: financial intelligence.
These are the elements we must add if we hope to confront this threat with any degree of success.
Diálogo: Another transformation we have witnessed in recent years involves patterns of violence, which have become more fragmented, more dynamic, and more localized. What factors are driving this evolution, and how should states adapt to respond more effectively to this new reality?
Chinchilla: Exactly. One of the points we make very clearly in my study is that we can no longer analyze homicide trends in Latin America and the Caribbean in aggregate terms. Regional statistics tell us less and less because the overall trend is generally downward.
However, when we take a closer look at subregions and individual countries, we see very different dynamics.
For example, Central America, historically considered the most dangerous subregion in the world in terms of homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants, no longer holds that distinction. Homicides have been declining there. Yet when we look at the Caribbean, we find that it is currently home to three of the countries with the highest homicide rates in the world.
That is why it is so important to focus analysis on subregions, countries, and even specific localities. Doing so reveals that some of the most dangerous — or increasingly dangerous — areas in the region are border zones, particularly where multiple countries converge, such as in the Amazon, as well as certain coastal areas.
This points to the need to better segment the information we use and adapt public policy responses to local realities.
At the same time, we must keep the broader framework in mind because this remains a transnational phenomenon, even if its manifestations vary from one territory to another. The response must therefore combine transnational cooperation with policies tailored to the specific needs of each local context.
Diálogo: Another major challenge we have seen in recent years concerns public trust in police and justice institutions. In your view, what factors most influence these perceptions, and how can governments strengthen security capabilities without weakening — and ideally while reinforcing — institutional legitimacy over the long term?
Chinchilla: That may be one of the greatest challenges we face. Earlier, when you asked about the key elements of a strategy, I noted that we cannot talk about confronting crime — whether common or organized — without strong, robust, professional, and transparent institutions operating within the rule of law. I am referring primarily to judges, prosecutors, and police forces.
Unfortunately, those institutions have historically been among the weakest components of Latin American democracies. As a consequence, public perception has often turned against them.
Judicial systems generally suffer from low levels of public confidence throughout Latin America because they carry the burden of a major problem: impunity. By almost every global measure, the region experiences very high levels of impunity — that is, crimes are committed and never punished. In that context, public frustration is understandable.
What is the challenge? In many cases, unfortunately, the short-term pressures that characterize governments and public policy in Latin America often lead to the adoption of “super tough-on-crime” approaches that, rather than strengthening judicial authorities, end up weakening them.
As a result, we may achieve short-term gains, but in the medium term we fail to solve the problem. That is why I continue to insist on the need for a strong commitment to the professionalization of justice administration throughout our countries.
Diálogo: Coordination among state institutions is essential for achieving effective results. Based on your experience, where do these coordination mechanisms tend to fail, and what are the most urgent gaps governments should address?
Chinchilla: There are different models throughout Latin America regarding the organization of judicial systems, the institutional placement of prosecutors’ offices, and the structure of police forces.
Some countries have federal systems with multiple local police agencies, such as Mexico, while others have centralized police forces, such as Colombia. Therefore, it is difficult to offer a one-size-fits-all solution because institutional structures vary significantly.
That said, there is no doubt that management gaps exist between what police do, what prosecutors do, and what judges do. Many times, in the absence of a shared philosophy and integrated efforts through task-force models, the evidence gathered by police fails to translate into a judicial conviction.
That is when we see headlines in which the police say, “I arrested him, and the judge released him.”
These situations can be resolved. We should not accept them passively because there are successful examples.
Speaking from personal experience, during a security crisis that I confronted successfully from a public-policy perspective, the first thing I did was bring together police officers, prosecutors, and judges and tell them: “We are going to operate under a single philosophy, with common training and joint task forces.”
Instead of going to the media to criticize one another, we sat down together to improve coordination. That is a fundamental task if we want to increase effectiveness.
Diálogo: Looking beyond the national level, how is this challenge of coordination being addressed among countries in the region? And how effective are regional cooperation mechanisms today, particularly regarding intelligence sharing and judicial coordination?
Chinchilla: When we look at analyses of institutional resilience against organized crime, it is interesting to see that countries in our region are often recognized for the cooperation frameworks they have been able to design and approve.
However, one of the warnings is that while we have a solid legal framework and numerous cooperation agreements, there remains a significant implementation gap in practice.
So we return to the same question: Are we truly doing what is necessary in areas such as financial cooperation? Are financial authorities effectively monitoring, reporting, and sharing information to prevent money laundering?
Are police agencies sharing relevant information on cross-border movements? Are judges coordinating judicial cooperation to secure convictions?
That is where more work is needed. The good news is that the mechanisms already exist. What we need now are actions that bring judges, prosecutors, and police officers from different countries together to work collectively.
Diálogo: Within that same framework of cooperation, what role should international partners, including the United States, play in supporting regional efforts to strengthen democratic governance and security?
Chinchilla: The United States understood decades ago that this was a matter of national security. For that reason, over the last four decades it has developed cooperation mechanisms such as joint patrols, information sharing, and extradition agreements, among other measures. I could not say that, at least in the case of the United States, this responsibility has not been taken seriously.
Something similar has occurred with several European countries through joint patrol arrangements. In the Caribbean and parts of the Atlantic, for example, we see participation from countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and others. So there is already a significant foundation in place.
However, the facts demonstrate that it has not been enough. Organized crime continues to grow, international markets continue to consume drugs, and there remains a gap in effective demand-reduction and prevention policies.
In addition, the business continues to generate extremely high profits. Therefore, we also have unfinished work when it comes to reducing the financial gains of organized crime.
Diálogo: Finally, looking ahead, what should be Latin America’s top priorities for strengthening democratic governance and building a more resilient response to organized crime?
Chinchilla: Security, crime, and violence are, by nature, multidimensional phenomena. Therefore, the first thing I would emphasize is the need to design comprehensive responses that not only address risk factors through economic and social prevention policies, but also improve the effectiveness of police action and strengthen the role of the judiciary in prosecution and punishment.
Responses that focus exclusively on a single dimension generally do not endure over time.
If I were asked to identify the single most urgent priority, while still recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach, I would say that Latin America must address its levels of impunity through much more effective investment in building judicial institutions that, in coordination with police forces, are efficient, professional, and transparent.
