Chile faces a criminal reality unprecedented in its recent history. The 2025 Report on Organized Crime in Chile, prepared by the Specialized Unit on Organized Crime and Drugs (UCOD) of the National Prosecutor’s Office, reveals that the country is now immersed in a more complex and violent scenario, defined by a dramatic increase in predatory crimes and the deep penetration of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).
This detailed analysis, compiled from the joint efforts of key institutions and focusing on threats, trends, and developments during 2024, outlines an integrated illicit ecosystem where criminal violence has become a strategic tool.
A complex and shifting landscape
Under the leadership of National Prosecutor Ángel Valencia and the UCOD team, the report consolidates evidence on the expansion and mutation of TCOs in Chile. In the report’s introduction, Valencia emphasized that the document’s main virtue is offering a comprehensive overview of organized crime in Chile, allowing the state to reflect on vulnerabilities and threats, as well as strengths and the tasks ahead. The Prosecutor’s Office stresses that the fight against TCOs continues: “When state institutions join forces and work in a coordinated manner, distances are shortened and real possibilities for success emerge,” the report indicates.
The investigation examines phenomena such as drug and arms trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, money laundering, and human trafficking. Among its most alarming findings is the sustained increase in predatory crimes like kidnapping and extortion, as well as the greater technological sophistication of criminal gangs.
The core threat: Violence and TCO penetration
The report confirms that while drug trafficking remains the primary economic engine of organized crime, accounting for nearly half of all illicit revenue in 2023 and 2024, the greatest changes are seen in specialized violence. Kidnappings reached a historical maximum of 868 cases in 2024, marking the third consecutive year of over 800 cases. Together with extorsion, these crimes showed the most significant growth in activity during the year. In addition, the prosecution of arms trafficking offenses increased by nearly 90 percent between 2023 and 2024, confirming that firearms are largely obtained illegally — through foreign smuggling, adaptation, or artisan manufacture — and are instrumental for territorial control and violence.
The criminal landscape has been redefined by the expansion of TCOs, The Venezuelan group Tren de Aragua (TdA) and its various franchises operate throughout all regions of Chile, engaged in a full spectrum of illicit activities from human trafficking and extorsion to homicide and money laundering.
Luis Toledo, director of the Center for Studies in Public Security and Organized Crime at the University of San Sebastián and former prosecutor for the Anti-Drug Unit, told Diálogo that the TdA “is not expanding exponentially as it did in 2021-2023, but it is not dismantled either. What we are seeing today is an internal reorganization of the gang: Several cells were hit by police and prosecutorial operations, but the vacuum left room for fragmentation and the emergence of more autonomous subgroups.” This, he explains, makes the phenomenon “more unpredictable and, at times, more violent.”
According to Toledo, the single hierarchical structure has given way to criminal nodes inspired by or linked to the TdA “brand,” but with more local dynamics adapted to the Chilean context. For 2026, he predicts a scenario of persistence and mutation: “less verticality, more diversification of crimes, and greater hybridization with Chilean gangs, with survival depending not on great leaders but on illicit markets that remain profitable: trafficking, sexual exploitation, extortion, express kidnapping, and migrant smuggling.”
However, the report identifies a diverse array of other foreign organizations exploiting Chilean territory.
Colombian TCOs like Los Shottas and Los Espartanos (originating from Buenaventura) are active in northern and central regions, involved in drug and arms trafficking, homicide, and extorsion. Links were also identified between Chilean organizations and Brazilian TCOs, the First Capital Command (PCC) and Red Command (CV), primarily concerning cocaine trafficking and export logistics. Notably, Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) was linked to the May 2024 seizure of 844 kilograms of liquid methamphetamine, underscoring Chile’s role as a platform for global drug export. The Peruvian extorsion group Los Pulpos, the Dominican Trinitarios, and the Chinese mafia Bang de Fujian are also documented as operating in the country.
This convergence of sophisticated TCOs confirms that organized crime in Chile is no longer an isolated phenomenon, but a coordinated ecosystem that feeds on multiple illicit markets. Given these challenges, international cooperation becomes a strategic pillar.
Deterioration measured by international indicators
The deterioration of security in Chile has not gone unnoticed internationally. The 2025 Global Organized Crime Index, published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), an international nongovernmental organization headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, notes that the country’s score has progressively worsened since 2021 as a result of the consolidation of transnational gangs.
The report also designates the TdA as the most notorious and harmful organization, responsible, among other crimes, for the increase in kidnappings, extortion, and trafficking of vulnerable persons.
State responses and policy evolution
Despite the grim diagnosis, the state is building upon its initial successes by shaping a more comprehensive strategic response. In October 2025, Chilean President Gabriel Boric enacted a law, which creates a Suprateritorial Prosecutor’s Office specializing in organized crime and highly complex crimes, with the capacity to operate in all regions of the country. This new entity is scheduled to become operational in April 2026. This law seeks to provide the Public Ministry with more effective tools to address current threats.
“The situation [in Chile] is indeed very complex, but it is not irreversible,” Toledo argues. “The current picture is bad, but it does not determine the future.”
Toledo insists that international experience shows that the state can regain control: “When a state corrects incentives, increases its territorial presence, professionalizes prosecution, removes the financial capacity of gangs, and regains control of prisons, criminal advances are halted […]. The greatest risk today is not ‘irreversibility’ but political inertia: If decisive action is not taken, the deterioration may become permanent. But if the state decides to reorganize its capabilities, the phenomenon is controllable.”
