In just two decades, China’s presence in Latin America has grown at a pace that is as overwhelming as it is strategic. Like a patient player in a long game, Beijing has managed to position itself in key sectors, reconfiguring the region’s economic and geopolitical landscape in its favor.
According to a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), at least 37 Latin American ports are now linked to Chinese companies. These are not minor terminals, but key hubs such as the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal on either side of the Panama Canal, the mega-port of Chancay in Peru, and the Paranaguá terminal in Brazil.
In the energy sector, its dominance is also overwhelming. In Peru, China controls 100 percent of Lima’s electricity distribution; in Brazil, it participates in 12 percent of the energy value chain; and in Chile, Chinese state-owned companies operate nearly two-thirds of the national electricity system. Added to this are thousands of kilometers of roads, a growing presence in mining, telecommunications, logistics, and, in some cases, even security.
At the same time, bilateral trade has reached record levels. Between 2000 and 2020, trade between China and Latin America grew from $12 billion to $315 billion. If the World Economic Forum’s projections are correct, by 2035 the figure could exceed $700 billion.
But while the spotlight is on the economic boom, another “silk road,” quieter and darker, is expanding in the shadows — that of Chinese organized crime.
“Chinese organized crime has grown worldwide, but especially in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Leland Lazarus, an expert on Sino-Latin American relations and co-author of studies such as Triads, Snake Heads, and Flying Money, told Diálogo.
According to Lazarus, in the last decade these criminal gangs have positioned themselves on at least four key fronts in the region. The first is the trafficking of chemical precursors for fentanyl: substances manufactured in China, brought into Mexico, and processed by the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels to produce synthetic opioids that are then distributed throughout the hemisphere.
The second is money laundering. “China has become the most popular money launderer for drug trafficking in Latin America,” Lazarus says.
The third front is wildlife trafficking, driven by demand for traditional Chinese medicine. Shark fins, totoaba bladders, and jaguar parts leave countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Suriname bound for Asia. “China is now the leader in illegal jaguar trafficking,” Lazarus adds.
And the fourth is human trafficking. This crime combines irregular migration with sexual and labor exploitation and has turned several Latin American countries into key corridors for clandestine migration.
“These are not isolated crimes, but an integrated criminal strategy. Many Chinese groups are simultaneously involved in several of these activities. This is what is known as criminal convergence,” Lazarus says.
Double-edged expansion
Chinese organized crime is advancing at the same pace as Beijing’s economic and political influence in the region. Far from being a coincidence, experts warn that the two dynamics are deeply intertwined.
“As Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects spread across the region, Chinese criminal networks and their illegal activities are also strengthening,” Christopher Hernández-Roy, deputy director of the Americas Program at CSIS and author of the report Are Chinese Ports in Latin America Preferred by Organized Crime?
The phenomenon, Hernández-Roy explains, is the result of a dangerous combination: expanding investment, the establishment of economic enclaves, and greater commercial connectivity, factors that together facilitate the movement and operation of Chinese criminal structures throughout the continent.
But this is not just a side effect of China’s advance. Various signs suggest structural permissiveness on the part of the Chinese State itself.
One of the most revealing cases is that of companies producing chemical precursors for fentanyl, many of which are state-owned.
“These companies are not hiding. They sell their products openly on the internet, not on the dark web, but on common sites targeting Spanish-speaking customers. They even detail how to hide the merchandise in makeup packaging or other items. They know perfectly well that they are exporting something illegal,” says Lazarus, stressing that the Chinese State benefits, directly or indirectly, from this activity that feeds Latin American cartels.
China is also the world’s largest importer of timber but lacks an effective legal framework to prevent the entry of illegally harvested timber, much of which comes from the Amazon and other biodiverse regions of Latin America. Added to this is the use of Chinese platforms such as WeChat, which functions as a social network, messaging system, and payment platform, and is under strict control by the regime, but is nonetheless used by criminal networks to coordinate money laundering operations and carry out illicit transactions openly.
“China is the largest techno-authoritarian state on the planet. It has the means to stop these networks but has chosen not to. And that is deeply worrying,” Lazarus says.
This structural permissiveness fuels growing suspicion: Is there a connection between the expansion of Chinese organized crime and Beijing’s strategic interests in Latin America?
Experts and analysts have sounded the alarm about the advance of Chinese criminal networks, which appear to be operating under the protection of China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence in the region.
According to Lazarus, collaboration between state-owned companies, local governments, and mafia structures — a pattern that has historically worked in China — could be replicating itself in Latin America, where corruption and institutional weakness create fertile conditions for its reproduction. “The result is an ecosystem where Chinese investment and illicit activities can easily intertwine, blurring the lines between legal and illegal,” Lazarus says.
The case of Chile
In May 2023, headlines in Chile were not about trade agreements or Chinese-funded megaprojects. They were about organized crime. A transnational network with roots in Asia had been dismantled in what became known as Operation Southern Dragon Dynasty, the biggest blow against Chinese crime in the country’s recent history, according to an investigation by Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN).
At the heart of the operation was the Fujian Bang, one of the most active and sophisticated Chinese mafias in the world, specializing in indoor marijuana cultivation. The operation uncovered an unprecedented drug trafficking network: more than 7,000 marijuana plants, 480 kg of processed cannabis, weapons, ammunition, and large sums of cash hidden in 11 safe houses. Twenty-one Chinese citizens who were members of the criminal network were arrested.
“On this scale, it is the first time we have seen anything like this in Chile. We are facing a new phenomenon,” Eduardo Gatica, head of Chile’s Southern Metropolitan Anti-Narcotics Brigade, then told TVN.
The structure was complex, efficient, and carefully camouflaged. It operated through alliances with local actors and labor illegally imported from China. “One of the ways this organization operates is by bringing in Chinese citizens with specific knowledge of cultivation. They are called ‘farmers’ or ‘harvesters,’” prosecutor Yans Escobar told Chilean daily La Tercera.
A criminal complaint in Santiago revealed that since 2021, more than 200 Chinese citizens had entered the country illegally. Once in cities such as Santiago, Valparaíso, or Temuco — the epicenter of the operation — they were forced into prostitution or to work on the plantations, InSight Crime indicated.
Capturing elites, operating in the shadows
Behind the criminal network was Yu Caixin, a Chinese businessman who not only ran the network but also chaired the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Temuco. Owner of a buffet restaurant and founder of several import companies, Yu cultivated ties with local authorities, including a close relationship with the governor of La Araucanía.
The case exposed more than just a criminal business: It showed how these mafias manage to insert themselves into the local economic and political fabric, operate under the radar, and build networks of influence.
“This is a clear example of the murky intersection between Chinese criminality, business, and state interests,” Lazarus says. As president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Temuco, Yu reportedly had some interaction with the Chinese embassy, facilitating the United Front’s outreach to the local Chinese diaspora, Lazarus explains.
The United Front is a key tool for CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping to project Beijing’s influence beyond its borders, mobilizing Chinese citizens abroad as part of its soft power strategy. Xi himself has described it as “the Party’s magic weapon.”
But in some cases, this “foreign influence” is hidden behind commercial or cultural front organizations with links to organized crime. In June 2025, a revealing investigation by the Washington Post exposed how the CCP is allegedly using mafias to operate outside China, as long as they do not compromise the country’s internal stability.
According to the Washington Post, the Hongmen World History and Culture Association, which presents itself as a promoter of Chinese culture, has spread pro-government propaganda, promoted unification with Taiwan, and served as a platform to expand the BRI in Asia. Its president, Wan Kuok-koi, alias Broken Tooth, has been identified as the leader of the 14K triad, one of the most powerful in China.
“The strategy is clear,” says Lazarus, “transnational crime can be tolerated and even used if it serves Beijing’s geopolitical interests.”
Part II and III
In the upcoming parts of this report, we explore the strategic role of the Chinese diaspora as a key cog in the expansion of Chinese organized crime in Latin America, with a strong presence in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Panama, and Peru. Far from being simple migrant communities, these populations have served as a bridge, shield, and platform for Chinese criminal organizations to infiltrate local communities, operate covertly, and consolidate their illicit activities under legal facades.
“About 35 Chinese networks have been identified in the region. We are facing a phenomenon of decentralized, highly adaptable organizations with a remarkable ability to operate under the radar,” says Lazarus.
Through this silent architecture, Chinese mafias have evolved from smugglers to key players in high-impact crimes such as money laundering, where they now surpass traditional networks, and illegal jaguar trafficking, a practice that was believed to be extinct but has resurfaced with force parallel to the advance of Chinese investment. “We discovered that this [jaguar trafficking] was growing at the same rate as Chinese investment in Latin America,” National Geographic journalist Sharon Guynup said.
