Brazil now occupies an increasingly central place in China’s food supply strategy, supplying about one-third of the Latin American country’s agricultural exports, particularly soybeans, corn, and sugar. To ensure its long-term food security, Beijing is systematically expanding its control across the entire Brazilian agricultural supply chain, from genetic seed production and machinery trade to key port terminal management.
“This influence could backfire on Brazil, which risks concentrating its resource production almost entirely in China’s hands,” Adriano Gianturco, coordinator of the International Relations course at IBMEC University in Belo Horizonte, told Diálogo.
According to the expert, many Chinese companies operating in the Brazilian agricultural sector are state-owned and adhere to the guidelines of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This creates risks where decisions are guided by political interests and the potential use of Brazilian resources as diplomatic or economic leverage, threatening Brazil’s autonomy and national sovereignty.
Control of genetic resources
The strategic acquisition of vital genetic resources is a primary focus. Since 2017, Beijing has secured full access to Brazil’s corn germplasm bank through the acquisition of Dow Sementes by the Chinese consortium, Citic Agri Fund Management and its subsidiary, Yuan LongPing High-tech Agriculture.
The Chinese grain trading giant, Cofco International, also entered the seed market by acquiring Nidera, a company that already controlled sugar mills and infrastructure across south-central Brazil. Cofco later sold the Nidera Seeds unit to Syngenta in 2018, ensuring the asset remained under Chinese control, as Syngenta is ultimately controlled by state-owned Sinochem Group.
“In this way, China guarantees itself access to strategic genetic resources, but it poses a serious risk to Brazil, where agriculture is a fundamental part of the gross domestic product,” Gianturco says.
Beijing is also investing in the next generation of seed genetics. DBN Biotech has announced plans to establish its Latin American headquarters in Brazil to develop the “new soybean route.” By 2028, it aims to sell genetically modified seeds to Brazil to secure soybeans at lower prices, thereby directly influencing the market value of the commodity.
“The risk lies in falling into dependence on Chinese suppliers,” notes Gianturco. The mandated use of seeds linked to specific technology packages, such as specialized herbicides, could render land unsuitable for other crops or non-Chinese brands, effectively creating a Beijing-centric monopoly.
Financial and operational investment
Chinese state banks are providing crucial financing. Since 2012, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has facilitated bilateral trade in the agricultural sector by easing exchange transactions between the yuan and the real. In 2023, it executed the first transaction in Brazil using Chinese currency, circumventing the U.S. dollar entirely.
Further expanding this financial footprint, the Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) and BNDES (Brazil’s Development Bank) announced a major joint investment fund of up to $1 billion in October 2025, which will be operational from 2026 and earmarked for various projects, including agricultural systems. Projects backed by China, such as those led by CITIC Construction, also include plans to convert degraded pastures into sustainable agricultural systems.
The investment extends to supporting family farming, which often lacks advanced technology. In July 2025, the state-owned Sinomach Digital Technology Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding with the municipality of Maricá and the Brazilian startup OZ.Earth to supply smart machinery, build local factories, and develop digital platforms for rural management in agrarian reform areas.
A recent report by Brazilian agribusiness consulting company Markestrat Group points to the risk of a growing structural imbalance. “Brazil has become highly dependent on Chinese purchases,” the study warns, highlighting the economic impact a major Chinese economic crisis could have on the Brazilian market.
Infrastructure and logistical dominance
China is expanding its presence in logistics and ports to streamline agri-food exports to Asia. In 2022, Cofco secured a 25-year concession for the STS-11 terminal in Santos, committing to a $285 million investment and purchasing trains and wagons to transport grain and sugar to the port.
Meanwhile, the Paranaguá Container Terminal, acquired by the China Merchants Port (CMPort) group in 2017, has nearly doubled its traffic and introduced new direct shipping routes to China. CMPort has also announced plans to purchase 70 percent of a terminal in the Port of Açu, while other Chinese firms have expressed interest in Brazil’s largest container terminal, Tecon 10 in Santos.
This logistical control extends inland. A 686-kilometer section of the BR-364 — one of the main Amazonian arteries connecting Brazil’s agribusiness heartland to the Pacific — has been privatized under a consortium led by 4UM Investimentos and Opportunity Bank. The group will manage the highway for 30 years with an investment of $2.1 billion to double and modernize the road. The project is a core component of the proposed bi-oceanic corridors designed to open faster trade routes to China.
Local indigenous communities are fiercely opposing the highway project, fearing it will increase deforestation and illegal exploitation of resources in their territories. “This project will have a social and environmental impact, but we have not been consulted as required by law. We demand this right,” Gilmar, a leader of the Cinta Larga community, told Brazilian news site G1.
According to Gianturco, China’s expansion into agricultural supply chains is a threat not only to the country’s food security. “The risk is also that of greater social control,” the expert concludes.
