Venezuela’s recent diplomatic realignment with the United States has forced Russia and Iran — along with longtime regional ally Cuba — to reposition their influence operations after losing one of their most important footholds in Latin America. Today, however, these campaigns have become increasingly more sophisticated and harder to counter than in the past. Their objective is no longer limited to shaping public opinion — they also seek to manipulate the algorithms that drive search engines, social media platforms, and even AI-powered chatbots, dramatically amplifying their reach and impact.
One example of this is the so-called Pravda network, an ecosystem of automated propaganda linked to the Kremlin. Following Nicolás Maduro’s arrest, the network flooded the internet with hundreds of articles and social media posts distributed through Telegram channels and Russian state media. The content pushed coordinated narratives portraying the situation as a “coup d’état” and warning of global destabilization.
The Pravda network relies on aggressive search engine optimization (SEO) tactics — extreme content manipulation designed to push material to the top of online search results — combined with machine translations and the mass reposting of articles. Through hundreds of nearly identical websites, the network relentlessly repeats the same keywords, headlines, and links, creating the illusion that certain narratives are broadly accepted and credible.
An interconnected ecosystem
The technological infrastructure developed by Russia could also be leveraged by Iran and Cuba, which for years have shared with Moscow — including in Venezuela — an information ecosystem primarily aimed at undermining the West. “It is a unique and coherent ecosystem that reflects an underlying ideological vision of strategic alignment among the regimes funding these media operations,” Emanuele Ottolenghi, senior fellow at the Center for Research of Terror Financing (CENTEF), told Diálogo.
A central player in this strategy is the Iranian television channel HispanTV, which maintains a permanent correspondent in Venezuela and consistently portrays Cuba, Iran, and Russia as defenders of human rights and regional stability. HispanTV regularly exchanges journalists and content with Russian state outlets RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo, both widely consumed in Venezuela, often featuring the same analysts and commentators.
The media convergence also extends to Cuba. Granma, the official newspaper of the communist Cuban regime, has described RT and HispanTV — both accessible on the island — as part of a “trinity of alternative news outlets.” At the same time, Cubadebate and other Cuban state media routinely reproduce and amplify articles, videos, and narratives originating from Russian and Iranian outlets.
In this environment, diplomatic activity also takes on a strong propagandistic dimension. In March, according to reporting by Venezuelan fact-checking organization Cazadores de Fake News and other regional outlets, Iranian Ambassador to Venezuela Ali Chegeni participated in a local radio program that included rhetoric encouraging the assassination of U.S. President Donald Trump. The episode underscored how these influence networks extend beyond online messaging and can contribute to the radicalization of local audiences.
Russian propaganda
Venezuela represents one of the clearest examples of Russia’s information warfare strategy in Latin America. A report from research organization Digital News Association released in April detailed a Russian influence campaign operating across eight countries in the region, including Venezuela. According to the report, more than a thousand influencers, journalists, and content creators — about 30 of them Venezuelan — were trained through RT en Español’s “RTCompaRTE” program. Under the guise of providing instruction in digital communication and social media management, the initiative promoted pro-Russian narratives.
“The Kremlin doesn’t broadcast propaganda to Latin America. The factory is there,” Jeffrey Scott Shapiro, one of the report’s authors, said.
What makes the strategy particularly effective is that Russian narratives are not spread exclusively through official Kremlin-linked outlets, but also through seemingly independent Latin American voices. This allows the messaging to appear organic and locally driven, increasing its credibility among regional audiences.
The network also reportedly operated at least 16 websites designed to imitate established news organizations, reinforcing the credibility of the content being disseminated. The narratives often focused on sensitive topics such as anti-colonialism, migration crises, and international conflicts. According to researchers, the objective is not simply to persuade audiences of a particular version of events, but also to sow confusion, deepen polarization, and erode trust in traditional institutions through conspiracy theories, false equivalencies, and selective reporting.
Iranian networks
Alongside Russian propaganda, Iran has steadily expanded its own influence network in Latin America, combining cultural outreach, diplomatic engagement, and ties to local structures. Supported by a Shiite diaspora of some 300,000 Lebanese descendants, Tehran has built a network of embassies and cultural centers throughout Venezuela and the region, interconnected through Al-Mustafa University, founded in Qom, Iran, in 1979.
With campuses in Caracas and Bogotá, Colombia, the university extends beyond academic activities and offering courses across Latin America, including Cuba. “Al-Mustafa continues to spread Iranian ideology and cooperate with universities, organizing events, recruiting new members, and promoting Islamic studies, which then become a tool for indoctrination,” Ottolenghi said.
One of the institutions associated with the university, the Eastern Islamic Cultural Institute (Instituto Cultural Islam Oriente), is led by Mohsen Rabbani, whom Argentine authorities consider the mastermind behind the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 attack against the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in 1994, which killed 114 people and wounded hundreds more.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Al-Mustafa University in 2020, followed later by Canada. According to Treasury, the institution “serves as an international recruitment network for the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” which oversees Iranian terrorist operations abroad.
“Al-Mustafa also serves as logistical support for potential intelligence and terrorist operations driven by the Iranian regime, as seen in the case of the failed assassination attempt against Israeli Ambassador Einat Kranz Neiger in Mexico City,” Ottolenghi said.
According to U.S. and Israeli officials, the 2025 plot was coordinated from the Iranian Embassy in Caracas and involved Hassan Izadi, a former Iranian diplomat in Venezuela and senior operative tied to Unit 11000, a covert branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps under the direct control of the Quds Force. Israeli intelligence identified the unit and its commander, Sardar Ammar, as part of a global network linked to terrorist operations. According to Infobae, the network’s operations in Venezuela are overseen by Ahmad Asadzadeh Goljahi.
The presence of these networks represents a threat that extends beyond Venezuela. “For several years now, we have seen how Iran increasingly relies on local organized crime to carry out attacks. It has happened in Europe, North America, Asia, and also in Latin America,” Ottolenghi said. Although many of these plots were thwarted — evidence, according to the expert, of weaknesses in Iranian operational capabilities — the motivation to retaliate for the deaths of senior Iranian leaders continues to create incentives for attacks against U.S. or allied targets in the region.
As for Iran’s main proxy, Hezbollah, Ottolenghi noted that “the Chávez and Maduro regimes sold passports for years to citizens from the Middle East, some of whom were linked to Hezbollah’s illicit activities.” According to the expert, individuals holding Venezuelan documents could continue moving throughout the hemisphere with relative ease even after leaving the country.
Countering these threats requires closer international cooperation and a multidimensional security approach that integrates intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, counter-disinformation efforts, financial tracking, and coordinated action against transnational criminal networks. It also demands stronger capabilities to identify foreign influence operations, monitor digital propaganda ecosystems, detect document fraud and illicit travel facilitation, and disrupt the operational links between hostile state actors, extremist organizations, and organized crime.
