A network of ground stations and satellite tracking centers linked to China is expanding in Latin America. Although many of these projects are presented under the banner of scientific or commercial cooperation, their development coincides with the advancement of China’s space capabilities, raising concerns about their potential dual-use nature and implications for regional security.
In its report, Pulling Latin America into China’s Orbit, the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on China concludes that this space infrastructure — driven by the Chinese state — is part of a national strategy that integrates foreign policy, military-civil fusion, and defense planning. Its objective: to strengthen China’s position in the space domain.
The document identifies four key findings: China’s space expansion in Latin America directly responds to strategic priorities linked to national security; the region occupies a central role in Beijing’s plans; China has gained access to dual-use infrastructure through civil and commercial agreements; and these capabilities can support intelligence, space monitoring, and the development of counterspace tools.
Chinese infrastructure in the region: Scope and dual nature
According to the report, at least 11 facilities linked to Chinese entities are operating or have been developed in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. These installations form part of a global satellite tracking network that expands coverage in the Southern Hemisphere and integrates with China’s broader space architecture.
China’s ambition to become a leading space power is outlined in its 2021 space white paper, released in January 2022, which states that the space industry “serves the overall national strategy.” Although Beijing maintains that its program is peaceful, China’s military structure continues to integrate space, cyber, and electronic capabilities in ways that reinforce the dual-use nature of these activities, according to analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Jorge Serrano, a security expert and advisor to the Peruvian Congress Intelligence Committee, told Diálogo that “this network must be analyzed within the context of China’s strategic planning in the space and technology sectors.” According to Serrano, many projects presented as civilian cooperation are part of a broader strategy, negotiated with little public transparency and limited national oversight mechanisms.
Lack of transparency and strategic risks
To bolster its space, missile, and artificial intelligence programs, China has deployed a global network of telemetry, tracking, and control ground stations beyond its borders, complemented by maritime capabilities. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, Beijing also operates a fleet of satellite and missile tracking vessels to fill potential gaps in this infrastructure.
Many of these projects involve state-owned defense companies that have been flagged for security concerns. According to CSIS, these companies manufacture satellites, launch vehicles, antennas, and other systems used in both commercial and military programs.
China’s space expansion model follows a pattern similar to its global rollout of 5G telecommunications networks. Through state-backed firms, Beijing offers integrated packages that include satellites, launch services, ground stations, and technical training. This model can create long-term technological dependencies, raising concerns about sovereignty and security.
In Latin America, the Chinese space base in Neuquén, Argentina, has drawn particular scrutiny. Established in 2017 on a 200-hectare site, the base operates under conditions that have raised persistent concerns about transparency, particularly given Argentina’s limited access to the facility and its operations, as well as its potential dual-use and military applications. The facility is operated by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, an entity linked to China’s military space and defense apparatus and involved in activities related to satellite tracking, telemetry, and broader defense-support functions.
In Brazil, the Select Committee on China identifies another Chinese-linked ground station whose precise location has not been publicly confirmed. In the Tucano region, Brazilian and Chinese facilities exchange satellite data. According to the report, this arrangement could allow Chinese systems to provide redundancy if Brazilian infrastructure fails, while also creating the potential for access to sensitive data related to Brazil’s space operations and those of partner countries.
In Chile, Chinese involvement in space-related infrastructure has also generated concern. A proposed Chinese-backed astronomical data center project was ultimately halted after scrutiny by the Chilean government, which determined that the initiative did not align with the country’s legal and regulatory framework. The case highlighted the challenges governments face in balancing scientific cooperation with national security considerations.
Technological reach and strategic concerns
China’s technological footprint in the region extends beyond the space domain. According to Serrano, multiple facilities linked to electronic intelligence and associated with Chinese entities operate in Cuba. Analyses by CSIS and other research organizations have identified several sites on the island that are assessed to support signal intelligence collection and monitoring activities in the region.
“The combination of these space and intelligence networks extends the reach of China’s technological infrastructure from the Caribbean to South America,” Serrano explained. He also noted that this architecture enables electronic intelligence functions, such as communications interception and, potentially, interference.
The implications of this network extend beyond the technological sphere, raising broader concerns about regional strategic security. According to Serrano, infrastructure installed by China may serve civilian purposes, but its dual-use nature means it can also support military and intelligence activities, raising concerns about security risks, oversight, and national sovereignty.
Strategic risks for the region
For Serrano, China’s international posture has evolved. “It used to be said that China did not get involved in conflicts, but rather in economic, technological, and development cooperation,” he noted. However, he warned that that approach now increasingly serves broader strategic objectives, including the development of military and intelligence capabilities.
The growing presence of Chinese technological infrastructure in Latin America poses strategic risks, especially when viewed in the context of the Chinese state’s long-term objectives and its integrated security apparatus.
Serrano emphasized that agreements negotiated with limited transparency — and the potential implications for the sovereignty of recipient countries — are issues that cannot be ignored. “There is no longer a lack of information to consider this a hemispheric threat,” he concluded.
