Colombia’s department of Cauca remains one of the country’s most challenging security environments, where guerrilla factions born from the remnants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continue to exploit coca-producing areas, strategic trafficking corridors, and difficult terrain despite sustained government security operations.
The department sits at a critical nexus of drug trafficking routes, connecting Colombia’s interior with departure points on the Pacific Coast and corridors leading toward the Ecuadorian border. The region is also one of Colombia’s principal coca-producing areas. Municipalities within the Micay Canyon account for roughly three-quarters of Cauca’s coca crops, making the area a strategic objective for both criminal organizations and Colombian security forces.
According to Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), more than 620 attacks by armed groups were recorded in Cauca and neighboring Valle de Cauca between January 2022 and May 2026. In Cauca alone, 175 attacks were registered in 2025, a 52 percent increase from 2024, underscoring the persistence of violence despite continued government efforts to restore security.
Armed groups and strategic corridors
Much of Cauca is influenced by three fronts affiliated with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), a network of dissident FARC structures formed by Iván Mordisco, after rejecting the 2016 peace agreement.
According to FIP, the EMC’s Western Bloc comprises 11 fronts operating across southwestern Colombia, including the Carlos Patiño, Dagoberto Ramos, and Jaime Martínez fronts, which maintain influence in strategic areas of Cauca. Together these structures secure coca-producing areas and transportation corridors leading toward the Pacific coast, helping sustain narcotics trafficking operations.
Carlos Patiño maintains its strongest presence in the coca-producing Micay Canyon, particularly around the town of El Plateado, which has become one of Colombia’s principal security priorities. Jaime Martínez operates across territory connecting Cali with Micay Canyon and extending toward the Pacific coast, while Dagoberto Ramos maintains influence in northeastern Cauca.
According to security expert Diego Arias, competition from other armed groups remains limited.
“The ELN tried to move in and has sustained confrontations in the Micay Canyon with members of the dissidents. But it is a very minimal presence of the ELN in Cauca, and control remains entirely with Carlos Patiño,” Arias told Diálogo.
He added that the type of territorial disputes common in other parts of Colombia are largely absent across much of Cauca. “The type of confrontation at the scale [common in other parts of Colombia], that dispute over territorial control, is not really significant here in the territory — not in the north of Cauca, not in the Micay Canyon, not in the area of Jamundí.”
Restoring state presence
Despite operating independently, the three fronts have often coordinated their activities against Colombian security forces. Through attacks on military and police patrols, intimidation of local communities, and protection of illicit economies, they seek to limit the state’s ability to maintain a lasting presence in contested territory.
For Colombian authorities, restoring control in Cauca requires more than military offensives. Operations are designed not only to dismantle armed structures but also to reestablish government institutions, protect communities, and disrupt the criminal economies that finance the groups.
One of the government’s largest recent efforts was Operation Perseo, launched in October 2024 with the deployment of approximately 1,400 soldiers and armored vehicles to retake El Plateado from the Carlos Patiño Front.
The operation enabled Colombian security forces to reenter an area that had been under criminal influence for years and demonstrated the government’s determination to reestablish a state presence in the Micay Canyon. Maintaining that presence, however, has remained a significant challenge. More recently, the government announced the deployment of an additional 2,800 soldiers following coordinated attacks in southwestern Colombia, reflecting its continued commitment to increasing pressure on armed groups and strengthening security in the department.
Adapting criminal tactics
Rather than relying solely on direct confrontation, EMC dissident fronts increasingly combine attacks on security forces with tactics designed to restrict government operations and maintain influence over local communities.
One tactic employed by these fronts has been the temporary detention of soldiers and police officers by civilians acting under pressure from armed groups. In June 2025, 57 Colombian soldiers operating near El Plateado were surrounded and detained by local residents allegedly acting under coercion from the Carlos Patiño Front. Earlier that year, another group of police officers and a soldier were similarly detained before being released following negotiations.
Armed groups have also continued attacks against military and police installations, as well as patrols using explosives and other improvised weapons. The most significant recent example was the wave of 34 coordinated attacks carried out by the Jaime Martínez Front over five days in late April 2026, in what analysts described as a demonstration of strength ahead of Colombia’s presidential election. The attacks targeted military bases and other security installations across Cauca and neighboring Valle del Cauca. The deadliest occurred when a cylinder bomb detonated as a bus passed along the Pan-American Highway in Cajibío, killing 20 civilians and injuring 36 others.
According to Arias, the coordination and frequency of these operations reflect the EMC’s growing operational capacity.
“They have increased their military capacity,” Arias said. “Imagine everything that it means to be able to organize these operations almost one right after another, some simultaneous — everything that implies in terms of intelligence, human resources… these groups have been strengthening considerably.”
Beyond military operations
According to analysts, one of the greatest challenges facing Colombian authorities extends beyond combat operations.
Campaigns of intimidation and years of criminal influence have enabled dissident groups to exert varying degrees of control over some rural communities. According to reporting from InSight Crime, residents in parts of rural Cauca have been required to carry identification cards issued by the EMC and comply with rules imposed by the armed group at illegal checkpoints, including presenting the identification card or paying a fine of approximately $130, illustrating how these organizations seek to regulate daily life in addition to protecting illicit economies.
Cauca illustrates the long-term challenge of confronting transnational organized crime in strategically important regions. While sustained military pressure has enabled Colombian security forces to reenter areas long dominated by armed groups, translating tactical advances into lasting state control remains a difficult and ongoing process. As Colombia continues these efforts, restoring a durable state presence will be essential to reducing the influence of armed groups and their illicit economies.
