Armed and security forces in Latin America increasingly rely on drones as innovative and powerful tools in the fight against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). As these criminal groups adopt advanced technology to perpetrate crimes, control of airspace has become a decisive factor in counternarcotics and counter-TCO operations.
Colombia: At the forefront of technological response
In October 2025, the Colombian National Army marked a milestone by activating Latin America’s first Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Battalion, headquartered in the Boyacá department. The battalion comprises four specialized companies with distinct missions and capabilities, integrating a highly autonomous and efficient surveillance system.
According to German broadcaster DW, the Colombian Army’s drones use artificial intelligence and can launch aerial attacks against organizations involved in both drug trafficking and illegal mining.
“Armed groups and criminal organizations use UAVs for surveillance, attack, and operational coordination,” Ángel Rojo, an Argentine analyst in strategic military air systems, told Diálogo. Rojo warns that this technology “changes the tactical balance, favoring irregular, decentralized conflict scenarios with increasing prominence.”
The threat is not new. Dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who rejected the 2016 peace agreement have used homemade drones to launch explosives against security forces. In 2025 alone, there have been more than 350 attacks, leaving 15 dead and 170 wounded, DW reported.
“What was once a symbol of technological modernity is now part of the everyday repertoire of armed groups in different regions of the world, including Latin America, which are adapting them with surprising speed,” Rojo said.
The FARC’s first experiments with commercial drones date back to the early 2010s, when they were used to monitor coca crops and conduct reconnaissance missions over military camps and river routes. “Over time, some units were adapted to launch grenades or homemade explosives. The objective was simple: to generate surprise, disorganize the enemy, and demonstrate territorial control,” Rojo noted. “After the peace process, these tactics migrated to dissidents and criminal gangs, consolidating drones as part of the toolbox of organized crime.”
Regional state adaptation
The deployment of state-owned drones is expanding rapidly across the region. In Peru, the National Police successfully dismantled a criminal gang in Lima in November 2025. The deployment of intelligence drones was crucial in identifying and tracking suspects during their escape, facilitating police intervention and leading to arrests.
In Argentina, the Federal Security Forces incorporated 69 cutting-edge drones in September 2025, to reinforce aerial surveillance and strengthen the fight against organized crime. This equipment — outfitted with thermal cameras, high-precision zoom, and real-time transmission — will be used for border control, detecting illegal crossings, and criminal investigations, thereby extending operational range and reducing risk to personnel.
That same month, in Ecuador, the Air Force launched the Rayo Justiciero (Vengeful Lightning) drone squadron, dedicated to aerial surveillance in critical areas dominated by drug trafficking and mafias. These unmanned aircraft patrol clandestine airstrips, monitor illegal mining, and identify routes used by organized crime.
Drones: Weapons of organized crime
Technological sophistication has also been aggressively exploited by organized crime, led primarily by Mexican cartels.
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), for example, operates a dedicated “Drone Operators” unit and has been responsible for pioneering attacks, including the first confirmed use of First-Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones in the region in early 2025. Between 2022 and mid-2023, the Mexican Ministry of Defense reported over 493 cartel drone attacks, primarily against rival groups.
Meanwhile, in Brazil, in late October 2025, the Red Command criminal group used drones to launch explosives at police during a large anti-gang operation in Rio de Janeiro.
“These are not large UAVs, but small devices that fly to their target and explode, sending a clear message: We can reach what was previously inaccessible,” explains Rojo. For the analyst, the drone has become a symbol of a “new war: fragmented, irregular, and increasingly aerial.”
Drones serve dual functions: tactical (monitoring police, coordinating ambushes, transporting illicit cargo) and symbolic (disseminating audiovisual material demonstrating territorial control). Their proliferation is due to their efficiency and low cost; for a fraction of the price of a conventional weapon, gangs can carry out precision attacks and gather intelligence, all without exposing their members to direct combat.
The Venezuelan terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA) also uses drone technology, primarily for surveillance and smuggling across the multiple borders where its network operates. Authorities in countries like Colombia and Peru have documented the gang using drones for monitoring rival groups and police movements in border areas and specific urban centers where they run extortion rings and human trafficking operations.
The future of conflict
For Rojo, the state’s response must move beyond reactive anti-drone systems and electronic interference. “Territorial control requires continuous intelligence, specialized police training, and clear legal frameworks.”
According to the analyst, “Latin America is facing a new phase of internal conflicts: that of territorial control assisted by affordable technology.” At this stage, the state needs more intelligence than brute force, to anticipate criminal adaptation, build a sustained presence, and reclaim airspace as part of urban control.
“In Latin America, the sky is no longer neutral; it is also a battlefield,” Rojo concludes.
