The expansion of criminal networks such as the Tren de Aragua, originating in Venezuela and potentially allied with local factions, intensifies violence, erodes institutions, and threatens regional stability, demanding an integrated strategy of repression and international cooperation.
Introduction
Transnational drug trafficking represents one of the greatest threats to public order and territorial integrity in contemporary Latin America. In the bilateral context of Brazil and Venezuela, Venezuelan transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) — notably the Tren de Aragua and the Cartel of the Suns — are emerging as vectors of this dynamic. They exploit the border’s porosity to facilitate the flow of cocaine, weapons, and vulnerable migrants. These networks not only perpetuate cycles of violence but also foster alliances with powerful Brazilian groups, such as the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command (CV), extending their reach far beyond the Amazonian border.
The central thesis of this article is that the negative impacts of these TCOs — including the expansion of gangs into almost half of the municipalities in the Amazon, the contamination of migration routes with human and arms trafficking, and the erosion of state authority in border municipalities — require a multifaceted strategic response. This response must encompass shared intelligence, international sanctions, and investments in socioeconomic development in the affected areas. Without such an approach, Brazil risks the consolidation of criminal enclaves that compromise its sovereignty and regional cohesion.
Evolution of the phenomenon: From prison gangs to sophisticated transnational networks
Drug trafficking on the Brazil-Venezuela border is not an isolated phenomenon, but the product of an accelerated evolution driven by the Venezuelan institutional crisis. Originating in the 2010s, the Tren de Aragua emerged as a prison mega-gang in the Tocorón penitentiary, controlling entire territories under the leadership of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero.”
Initially focused on extortion and local trafficking, the group expanded alongside mass migration — nearly 7.9 million Venezuelans had fled by mid-2025 — transforming itself into a multipurpose TCO with operations in multiple countries.
This transformation gained complexity through its integration into international drug trafficking. Reports by InSight Crime highlight that the Tren de Aragua, while not the primary exporter of cocaine, acts as a logistical facilitator, controlling routes on the Amazon border and possibly linked to the Cartel of the Suns, which allegedly involves Venezuelan military personnel. In Brazil, these TCOs maintain a sporadic presence, with established cells in Roraima and Amazonas. They exploit the 2,200-kilometer border for cocaine trafficking, amidst a global increase in production that exceeded 3,700 tons in 2023, according to the 2025 World Drug Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Concrete examples illustrate this sophistication. In February 2025, the Brazilian Air Force shot down a plane from Venezuela carrying about 500 kilograms of marijuana and hashish near Manaus, revealing sophisticated clandestine air transport alliances. Cooperation with local factions amplifies the risk: the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP) reports that gangs operate in 45 percent of Amazonian municipalities, with Venezuelan groups supplying weapons and contributing to territorial disputes.
The Venezuelan crisis, with a contraction of about 75 percent in GDP since 2014, has catalyzed this expansion. As researcher Ronna Rísquez notes, forced migration has created a vulnerable workforce, which is then co-opted into trafficking networks that combine extortion, drug trafficking, and money laundering. In Brazil, this translates directly into violence: homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Roraima fell from 38.6 in 2022 to 34.4 in 2023, but with initial peaks in violence, and 60 percent of those homicides possibly involving migrants. This evolution integrates drug trafficking into parallel economies, such as illegal mining, financing cross-border instability.
Brazil’s strategic response: Repressive measures and coordination challenges
Faced with the incursion of these TCOs, Brazil has adopted political and legal responses that simultaneously expose gaps in transnational coordination. A key initiative is Law No. 15,245/2025, which amends the Penal Code to address criminal association, increasing penalties for border crimes and allowing for the freezing of assets. This legislation facilitated operations such as Fronteira Segura 2025 (Safe Border 2025) — a joint operation between the Federal Police, the Army, and regional partners — which reinforced surveillance against trafficking and smuggling.
These actions are necessary because drug trafficking contributes to the increase in violence across the Amazon, with gangs controlling routes that generate billions in illicit profits, according to the FBSP. The Supreme Federal Court has strengthened foreign cooperation, leading to a reduction in clandestine flights. Furthermore, sanctions against the Cartel of the Suns, aligned with those of the United States, which designated it a terrorist organization in 2025, help cut off financial flows.
At the operational level, Operation Welcome (Operação Acolhida) has evolved to include screening of migrants, resulting in deportations of Tren de Aragua members by 2025, according to the Ministry of Justice. However, the lack of dialogue with Venezuela limits the full effectiveness of these measures. Experts warn that border porosity requires active, bilateral cooperation, rendering unilateral actions insufficient. These measures require expansion into cyber intelligence and robust migrant reintegration programs.
Case study: The infiltration of the Tren de Aragua in Roraima and its “cascade effect”
The state of Roraima exemplifies the impact of Venezuelan TCOs, serving as a primary gateway for drug trafficking into the Brazilian Amazon. With municipalities bordering Venezuela, Roraima saw the arrival of the Tren de Aragua around 2018, primarily via the migratory flow of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans through Operation Welcome. The group, possibly allied with the PCC, operates in drug retail in Boa Vista, extorts shelters, and uses illegal gold mines for money laundering.
Between 2022 and 2024, homicides in Roraima varied, with a rate of 38.6 per 100,000 in 2022 and subsequent reductions, but with high concentrations of migrant victims involved in disputes over routes. An emblematic case is the murder of Bryan José de Jesus Hernández in 2022, executed in Boa Vista by suspects linked to the Tren de Aragua, revealing a modus operandi of terror used to intimidate rivals. [De Jesus Hernández was a 30-year-old Venezuelan whose dismembered body was found in vacant lot and whose case that drew attention due to its brutality and link to the activities of criminal groups such as the Tren de Aragua in Brazil.] This violence is directly intertwined with trafficking: in 2024, operations in Pacaraima seized drugs linked to transnational networks, which were subsequently tied to local homicides.
Socially, the impact is devastating. The group actively recruits in shelters, increasing cases of violence among vulnerable migrants, according to the FBSP. Economically, its activity erodes the local fabric: Municipalities see declines in GDP per capita due to the contamination of the local economy by money laundering, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
Experts reinforce the challenge. Researchers argue that the Tren de Aragua exploits the existing migration crisis, transforming Roraima into a hub where factions gain territory, thereby creating localized ecosystems of violence. This case reflects how Venezuelan TCOs export instability, with the potential for additional displaced persons in 2026, according to the UNHCR.
Projections for the future and strategic imperatives
Looking ahead, the absence of decisive, coordinated action could exacerbate these impacts. The 2025 World Drug Report by the UNODC predicts increases in the flow of cocaine through the Amazon, which will inevitably raise homicide rates and further contaminate migration routes. With the U.S. designation of the Tren de Aragua as a terrorist organization in 2025, routes may migrate further into Brazil, strengthening local alliances and generating additional waves of displaced persons.
An integrated, regional approach is crucial. Measures such as Law 15.245/2025 demonstrate political viability but require expansion and harmonization through existing Amazonian treaties. Experts emphasize that without regional cooperation, drug trafficking will consolidate criminal enclaves, posing a direct threat to the regional democratic fabric.
Recommendations:
(1) Creation of a multinational task force with UN funding,
(2) Inclusion of Tren de Aragua on regional terrorist lists,
(3) Investment in border intelligence,
(4) Training programs for migrants.
The preservation of Brazil’s stability is an imperative for hemispheric security.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government, Diálogo magazine, or its members. This article was machine translated.
