Originally conducted in mid-2025, the following conversation offers a timely look at the structural shifts in hemispheric relations that continue to define the current landscape.
Over the past two decades, China has transformed its presence in Latin America and the Caribbean from a commercial relationship centered on trade into a far-reaching strategy with economic, political, technological, and security dimensions. What once appeared to be a pragmatic exchange of commodities and capital has evolved into a complex web of influence that now touches critical infrastructure, democratic institutions, information systems, and regional diplomacy.
Eric Farnsworth, partner at Continental Strategy — a consulting firm specializing in U.S.-Latin American policy and trade — and former vice president of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, and a longtime observer of hemispheric affairs, has been warning about this shift since the early stages of China’s expansion into the Western Hemisphere. In a 2017 analysis, he described China’s entry into the region as the most consequential development in hemispheric relations of the 21st century, an assessment that, in his view, has only grown more relevant with time.
In this exclusive interview with Diálogo, Farnsworth offers a comprehensive analysis of China’s deepening engagement across Latin America and the Caribbean. He examines how China has translated economic ties into strategic leverage, how infrastructure and technology projects carry national security implications, and why democratic governance, transparency, and the rule of law are increasingly at stake as Chinese influence expands.
Diálogo: In 2017 you described China’s entry into Latin America and the Caribbean as the most significant issue this century in hemispheric affairs. Do you still stand by that assessment today?
Eric Farnsworth partner at Continental Strategy and former vice president of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas: Yes, I do stand by that assessment. If anything, I would say the issues have become even more intense. There has been a fundamental change in the Western Hemisphere because of China’s entry into the region, economically, financially, politically, diplomatically, and from a security perspective. The full spectrum of hemispheric relations has shifted as a result of China’s presence. Over time, as economic ties have deepened across virtually every country in Latin America, China’s leverage over those countries has also increased. That leverage can take the form of economic coercion conditioning market access or investment on certain political behaviors. It can also take the form of political influence, for instance in voting behavior at the United Nations, in international forums, or within bilateral relationships.
Additionally, China’s engagement manifests internally within countries through investments that have direct implications for environmental standards, anti-corruption efforts, democratic governance, freedom of the press, and labor practices, particularly regarding where workers come from and who is employed in major projects. These issues are not temporary, they are structural. Countries in the region must recognize the very real downside risks that accompany engagements with China.
Diálogo: You have also noted that what began as transactional trade relations has evolved into a deeper geostrategic engagement. What are the clearest indicators of this shift? How are China’s strategic interests materializing on the ground through infrastructure projects, surveillance technologies, political alignment, or other channels? And would you say that China’s interests in the region were always strategic, with trade serving as only one component of a broader ambition?
Farnsworth: Yes. The relationship really began in the early 2000s, around 2003 or 2004, with high-level visits by Chinese leaders to the region and China’s recognition of opportunities in the Western Hemisphere. Initially, the focus was largely economic, driven by the need for trade and the acquisition of raw materials and primary products to fuel China’s rapid growth. Fundamentally, this story is not about Latin America, it is about China, its interests, its needs, and its global strategy. At the time, China was growing at 6, 7, even 8 percent annually and needed raw materials from all around the world. China had already been very active in Africa, often under the radar of many observers. Its entry into the Western Hemisphere came later, but once it arrived, it quickly recognized the scale of opportunity and started building that relationship.
China made mistakes early on, but it has since become highly sophisticated in how it engages with countries in Latin America. One could argue there was always a strategic dimension, but that strategy has clearly evolved over time. As China has recognized the depth of opportunity in the region, its ambitions have expanded. We now see frequent high-level political engagement, including multi-day state visits by President Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese leaders. China’s presence has become normalized at the political level. Symbolically, this is reflected in leader-to-leader diplomacy, but symbolism alone does not explain the scope of what is happening.
A particularly timely and illustrative example is the opening of the Port of Chancay in Peru, inaugurated during the APEC meetings in November [2024]. This is a massive infrastructure project and represents a major enhancement of China’s capabilities in the Western Hemisphere. Economically, there is a case to be made as Peru has a substantial trade relationship with China. However, the port is potentially dual-use and could accommodate military vessels. More importantly, Chancay is not the endgame. What we are now hearing about is the development of transportation infrastructure linking Brazil and Peru, potentially crossing the Amazon, to transform Chancay into a strategic hub for much of South America. This would allow goods to reach China via the Pacific rather than traveling around the Atlantic, saving considerable time and cost. This reveals the true scale of China’s ambitions. Such projects are not just economic. They are environmental, engineering, financial, and political undertakings that require sustained engagement at the highest levels. So there are some developments here that one has to be aware of. There are many infrastructure projects one could cite, but from a symbolic and strategic standpoint, Chancay stands out because of the magnitude and reach of its implications.
Diálogo: You mentioned an issue that is particularly significant, which is the dual-use nature of many infrastructure projects China is developing in the region. Could you expand on the national security implications of this dual-use infrastructure? How can these investments enable coercive diplomacy or provide strategic leverage to China in times of tension?
Farnsworth: Let me use an example that is not physical infrastructure but cyber infrastructure, specifically, so-called “smart cities” technology. This is an area China has developed extensively. I have traveled to China and seen these systems in operation, and they are now being exported across developing markets, including Latin America.
The way these technologies are marketed is quite benign. They are presented as tools to improve government efficiency, managing traffic flows, ambulance services, emergency response, and public security. On the surface, it all sounds reasonable. But in practice, this means massive data capture. That data often flows back to China for uses that are not transparent, whether for artificial intelligence development, security applications, or other purposes. These systems also create potential leverage over individuals and populations in their daily lives.
Democratic societies everywhere are grappling with the balance between security and personal liberty. The challenge in Latin America is that this debate has not always occurred openly or fully. Decisions are often made among political, military, or police elites, whose objectives may not be illegitimate, public security is a legitimate concern, but who may not adequately consider privacy, accountability, or democratic oversight. From China’s perspective, it also gives potential leverage in terms of coercive abilities because these systems are provided, managed, and maintained by Chinese entities. Governments often have little visibility into how, where, or for what purpose the technology is ultimately deployed. Cyberspace is an area where awareness is growing in Latin America, but there is still a long way to go.
Diálogo: This leads directly to the issue of political influence and democratic norms. China’s support for authoritarian regimes has been linked to democratic backsliding in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cases such as Ecuador’s ECU-911 surveillance system under the Correa administration, or Venezuela’s Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card), designed with Chinese support, raise serious concerns. As countries continue to adopt Chinese technologies, including Huawei, which several governments have flagged for security vulnerabilities, what are the long-term risks of relying on China for critical state infrastructure?
Farnsworth: This is a crucial point. What we discussed earlier was China’s leverage over states. What you are raising now is related but distinct, which is the use of Chinese technology, training, and governance models to control, or even repress, domestic populations. We see this most clearly in Venezuela and we have seen it in other countries around the region as well, and that is a real risk, which is not limited to cyber tools alone. China has supplied equipment, including armored personnel carriers (APC) and other systems, that are being used to suppress citizens and entrench Venezuela as an authoritarian police state. That is a very real and troubling dynamic, and China has played a direct role in enabling it.
But there is another issue too, and that is China’s engagement. Staying with Venezuela, this engagement dates back to the Chávez era and facilitated the country’s trajectory, partly through cyber equipment, but also through purchases of Venezuelan crude oil, which injected billions of dollars into the regime — funds whose ultimate use remains opaque. Those resources allowed the government to consolidate power internally, expand influence abroad, and avoid reliance on international financial institutions such as the IMF or World Bank, which traditionally exert policy discipline and transparency requirements.
This support allowed Venezuela to reject international norms and accountability mechanisms. When you combine that macro-level backing with specific technological and security assistance, the result is deeply damaging to democracy. Importantly, this risk is not confined to countries like Venezuela, Cuba, or Nicaragua. It also affects countries such as Ecuador and others where surveillance technologies are already being implemented. In contexts where institutions are weak, the rule of law is fragile, and oversight is limited, such tools can easily be misused against political opponents.
Latin America has long struggled with abuses of state power. Advanced surveillance technologies significantly increase both the risk and the temptation to misuse authority. Addressing this challenge requires strong rule of law, transparency, and public awareness, but that is not an easy or fully satisfying solution. It has to have safeguards, it has to have standards, otherwise you are unleashing this into the wild and there is no way to keep it under control necessarily.
Part II
In the second part of this interview, the conversation shifts to the subtler and often less visible tools China uses to shape political outcomes and public perceptions. Farnsworth examines Beijing’s use of sharp power, its ties to authoritarian regimes, emerging signs of regional reassessment, and the strategic importance of Central America and the Caribbean, while assessing how China’s expanding footprint may influence elections, democratic resilience, and geopolitical alignment across the hemisphere.
