With a population of more than 18 million, the largest economy in Central America, and a strategic location between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Guatemala occupies a unique position in the region. As the country modernizes its port, digital, and technological infrastructure, Chinese companies and technologies have expanded their presence across multiple sectors. This has prompted broader discussions about how to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen digital resilience, and avoid technological dependencies that could affect national security and the state’s ability to make independent strategic decisions.
Guatemala also holds particular strategic value for Beijing as Taiwan’s principal diplomatic ally in Central America and one of the few countries in the world that continues to officially recognize Taipei. “If China were to change Guatemala’s diplomatic position, it would not only gain another country recognizing the ‘One China’ principle, but also strengthen its political presence in a region that has historically been closely linked to the United States,” Juan Manuel Aguilar, a research professor at the Faculty of Higher Studies Aragón at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), told Diálogo.
According to experts, Guatemala is only the tip of the iceberg in a broader regional strategy through which China is expanding its presence in Central America and the Caribbean through investments in telecommunications, ports, digital infrastructure, and technology training programs. The objective extends beyond commercial expansion and could also facilitate access to data, critical infrastructure, supply chains, and decision-making processes, thereby expanding Beijing’s geopolitical influence throughout the region.
Against this backdrop, analysts are increasingly focused on so-called dual-use infrastructure. Although these projects are typically presented as commercial or civilian initiatives, infrastructure such as ports, telecommunications networks, digital platforms, and data storage systems can also perform functions that are critical to the operation of the state. “The primary risk is that they could be used for strategic, logistical, or intelligence purposes,” Aguilar said.
The Huawei case
Huawei has established itself as one of the leading Chinese technology providers in Latin America, with a presence in telecommunications, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), data storage, and training programs. In Honduras, Huawei stated in 2019 that it supplied approximately 70 percent of the country’s telecommunications equipment, according to a report by the Central American think tank Expediente Abierto. The report argues that Huawei’s extensive presence in 3G and 4G networks subsequently facilitated the transition to 5G within the same technological ecosystem. In Panama, the company has participated in smart city and video surveillance projects, while in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic it has expanded through mobile networks, cloud services, and training programs.
In Guatemala, where there are no diplomatic relations with Beijing, Huawei’s role has become even more significant. “Unlike other countries in the region where China’s influence is supported by formal diplomatic relations, in Guatemala Huawei has acted as a kind of technological and institutional bridge,” Aguilar said.
Huawei has also expanded its presence in both the private and public sectors. The company partners with Guatemala’s Technical Training and Productivity Institute (INTECAP) through the Huawei ICT Academy to train professionals in 5G, cloud computing, cybersecurity, AI, and big data. In 2025, Guatemala’s Social Security Institute (IGSS) canceled a procurement process for a data backup and recovery system offered by a Huawei technology distributor, reigniting debate over the use of foreign technologies in systems that manage sensitive government data.
“When a company begins influencing training, professional certification, and technology adoption processes, it also indirectly influences how a country develops its future digital capabilities,” Aguilar observed.
Ports, logistics, and data
At the same time, Chinese companies have expanded their participation in port and logistics projects across Latin America by supplying specialized equipment and infrastructure linked to maritime trade.
In Panama, Chinese companies have strengthened their presence around infrastructure associated with the Panama Canal. In El Salvador, they have expressed interest in the Port of La Unión and special economic zones on the Pacific coast, while in the Caribbean Beijing has financed or contributed to the modernization of port infrastructure in Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago.
In Guatemala, in 2024, the Chinese company ZPMC supplied four mobile straddle carriers to the Port of Santo Tomás de Castilla, equipped with remote diagnostic and digital monitoring systems. Private operators also use cranes and scanners manufactured by the same company, while Hikvision maintains a presence in Guatemala’s commercial video surveillance market.
For analysts, the challenge is not limited to who manufactures or supplies the infrastructure, but also to the strategic information these systems generate and manage. Ports, logistics networks, digital platforms, and telecommunications systems produce large volumes of operational data whose access, protection, and governance have become increasingly strategic. “When a foreign power participates in port infrastructure, logistics, telecommunications, or related digital systems, it also gains potential access to information about trade flows, cargo movements, logistical patterns, and the operation of supply chains,” Aguilar said.
The cyber dimension
If ports, telecommunications, and logistics represent the physical dimension of China’s expanding technological presence, cyberspace is its least visible front.
In April 2025, during a joint review conducted by Guatemalan authorities and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), activity attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group APT15 — also known as Nickel, Ke3Chang, Vixen Panda, or Nylon Typhoon — was identified in the systems of Guatemala’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Guatemalan authorities later reported that the intrusion is believed to have occurred in 2022.
According to Aguilar, the significance of the incident extends far beyond the intrusion itself.
“Traditionally, espionage focused on obtaining classified documents or specific secrets. Today we are seeing a transition toward a data-centric model. The objective is no longer simply to steal sensitive information, but to build a comprehensive digital picture of how a state functions.”
In this model of espionage, every compromised database, network, or system contributes to building a detailed map of government institutions and critical infrastructure.
“The fundamental question for Guatemala is not simply who gained access to a government network, but what cumulative knowledge may have been obtained about the functioning of the Guatemalan state as a whole,” Aguilar said.
The case of Guatemala illustrates how the growing presence of Chinese companies and technologies in strategic sectors across Latin America has intensified debate over the security of critical infrastructure, digital sovereignty, and control of data. According to experts, the challenge is to ensure that technological modernization does not create dependencies that could undermine states’ ability to protect their strategic interests.
