More than a business conglomerate, the Business Administration Group S.A. (GAESA) has become the primary vehicle through which Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) control much of the country’s strategic economy. Ports, logistics, tourism, financial services, foreign trade, and other hard-currency-generating sectors form part of a corporate structure unlike any other in Latin America and the Caribbean.
For analysts, GAESA’s significance extends well beyond economics. By placing much of Cuba’s strategic infrastructure under military control, the conglomerate not only provides the Cuban regime with a critical source of financial support but also serves as the principal gateway for foreign governments and companies seeking to operate in key sectors of the island’s economy. This concentration of economic power has implications for financial transparency, regional security, and the growing presence of extra-regional actors such as China and Russia in the Caribbean.
The United States recently imposed new sanctions on several companies and senior executives linked to GAESA, once again placing the conglomerate under international scrutiny. In announcing the measures, the U.S. Department of State described GAESA as “the heart of Cuba’s kleptocratic communist system,” arguing that it concentrates, through opaque mechanisms, revenues generated by some of the country’s most profitable industries for the benefit of the political and military elite rather than the Cuban people.
“This oligopoly maintains offshore accounts, its shareholders are invisible, its principal companies are registered in Panama under other nationalities, and they cannot be audited by any of Cuba’s administrative or political institutions, including the Office of the Comptroller General, the Council of State and Council of Ministers, or the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party,” Cuban political scientist Juan Antonio Blanco, president and director of the U.S.-based think tank Cuba Siglo 21, told Diálogo.
Although the Cuban government does not publish official figures, independent estimates indicate that GAESA controls between 40 and 70 percent of the country’s economic activity, including tourism, port logistics, financial services, foreign trade, telecommunications, and other strategic infrastructure. Through companies such as Gaviota, Banco Financiero Internacional, and Almacenes Universales, GAESA has become the regime’s principal center for capital accumulation.
For experts, however, the issue goes beyond economic concentration. By controlling the country’s main hard-currency-generating sectors, GAESA has turned economic activity into an instrument of state power.
The rise of a military-economic empire
GAESA emerged in the 1990s during the so-called Special Period, the severe economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially, its mission was to enable the FAR to generate their own revenue through tourism, foreign trade, and other hard-currency-producing sectors.
“Over time, this institution became an octopus with many tentacles, operating beyond the control of the state, while its subordination to the FAR became more nominal than real. It is a true Cuban Cosa Nostra,” Blanco said.
GAESA’s growth accelerated after Raúl Castro came to power in 2006. Under the leadership of his son-in-law, General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja — widely regarded as the architect of the conglomerate’s expansion — the regime’s holding company began absorbing some of Cuba’s most important state-owned enterprises. These included Corporación CIMEX S.A., the country’s largest commercial network; Gaviota, the tourism giant that controls a large share of Cuba’s hotel industry; and Habaguanex, whose hotels, restaurants, and retail establishments in Havana’s historic district were transferred to the military business system in 2016. Through companies such as Almacenes Universales, GAESA also occupies a central position in the logistics and commercial operations associated with the Port of Mariel and the Mariel Special Development Zone, one of Cuba’s principal trade and investment hubs. Following General Rodríguez López-Calleja’s death in 2022, command of the conglomerate passed to Brigadier General Ania Guillermina Lastres, who was recently sanctioned by the United States.
“By insisting on maintaining totalitarian control over economic activity and production, this mafia-style system of governance is driving an ever-growing number of Cubans into poverty at an alarming rate,” Blanco said.
At the center of this system are institutions such as Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI) and the financial services company Rafin, both sanctioned in June 2026. According to experts, these entities play an essential role in moving funds on behalf of the regime. A significant share of Cuba’s hard-currency transactions — from tourism revenues and remittances to foreign investment and exports — flows through these institutions.
The ability to mobilize these resources is made possible by a structure that operates beyond any form of independent oversight. What distinguishes GAESA from other Cuban state institutions is precisely the level of secrecy surrounding it: It publishes no financial statements, discloses no revenue figures, and is not subject to independent auditing or oversight. In practice, it functions as a parallel economic state, concentrating control of the country’s principal sources of hard currency in the hands of the military establishment.
Regional security implications
GAESA’s influence extends beyond the volume of assets it manages to the strategic sectors it controls. By channeling much of Cuba’s foreign investment and commercial activity through entities linked to the FAR, the conglomerate occupies a central position in the country’s relationships with foreign governments, companies, and investors. This gives GAESA an important role in shaping partnerships with extra-regional actors seeking to establish or expand their presence in strategic sectors of the island.
“It is a paramilitary complement to the repressive apparatus. Whenever the regime needs to crack down on demonstrations or shut down the internet, GAESA acts as a paramilitary arm in support of the Ministry of the Interior,” Blanco said.
By controlling ports, logistics, financial services, telecommunications, and a significant share of foreign investment, this “economic black box” of the regime has also become one of the principal channels through which foreign governments and companies establish relationships with strategic sectors managed by Cuba’s military establishment.
Internal financial documents published by the Miami Herald revealed that, as of March 2024, the GAESA companies examined held assets totaling $17.9 billion, including more than $14 billion in bank accounts. Although experts differ on the precise interpretation of these figures, the documents illustrate the scale of the resources managed by the conglomerate and the difficulty of determining the true extent of its holdings because of its lack of transparency.
“The ruling elite that controls the country through the oligopoly known as GAESA has established ties with other states and with non-state actors linked to organized crime and terrorism,” Blanco said.
In recent years, China has expanded its presence in Cuba through agreements covering tourism, logistics infrastructure, telecommunications, digitalization, renewable energy, and other strategic sectors. In 2025, Beijing and Havana signed a memorandum of understanding to expand tourism cooperation and signed letters of intent for new hotel projects between entities from both countries during the International Tourism Fair (FITCuba). Although not all of these projects are managed by GAESA, the conglomerate maintains a dominant position in Cuba’s tourism sector, meaning that a significant share of foreign investment in the industry ultimately becomes linked to companies under its control or influence.
China has also expanded its cooperation with Cuba in areas such as telecommunications, video surveillance, and other strategic sectors. Many of these initiatives are developed in sectors where GAESA maintains a predominant position within the Cuban economy.
For analysts, this convergence between Chinese capital and Cuba’s military-economic apparatus not only strengthens the regime but also consolidates a financial and logistical infrastructure capable of advancing Beijing’s strategic interests, as well as those of other Havana allies, including Russia and Iran. The result is greater cooperation in high-value strategic sectors — including telecommunications, cyber intelligence, and intelligence collection — posing a threat to the security of the entire region.
