The Caribbean has become a critical front in a high-stakes resource war where the American eel (Anguilla rostrata) has emerged as a strategic currency for transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Unlike traditional illicit flows like drug and arms trafficking, this biological resource provides a low-risk, high-reward bridge for criminal convergence, allowing TCOs to integrate into global supply chains dominated by China.
This trade is a clear manifestation of China’s expanding predatory footprint in the Western Hemisphere, where the exploitation of natural resources funds illicit networks and threatens regional stability.
China’s strategic monopoly
The demand driving this predation originates largely in China, which has transformed eel production into a strategic industrial sector. Currently controlling 70 percent of the global market and producing an estimated 240,000 tons annually, China operates massive aquaculture complexes in provinces like Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi.
In the Chinese economic model, the distinction between private companies and the state is virtually non-existent. Under China’s National Intelligence Law and its strategy of civil-military fusion, private enterprises are legally mandated to support state interests and intelligence operations. These facilities, therefore, function more like secretive state-directed industrial complexes than traditional commercial fisheries.
Marvin de Cid, an independent reporter in the Dominican Republic, explained to Diálogo that China effectively “controls the final stage of the chain.” Juvenile eels are trafficked to China where they complete their growth, are slaughtered, and are then distributed to other global markets.
This centralization creates a traceability gap. Because American eels belong to a single genetic group, it is virtually impossible to distinguish legal catches from poached ones once they enter the Chinese industrial system. De Cid warns that these operators possess the “technical and logistical knowledge to negotiate, evade controls, and move the product along the chain.” This lack of transparency allows TCOs to “wash” illicit harvests through legitimate exports, directly funding Caribbean criminal networks with Chinese capital.
The value of “glass gold”
The economic incentive for this trade is staggering, often outstripping traditional contraband in profitability. Juvenile eels, known as “glass eels” for their transparent appearance, are prized as the essential “seed stock” for the entire global industry as they cannot be bred in captivity. In recent years, the market value for these juveniles has reached as high as $5,000 per kilogram.
Chinese industrial complexes that procure these juveniles facilitate a growth cycle that can inflate the price of the final product to as much as $35,000 per kg. This “glass gold” provides TCOs with a massive infusion of liquidity that is laundered through the guise of legitimate aquaculture trade, financing the expansion of criminal networks across the region.
From the Sargasso Sea to global markets
To understand the vulnerability of this resource, one must look to the Sargasso Sea, the only spawning ground for the American eel. Located in the North Atlantic, the Sargasso Sea sits directly to the northeast of the Caribbean. Because it is positioned “upstream” from the islands, millions of eel larvae are pushed by ocean currents toward the Caribbean coasts.
This biological necessity creates a predictable seasonal bottleneck that TCOs exploit. They harvest the juveniles as they enter freshwater estuaries, effectively “mining” the species before they can reproduce. This extraction is most aggressive where maritime domain awareness may face more technical and logistics challenges. Haiti has become a primary hotspot due to its persistent instability, with higher volumes of illicit trade moving from Haitian waters into Dominican territory for export.
Eel harvesting is not limited to the Caribbean. De Cid noted that the activity has been detected in other parts of the region, including Honduras and Panama, suggesting an expansion of the phenomenon beyond traditional hotspots. In Cuba, the situation is particularly opaque; during a visit in 2025, De Cid received evasive answers regarding the trade. Control of the activity falls directly to the Cuban regime, although there are reports of regional illicit flows operating outside official controls.
By using the same clandestine maritime routes than for drug, arms, and human trafficking, the eel trade strengthens the logistical infrastructure of regional gangs, increasing the complexity of security interventions.
Criminal convergence
On November 20, 2025, during a strategic working group in Wildey, Barbados, the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) underscored that eel trafficking has become a cornerstone of criminal convergence. Nadine Bushell, CARICOM-IMPACS deputy director of projects, noted that “the high value of eels on the international market makes them an attractive product for criminal actors seeking low-risk, high-value activities.”
She emphasized that this lucrative trade “allows criminal groups to diversify their operations beyond traditionally monitored crimes,” effectively using the eel as a tool for money laundering and a gateway to broader corruption.
Recent enforcement actions underscore the scale of the threat. In 2024, two Dominican smugglers were sentenced for attempting to move 110,000 juvenile eels through Puerto Rico in violation of the Lacey Act, the U.S. federal law that prohibits trafficking in illegally taken wildlife, fish, and plants. That same year, a seizure in Saint Martin of 66,000 eels — shipped with fraudulent documents — exposed how TCOs use the Caribbean’s transit hubs to bypass international scrutiny.
Despite these warnings, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) recently failed to provide binding international protections for the species at CoP20 — the 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties, held in late 2025. Without a global mandate, the burden of defense falls on regional cooperation. Ultimately, the unregulated extraction of the American eel is a strategic vulnerability.
As De Cid concluded, if China’s intensive demand continues to fuel this trade, “the American eel could follow the same path as the Asian and European varieties,” toward depletion. This unchecked resource predation not only scars the Caribbean’s ecosystems but cements a Chinese footprint in the region that empowers organized crime, undermines the rule of law, and challenges the security architecture of the Western Hemisphere.
