China’s growing influence in Latin America now extends into legal and political spheres, raising concerns about regulatory sovereignty and political infiltration.
Beijing’s tactics includes using legal cooperation agreements to influence judiciaries, applying pressure on issues of economic and political importance to China, and advocating for its authoritarian regulatory and technological frameworks. This includes backing digital surveillance that could strengthen authoritarianism and weaken the rule of law.
To enhance its institutional and diplomatic influence, China’s “soft power” strategy now includes engaging directly with key figures in Latin American judiciaries. For example, in April, the vice president of Brazil’s Supreme Court, Edson Fachin, met with a delegation of five judges from China’s Supreme People’s Court and other Chinese high courts, to discuss cooperation and the use of Chinese artificial intelligence in Brazil’s judicial system.
“There are many trials underway in Brazilian courts that could be expedited with the use of artificial intelligence. However, it’s very dangerous to think about using China’s because it’s not a democratic country and its judiciary is not independent,” Marcelo Batlouni Mendroni, a prosecutor at the São Paulo Court in Brazil, told Diálogo. “The risk is that search results will be biased in favor of Chinese interests in Brazil.”
China has a history of encouraging Latin American countries to change their regulations to better suit Chinese investors. This often means pushing for more favorable laws regarding concessions, special economic zones, and environmental regulations, among others. It’s notable that the first Brazil-China Legal Congress at Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice (STJ) last March covered not only artificial intelligence but also legal solutions for environmental damage, suggesting a link to China’s broader interests.
A common practice in Chinese contracts is the inclusion of international arbitration clauses, which bypass local courts for resolving disputes, instead using private tribunals. This strategy often leads to an imbalance in negotiations, allowing China to secure favorable terms such as the location of arbitration or the governing law. As a result, the ability of host countries to apply their own national legislation is limited. Notably, Chinese state-owned investors can initiate lawsuits if they perceive that new laws or regulations, even those in the public interest, harm their investments.
“The risks for Latin America are normalizing a brutal dictatorship as a reasonable actor and consolidating an opaque and very large economy as the region’s main trading partner. The asymmetry in size, coupled with opacity, means that short-term commercial benefits become growing institutional costs in the medium to long term,” Pedro Isern, executive director of the Center for the Study of Open Societies (CESCOS), an independent think tank based in Montevideo, Uruguay, told Diálogo.
Beyond their high costs, international arbitration processes favored in many Chinese contracts typically involve confidential and non-public proceedings. This lack of transparency reduces democratic control and the participation of civil society. A notable recent case is the arbitration initiated by the Chinese mining firm Junefield against Ecuador. Junefield demanded some $480 million, alleging indirect expropriation after gold mining operations in the Cuenca region were suspended following an appeal by indigenous communities asserting their right to prior consultation.
Political influence
By exerting pressure on the judiciary and the political system, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only protects its economic interests but also advances its political agenda. The case of Chinese citizen Zhifeng Tan illustrates this. Accused of fraud in China, he was arrested in Brazil in 2022 at China’s request. In 2024, Brazil’s Supreme Court initially denied his extradition, citing a “lack of transparency in respecting fundamental guarantees of his country,” particularly the risk of death penalty or life imprisonment, which are not legal in Brazil. However, in March 2025, Brazilian judges reconsidered and approved the man’s extradition, “in light of information that China’s criminal and procedural law has undergone profound reform,” according to the court’s website.
“The risk of Chinese authoritarian influence in our judicial system is also high, including extraditions. No one, apart from the CCP that controls it, really knows how the Chinese judicial system works,” Mendroni said.
To protect its own interests, Beijing also consistently engages with the political agendas of Latin American countries. For example, in August 2024, when the X platform was suspended in Brazil, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement emphasizing its “firm supports” for Latin American countries in “opposing external interference and defending sovereignty” against digital platforms that break national laws. Similarly, in October 2024, the Chinese Embassy in Brazil issued a statement on Brazil’s possible entry into the Belt and Road Initiative. The Embassy stated that “Brazil does not need others to come and dictate who it should cooperate with or what kind of partnerships it should enter into.”
“The dangers for the region are enormous because China will cease to be an exceptional trading partner and will begin to be a complicated political partner,” Isern said.
The CCP frequently invites Brazilian political parties and the Brazil-China parliamentary front to meetings, where the socialist development model with Chinese characteristics is highlighted favorable.
“The problem with Beijing has been clear over the last two decades: concrete short-term material benefits and vague long-term institutional and political costs. The central issue is that the long term has arrived. The long term always arrives,” Isern concluded.
