China is intensifying its influence strategy in the Caribbean through a combination of diplomacy, investments, media cooperation, and information campaigns aimed at expanding its strategic presence in the region. According to experts, Beijing is using journalism training programs, content-sharing agreements, ties with local media outlets, and in some cases even coercive practices to promote narratives favorable to its geopolitical interests, reduce scrutiny of its strategic projects, and consolidate support for key positions such as the One China principle.
Analysts warn that this strategy goes beyond the media sphere. In a region where China has expanded its economic presence through infrastructure, ports, and telecommunications, Beijing’s growing weight within the information ecosystem is raising concerns about transparency, press independence, and the ability of Caribbean countries to preserve information spaces free from authoritarian influence.
In a March 2026 report, Reporters Without Borders (RSF), examined Chinese media influence efforts in the Caribbean, including government-funded press trips and training programs involving Caribbean journalists. The report described visits to Beijing during which reporters were exposed to content aligned with the official narrative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, in some cases, temporarily deprived of their passports.
“China is one of the world’s most repressive countries for press freedom, and these initiatives risk transforming local independent media into instruments of foreign propaganda,” RSF warns.
According to RSF’s 2026 World Press Freedom Index, China ranks 178th out of 180 countries and is described as “the world’s largest prison for journalists.”
Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation
The Caribbean represents a strategic region for China, both because of its strategic position in the hemisphere and because it is home to some of Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic allies, including Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Expanding its influence in the region allows Beijing not only to increase its economic and geopolitical weight, but also to diplomatically isolate Taiwan.
One of the most visible examples is Grenada, considered alongside Jamaica, Guyana, and Cuba among the Caribbean countries most exposed to Chinese soft power. Beijing is exploiting vulnerabilities within the local media system, such as lack of funding, low salaries, and limited professional training opportunities for journalists, to expand its influence through training programs in China. According to RSF, nearly 90 percent of Grenadian journalists participated in these types of courses, described by some participants as tools of propaganda and indoctrination.
“Local newsrooms are also under pressure to publish ready-made editorials and articles produced by Chinese authorities, often without independent editorial oversight,” Aleksandra Bielakowska, Head of Asia-Pacific Advocacy at RSF, told Diálogo.
This strategy has coincided with stronger political ties between Beijing and several Caribbean governments. Grenadian Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell was the first foreign leader received by Xi Jinping in 2025. During the meeting, widely covered by local media, Mitchell reiterated Grenada’s “firm commitment” to the One China principle, which considers Taiwan an integral part of Chinese territory, and also called for “respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
After severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2005, Grenada has seen a significant increase in Chinese investment. During the prime minister’s visit to Beijing, the Chinese government announced $13.8 million in new investments for economic and technical cooperation with the island.
The Dominican Republic also experienced a sharp increase in Chinese media presence after breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2018 to officially recognize Beijing. Since then, Chinese television programming, content-sharing agreements, and training initiatives for local journalists have increased.
“Through this approach, China is effectively exporting an authoritarian model of information control that undermines the principles of independent journalism and, more broadly, democratic values,” Bielakowska said.
Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative
The importance Beijing places on the information sphere also became evident with the creation in 2019 of the “Belt and Road Journalists Forum,” launched within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, the global project launched in 2013 through which China finances infrastructure, ports, and telecommunications projects to expand its international influence.
The network, led by the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP, also includes media outlets and journalists from the Caribbean with the stated objective of promoting “positive coverage” of the initiative. Through forums, seminars, and training trips, Beijing has built a local network of communicators favorable to its geopolitical agenda.
This favorable information ecosystem also accompanies China’s broader economic and strategic expansion in the region. In Jamaica, for example, the government granted the state-owned China Harbour Engineering Company a 50-year concession after it financed the North-South Highway connecting the capital Kingston to Ocho Rios on the northern coast in 2016 for $730 million. China also expanded its presence in port and logistics infrastructure through concession agreements and operations linked to the Port of Kingston.
According to analysts, the promotion of positive narratives surrounding Chinese cooperation helps reduce public and political scrutiny over Beijing’s strategic projects, critical infrastructure, and investments in the region.
At the same time, Chinese state media content has expanded its presence within the regional information ecosystem. CGTN provides programming to Dominican channel Acento TV, while dispatches from Xinhua News Agency are reproduced by several regional digital media outlets.
One of the most significant cases is that of Cuban state news agency Prensa Latina, which has maintained cooperation and content-sharing agreements with Chinese state media outlets, including Xinhua and CGTN. These agreements have included content exchange, training cooperation, and audiovisual collaboration. Since 2023, another pillar of Cuba’s state media system, Canal Caribe, has co-produced the daily program “Contextos” together with CGTN. Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma also regularly reproduces content and narratives originating from Chinese state media.
According to analysts, this type of cooperation seeks to strengthen the Cuban regime in the media and political spheres by expanding the international reach of Havana’s official narrative and consolidating the strategic alliance between Cuba and China.
According to RSF, China’s influence in the Caribbean also extends into the diplomatic sphere. “In some cases, Chinese embassies have attempted to convince journalists to publish articles written directly by their diplomats, even exerting pressure on media outlets after providing support such as equipment or financial assistance,” Bielakowska said.
The risk, expert warns, is that the growing economic and informational dependence of local media will make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between journalistic cooperation and political propaganda.
According to Bielakowska, effective measures are needed to counter this influence: “Civil society and democratic governments must intensify efforts to support independent media. This includes providing continuous support to fragile media organizations, which often lack the resources necessary to operate independently in the face of authoritarian influence,” she concluded.
