In recent years, China has accelerated its expansion in Latin America’s biotechnology sector, investing in production facilities, laboratories, genetic sequencing technologies, and partnerships with local institutions. From vaccines to genomics, China’s presence is reaching strategic sectors that are critical not only to public health, but also to scientific research, technological capabilities, and the national security of countries across the region.
While these investments are often presented as a solution to gaps in production and technological capacity, particularly in more fragile health systems, they also risk creating dependencies that are difficult to reverse when strategic technologies, supplies, or infrastructure become concentrated among Chinese providers or reliant on supply chains linked to China.
“Access to genetic data, biological samples, research infrastructure, and specialized knowledge can have security implications, especially in countries with weak regulations on biosafety, data protection, and technology transfer,” César Santos Victoria, a researcher at Central American think tank Expediente Abierto who specializes in Chinese influence in Latin America, told Diálogo.
The risk is particularly significant because biotechnology depends on resources and capabilities that take years to develop, such as genetic data and research infrastructure, and that cannot easily be replaced. Dependence on Chinese providers can create market concentrations that are difficult to reverse, increase Latin American countries’ vulnerability to China, and give Beijing a strategic position in sensitive sectors such as health care, scientific research, and national security.
From vaccine supply to local production
The vaccine sector represents one of the most sensitive areas of China’s biotechnology expansion. Chinese biotechnology companies are increasingly seeking to establish large-scale, competitively priced local production in Latin America, bringing manufacturing facilities closer to consumer markets and reducing supply times and costs. While this may offer advantages to countries in the region in terms of health security and access to essential medicines, it also risks progressively consolidating Chinese companies as key suppliers. Large-scale production capabilities, competitive prices, and long-term government contracts can make it more difficult for other competitors to enter the market and for countries to diversify their sources of supply, creating strategic dependence.
As Santos Victoria warns, “Local production does not necessarily mean autonomy. A plant established in Latin America may continue to depend on China for active ingredients, equipment, reagents, maintenance, financing, or training. The risk is creating production ecosystems that are difficult to replace.”
Among the companies expanding the most is Sinovac Biotech, which announced in June plans to invest $100 million in Brazil over the next five years to establish a local operation focused on vaccines and other areas of biotechnology, including cell therapies and monoclonal antibodies.
The project initially includes vaccines against human rabies and chickenpox through an agreement with the Paraná Institute of Technology. In Colombia, Sinovac Biotech established a public-private partnership with the Bogotá city government and BogotáBio, which plans to begin producing vaccines in 2029. In Chile, meanwhile, Sinovac secured the government contract for influenza vaccines for the second consecutive year, winning exclusive rights for 2026 with an order of more than 8 million doses.
The COVID-19 pandemic showed how Beijing sought to use its production and distribution capacity as a tool of geopolitical influence, using vaccine distribution in Latin America to strengthen political and diplomatic ties through what became known as “vaccine diplomacy.” With production established directly in the region, the concentration of supply among Chinese providers could take on a more lasting dimension: a dominant position in the supply of essential vaccines risks creating structural dependence within local health systems and increasing Beijing’s ability to exert influence over a critical sector during periods of crisis or geopolitical tension.
China’s race for Latin American biodata
China’s biotechnology expansion in Latin America is also extending into genetic sequencing, a strategic sector because it enables the collection of highly sensitive and permanent information not only about individuals, but also about their relatives and, on a larger scale, the genetic characteristics of entire populations. Control over such information can have long-term implications for pharmaceutical research, precision medicine, and the development of new biological technologies.
In 2024, Chinese company MGI Tech Co. opened its main Latin American center in São Paulo, with the goal of expanding the use of genetic sequencing in diagnostics and the fight against cancer, while providing technology and training to laboratories, hospitals, and universities. Applications include precision medicine and oncology. The company also operates in Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. That same year in Uruguay, BGI Genomics opened its first Latin American laboratory, dedicated to genetic sequencing and early diagnosis, with a planned investment of $10 million over five years.
BGI’s presence took on an additional security dimension in June 2026, when the U.S. Department of Defense included BGI Group and BGI Genomics on its list of Chinese military companies under Section 1260H. The Pentagon maintains that BGI Group is affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army and contributes to China’s military-civil fusion system.
Large-scale access to genetic and clinical data can strengthen China’s position in the development of medicines and therapies, increasing its market concentration and other countries’ dependence on its technologies. As occurred with vaccines during the pandemic, China could use this dependence as a tool of geopolitical influence. “China’s approach has been to steal, scale, and strangle competitors,” Caitlin Frazer, executive director of the U.S. National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB), told industry publication BioSpace. Frazer also warned of the risks of depending on Beijing “for life-sustaining medications.”
Artificial intelligence further amplifies this risk: Combined with vast quantities of biodata, it can more rapidly identify biological correlations, design proteins, identify new therapeutic targets, and accelerate drug development. If agreements do not clearly establish where data is stored, who can access it, and how it can be used in subsequent research, biodata generated in Latin America could become a strategic resource for outside companies or research centers without the region necessarily retaining control over it or benefiting from its economic and strategic value.
“In joint projects, it must be clearly established who controls the patents, the data, the research results, and their subsequent commercialization,” Santos Victoria said. The expert warns of the risk of “asymmetries in negotiations” with countries in the region, including opaque contracts and unbalanced negotiating terms that favor Chinese partners, leaving Latin American universities and health institutions in a weaker position when it comes to controlling data, research results, patents, and their subsequent commercialization.
Defending biotechnology autonomy
Countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Chile have already adopted measures to protect genetic data, biological samples, and genetic resources. In Brazil, the General Data Protection Law (LGPD) classifies genetic data as sensitive personal data, while the Biodiversity Law regulates access to genetic resources and benefit sharing. In 2023, Colombia created a National Biobank System that regulates informed consent, confidentiality, and the traceability of genetic samples and data, and establishes specific authorizations for their transfer abroad. Chile, meanwhile, has had specific regulations governing scientific research and the human genome since 2006. These regulations protect genetic identity, classify genetic information as confidential, require consent for its use, and mandate encryption of identifiable genomic data.
These regulations provide an important foundation, but experts say they increasingly need to be integrated into national security plans that assess the risks associated with control over research infrastructure, biological resources, intellectual property, and technologies with dual-use potential. At the same time, stricter standards are needed for the collection, storage, and transfer of biodata, along with traceability, cybersecurity, and biosafety systems capable of preventing unauthorized access and uses that conflict with national interests. Finally, mapping supply chains, identifying bottlenecks, and maintaining alternative suppliers should be considered an integral part of national security planning, rather than solely a matter of industrial policy.
A regional response is also important. Common standards, reference laboratories, surveillance capabilities, and shared procedures for assessing investments can strengthen Latin American countries’ ability to protect strategic infrastructure and resources. Knowing where sensitive data is stored, who can access it, who maintains technological platforms, and what alternatives are available if a supplier is disrupted is also part of that resilience. For Latin America, maintaining control over biodata, biological resources, infrastructure, and technologies means safeguarding not only its competitiveness, but also its autonomy and national security.
