China is relentlessly flooding Latin America with its commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) — commonly known as drones. In Brazil, the region’s largest market, the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) has registered more than 133,000 such aircraft as of late November 2025. Of this total, the vast majority, over 113,000, are manufactured by Shenzhen Da Jiang Innovations Science and Technology (DJI), followed by Xiaomi Corporation.
“Their abundance in the market, low cost, ease of use, and potential for weaponization make these drones dangerous,” Robert J. Bunker, director of Research and Analysis at C/O Future and a researcher at Arizona State University’s Future Security Initiative, told Diálogo.
Increasingly automated flight functions have significantly simplified the piloting of these drones, contributing to their rapid spread in the region.
“They are basically flying computers. Although sometimes considered toys, these systems can actually be more advanced than some traditional military weapons,” Bunker says.
The risks of espionage
The Chinese government’s massive technological investment in the civilian drone sector, combined with regulatory gaps in several Latin American nations, encourages the dual use of these tools, particularly for espionage.
“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has political officials in contact with both DJI and other major Chinese manufacturers of domestic drones. These systems have special backdoors in their software through which the CCP can extract information,” says Bunker.
In 2024, the potential for state-level surveillance was thrust into the spotlight when Chinese spy drones were detected operating over Mexico, raising security alarms across the region. Furthermore, the presence of Chinese military and intelligence facilities in Cuba could, according to experts, facilitate drone-based espionage operations throughout the region.
“Drones can carry virtually anything within their weight and aerodynamic limitations, so they can carry cyber packages to steal data and spy on computers and secure data facilities,” Bunker explains.
According to the expert, a small drone can land on a rooftop or attach itself to a building facade and simply wait for a computer to be turned on to attempt to intercept communications.
This risk is amplified by next-generation technology, demonstrated by the tiny Chinese spy drone — mosquito-sized — recently showcased on Chinese state television, which is equipped with artificial intelligence and is difficult to detect with conventional radar systems.
The risks to agriculture and food security
In Brazil, ANAC has so far authorized 16 drone models for agricultural use, seven of which are manufactured by Chinese companies adopting an integrated strategy. As in the rest of Latin America, they offer not only the drone, but also comprehensive training, repair, and ongoing services.
The primary risk is that farmers in the region will become technologically dependent on Beijing, with possible medium- and long-term consequences for global food security.
The massive collection of agronomic and geospatial data — on crops, soils, infrastructure, and even climate vulnerabilities — allows Chinese companies to develop highly specific products, such as fertilizers, pesticides, and genetically modified seeds. This capability creates a monopolistic agricultural ecosystem. It is no coincidence that Chinese drone manufacturer XAG, which specializes in smart agriculture, recently signed an agreement with seed company Syngenta, which is part of Chinese state-owned Sinochem group, dedicated to the production and trade of chemicals and fertilizers.
As researchers Claris Diaz and Emilian Kavalski noted in a report for War on the Rocks, this strategy allows “China to control prices, impose export restrictions, and apply trade tariffs on products that influence crop growth.”
In particularly sensitive areas, such as the Amazon, the use of these drones also opens the door to additional risks, from biopiracy to illegal mining and new forms of deforestation aided by advanced technologies.
Danger to infrastructure
Chinese-made drones also represent a growing factor for potential attacks on regional infrastructure. Beijing could activate them remotely as a strategic lever or in the event of actual conflict. The fact that Chinese companies such as Shenzhen ZD TECH are selling anti-drone systems in the region gives them an additional advantage.
When Chinese drones are used by other actors, Beijing can leverage the resulting instability by offering itself as the provider of technological security solutions.
In September 2024, in Ecuador, a drone loaded with 18 kilograms of explosives was launched against La Roca prison, near Guayaquil, in a failed attempt to facilitate a massive breakout. This violent episode increased public consensus on the need to build maximum-security mega-prisons, projects which are subsequently being carried out by Chinese companies such as Puentes y Calzadas Infraestructuras SL, a subsidiary of state-owned China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC).
Major events and international summits have also been targeted by drones with destabilizing intentions. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) held in Belém, Brazil, federal police intercepted 184 attempts at illegal flights. Similarly, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Lima in November 2024, Peruvian authorities neutralized 35 potential threats involving drones.
“It is possible to place explosives on drones, launch them from drones, cause arson, spy on facilities, infiltrate computers and networks, and steal objects using mechanical claws,” Bunker said.
The expert also highlights the growing possibility of civilian drones being used in swarms, a modality that dramatically increases their offensive effectiveness. In addition, the increasing integration of artificial intelligence is turning them into “fire-and-forget” weapons, capable of autonomously identifying their target once activated.
Use by organized crime
The widespread adoption of Chinese-made drones by Latin American criminal groups is profoundly transforming the regional security landscape. The spread of these inexpensive, powerful, and easily modifiable devices is giving cartels and guerrilla groups operational capabilities that previously belonged exclusively to state actors.
Following the example of Mexican cartels, pioneers in the use of Chinese civilian drones for reconnaissance and the transport of drugs and explosives, numerous criminal organizations in the region have incorporated these tools into their arsenal.
“Criminal and terrorist groups go through cycles of using armed drones, first experimentally and then institutionally, as they learn to integrate them into their force structure and tactical operations,” Bunker observes. According to the expert, there has been a shift from disposable drones to civilian models repurposed into fiber optic versions that are difficult to intercept and capable of striking with “surgical precision.”
In August 2025, in the department of Antioquia, Colombia, dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) shot down a National Police Black Hawk helicopter using a small drone loaded with explosives, killing 12 officers. In 2024 alone, there have been 115 drone attacks in the country.
In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, members of the Red Command used DJI Mavic drones to launch grenades and explosives at police forces. In other cases, drones have been used to surveil judges, smuggle phones into prisons, carry out explosive attacks on banks, and attempt escapes, such as the thwarted plan by Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, known as Marcola, leader of the First Capital Command (PCC).
The Chinese drone fleet is transforming the Latin American sky into a new theater of asymmetric warfare, from which Beijing can gain geopolitical, military, and commercial advantages, to the detriment of the security of the entire region.
