The expansion of China’s economic and political presence in Latin America has in recent years been accompanied by growing concerns about surveillance and intelligence activity, particularly in cyberspace. According to CrowdStricke’s 2025 Threat Landscape Report for Latin America, China-linked cyber actors were among the most active nation-state groups targeting the region, conducting operations against government institutions, telecommunications infrastructure, and strategic sectors.
For Laura Harth, director of the China in the World program at the Madrid-based human rights organization Safeguard Defenders, Beijing’s objective is to expand its strategic influence, weaken democratic alliances, and secure geopolitical advantages abroad, including in support of its claims over Taiwan, she told Diálogo.
According to Harth, one of the drivers of China’s intelligence activities abroad is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which experts say functions not only as an infrastructure and investment program but also as a vehicle for political influence and strategic positioning. Its technological component, the Digital Silk Road, includes telecommunications networks and digital infrastructure projects led by companies such as Huawei, which has been restricted or blacklisted in several countries over security concerns.
“The BRI is a clear example of Beijing’s use of supposed economic benefits to advance its political agenda,” Harth said. “One only has to look at the rapid succession of countries that joined the BRI and, almost simultaneously, shifted their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.”
Espionage networks as an ecosystem
In Latin America, China’s intelligence efforts rarely rely on isolated agents. Instead, analysts describe a complex ecosystem in which intelligence collection overlaps with diplomacy, economic activity, and political influence.
“Many of these activities are presented as people-to-people diplomacy and are often perceived as innocuous exchanges, when in fact they serve to build networks of information, relationships, and vectors of influence,” Harth says.
Human intelligence operations are also conducted through official diplomatic channels, including the network of Chinese military attachés stationed in embassies across the region. Analysts note that these officers are typically linked to the intelligence apparatus of the Chinese military.
According to research by British consulting firm Grey Dynamics, China’s intelligence strategy emphasizes “long-term access, elite penetration, and persistent information coverage,” rather than short-term tactical collection.
At the same time, China’s Ministry of State Security operates in the region both under diplomatic cover and through so called non-official cover (NOC), including businesspeople, consultants, researchers, and academics.
Concerns about political influence surfaced in December 2024, when Paraguay revoked the visa of Chinese diplomat Xu Wei, who had traveled to the country for a conference. Paraguayan authorities accused him of interfering in domestic affairs after he reportedly urged lawmakers to reconsider Paraguay’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.
Mapping the territory and dual scientific-military use
Scientific expeditions can also have strategic implications. In early 2026, a joint China-Chile deep-sea mission explored the Atacama Trench, one of the deepest areas of the Pacific Ocean and a known strategic location. The Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao participated in the expedition, deploying the deep-sea submersible Fendouzhe, capable of descending beyond 10,000 meters.
While presented as scientific research, deep sea exploration can generate highly valuable geospatial and oceanographic data. Detailed seabed mapping, for example, can help identify and analyze infrastructure such as submarine cables, which are critical to global communications.
Similar dual-use concerns have been raised about Chinese naval deployments in the region. In early 2026, the Chinese hospital ship Silk Road Ark visited several countries in Latin America as part of a medical outreach mission. When the vessel arrived off Valparaíso, however, Chilean authorities refused authorization for it to treat local residents onboard, citing national health regulations requiring medical personnel to be accredited in the country. The decision came amid heightened scrutiny of China’s strategic activities in the region.
Although such deployments are officially framed as medical diplomacy, security analysts note that Chinese naval vessels often carry advanced communications equipment and sensors, raising questions about intelligence-gathering capabilities.
Technological intelligence and information dominance
China has also expanded its military capacity for information and space-based intelligence. In April 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) established the Information Support Force (ISF), a new branch designed to integrate cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities.
The ISF plays a central role in China’s concept of “informationized warfare,” integrating data from satellites, signal intelligence, and cyber operations into military decision-making.
A recent report by the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party identified at least 11 Chinese-linked space facilities in Latin America, including sites in Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Brazil. These installations, which include ground stations and astronomical observatories, are formally presented as civilian, but experts contend that they form an extensive network of dual-use space infrastructure linked to Chinese military entities and are used to collect adversary intelligence and strengthen the PLA’s war-fighting capabilities.
Among the most debated cases is the Chinese-operated deep-space tracking station in Neuquén, Argentina. While formally presented as a civilian lunar exploration facility, it is operated by a PLA-linked organization and has generated persistent scrutiny among analysts due to the agreement granting China long-term operational control and the limited oversight exercised by Argentine authorities, among other issues.
Satellite imagery analysis has also identified sites in Cuba — particularly in areas such as Bejucal and Calabaza — that experts say could be used to intercept communications from the region.
Economic espionage
Another dimension of concern involves economic and technological intelligence.
China’s National Intelligence Law obliges organizations and citizens to support and cooperate with state intelligence work when requested. Security analysts say this legal framework creates pathways for intelligence collection through companies, research partnerships, and technology providers.
Cybersecurity experts have also raised concerns about vulnerabilities associated with digital infrastructure. Port management software, logistics platforms, and automation systems — such as those used in major regional ports including Chancay in Peru and Santos in Brazil — can generate large volumes of trade and operational data with strategic value.
Cyber espionage is another vector. In recent years, security researchers have documented long-running cyber campaigns carried out by Chinese state-sponsored groups targeting telecommunications operators and government entities worldwide. Some operations have relied on sophisticated malware such as GRIDTIDE and have exploited legitimate cloud service to maintain persistent access to compromised systems.
Digital recruitment also represents a growing concern. Intelligence agencies in several countries have warned that professional networking platforms such as LinkedIn can be used to identify and approach employees in sensitive sectors, often under the pretext of consulting or market research in exchange for financial compensation.
A “whole-of-society” model
China’s intelligence operations are also intertwined with the activities of the United Front, a political influence apparatus that Chinese leader Xi Jinping described as a “magic weapon” of the Communist Party.
Experts describe Beijing’s approach as a “whole-of-society” model. “In addition to traditional forms of espionage, China adopts a model in which every interaction can become a vector for information gathering, influence, or future coercion,” Harth says.
The United Front works through diaspora associations, chambers of commerce, cultural organizations, and academic networks. Through these relationships it seeks to cultivate connections with political leaders, business elites, media organizations, and universities.
Analysts say such networks can also facilitate monitoring of Chinese diaspora communities abroad and pressure on dissidents or activists critical of Beijing.
Safeguard Defenders has reported the presence of Chinese overseas police stations in several parts of the world including Latin America. According to the organization, at least 14 such offices have been identified across eight countries in the region, including Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. Although formally presented as administrative service centers for Chinese nationals, investigations indicate that these stations are used to monitor diaspora communities abroad, collect information, and support broader intelligence-gathering activities.
“This is not something that happens only at the highest levels of power, but extends to all areas — political, economic, security, scientific, academic, and cultural. It is a slow and covert erosion of a country’s sovereignty and its capacity for independent decision-making, which any nation should reject,” concludes Harth.
