China’s footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean is becoming increasingly sophisticated, moving beyond traditional infrastructure projects into areas of political influence, elite capture, ideological positioning, and institutional penetration. In this second part of our interview, Vladimir Rouvinski, director of the Laboratory of Politics and International Relations (PoInt) at Icesi University, explains how Beijing is transitioning from hard infrastructure to soft persuasion — and, increasingly, to sharp and coercive power.
As Rouvinski explains, this shift is about how power is exercised, and Latin America and the Caribbean need to understand what’s truly at stake.
Diálogo: You’ve distinguished between soft, sharp, and hard power, and noted that China has largely relied on soft power in Latin America. Do you see a shift toward sharper or more coercive influence as global tensions rise?
Vladimir Rouvinski, director of the Laboratory of Politics and International Relations at Icesi University: Yes, we’re seeing China move toward a more precise use of sharp power. For instance, China is now investing in the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), which is deeply concerning because universities shape future elites. Young people who attend these institutions will soon become the political and business elites, and they’re being exposed to narratives aligned with Beijing’s interests. As a professor myself, I understand the weight of that influence, and what will happen is that they will be brainwashed by China through this kind of campaigns.
China also exploits existing vulnerabilities, particularly where it can operate without being questioned. It shapes the public opinion through the media, using soft power tools like all-expenses-paid trips for journalists. These trips often include luxury accommodations, entertainment, and highly curated exposure to China. Naturally, those journalists return with favorable impressions and that narrative is then passed on to their audiences.
We’re also seeing growing involvement in political processes. China sends election observers to Latin America, particularly to countries with doubtful electoral transparency. A striking example is Venezuela, where Chinese observers endorsed elections widely considered unfair, lending legitimacy to authoritarian regimes and reinforces China’s geopolitical influence.
Diálogo: Given China’s deep relationships and economic dependencies in the region, at what point does soft power become more coercive? Can we distinguish between sharp power and more overtly coercive strategies once China is entrenched in a country’s economy?
Rouvinski: Exactly. Joseph Nye’s classic definition of soft power is when a country attracts others through its values, culture, or policies, without resorting to force or coercion. Other nations look up to it, want to emulate its success, and adopt similar models. China has managed to project itself this way, largely because many people still don’t fully understand how China actually operates. It’s positioned itself as an alternative to Western powers.
However, sharp power is something entirely different. It’s when an authoritarian regime exploits the vulnerabilities inherent to democratic systems. For example, if freely elected governments are pressured or blackmailed by China due to economic dependencies — as seen with Brazil and elsewhere — that’s sharp power. It’s not about attraction; it’s through pressure, used to align governments with China’s strategic interests.
Diálogo: China’s foreign policy has shifted from the infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to new values-driven global initiatives like the Global Development, the Global Security, and the Global Civilization initiatives. How do these reflect China’s evolving strategic priorities and are they designed to promote authoritarian norms?
Rouvinski: I think we need to differentiate between Beijing’s narratives and real politics. In many cases, what we see is a way of camouflaging China’s true intentions. Publicly, China presents itself as a new global leader, speaking of peaceful cooperation, mutual respect, and non-interference. But in practice, China’s goal is to align governments with its discourse and strategic interests; non-compliance risks losing access to Chinese resources. So, what we’re really seeing is Beijing’s attempt to impose a different set of values and standards, redefining what is right and wrong to suit its own agenda.
Diálogo: Do you think China launched these new initiatives because earlier efforts, like the BRI, are losing momentum?
Rouvinski: Yes, this is a good example of “nation branding.” The BRI became a global brand that China successfully marketed. That’s why countries like Colombia expressed interest. However, China is now moving away from that specific label or introducing new narratives. For example, they’re now positioning themselves as the world leader in clean energy. China has been quite successful at managing this nation brand, and we could see something similar happening in the future.
Diálogo: Considering China’s expanding influence, growing scrutiny, strategic infrastructure investments, and shifting power dynamics, what are your main concerns about its future in Latin America and the Caribbean? What should countries of the region be mindful of?
Rouvinski: The main risk is that over the past 20 years, China has managed to establish very deep relationships of interdependence, and in some cases, outright dependency, with countries in Latin America. It would be extremely difficult for many of these countries to break away or replace these ties. This is one of the risks. China is fully aware of these dependencies.
Diálogo: To end this conversation, I’d like to focus on a region that’s often left out: the Caribbean. China has significantly expanded its influence there. What are the consequences, and how strategically important is the Caribbean to China’s broader geopolitical ambitions?
Rouvinski: The Caribbean is of strategic interest to China. China does what it does best: It operates in the shadows, with very little public scrutiny. Many outside the region are unaware of China’s growing presence. There’s significant financial offshoring happening there. A tangible outcome of China’s involvement is that it now feels very comfortable operating in the region, understanding of how things work, and how to engage with local elites and businesses. That’s one of the biggest risks: China can expand its presence at any moment.
