China’s extensive reach is penetrating further into the Brazilian Amazon. The Maritime Silk Road, a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative; the infrastructure and management of electrical grids; technology sector control, and rare materials exploitation are the main forms of this expansion that threatens to compromise the green lung of the Earth. The consequences are worrying, including environmental degradation, labor exploitation, harm to indigenous communities, and even the destabilization of Brazil’s strategic sectors.
In March, a Beijing delegation visited the town of Barcarena, in Pará state, to prepare the ground for the Maritime Silk Road project in the Amazon. Chinese state-owned company Sino-Lac Supply Chain Co. Ltd. wants to invest in the Amazon port sector, both in the states of Maranhão and Pará, to control the entire export chain to China of Brazil’s main agri-food products, especially soybeans and meat. The project involves the creation of a logistics structure, managed by China, including storage of goods, customs, and sanitary measures to enable maritime transport to the motherland. Sino-Lac has also signed agreements with the Federal University of Amazonas to produce fertilizers in the region.
“China’s encroachment in the Amazon is cause for concern. Beijing has also shown interest in scientific research, bioeconomy, and even fertilizer processing. The problem is that China is known for its predatory exploitation, which, without adequate regulation and control, poses significant risks for Brazil, from creating dependency dynamics to even monopolizing entire market segments,” Jorge M. Lasmar, professor of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais, told Diálogo.
Infrastructure and strategic minerals
In the Amazon, China is not only interested in port investments, but also in land infrastructure to ensure a fast and efficient transport network for its exports. On August 15, on the celebration of 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, Beijing announced investments in infrastructure, railroads, and transmission lines in the Latin American country worth some $50.5 billion.
For example, state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) won the contract to pave the BR-319 Highway through Concremat, a Brazilian company in which it has an 80 percent stake. BR-319 stretches for 885.9 kilometers and connects the two main Amazonian cities, Manaus and Porto Velho. The project has been at the center of controversy for years. It is feared that, once implemented, it will lead to further deforestation and environmental degradation, an increase in illegal activities, from mining to timber and cocaine trafficking, facilitated by the road.
“Large projects like this can also lead to the forced displacement of local indigenous communities, cause the destruction of territories considered sacred, and have a negative impact on the culture and identity of these communities in a region like the Amazon, where tensions between large economic interests and indigenous rights are already historically high,” Lasmar said.
The Ferrogrão project, in which the CCCC has already taken an interest, has also been the subject of protests by indigenous communities and environmentalists due to the possible increase in deforestation and illegal fishing. The 933 km railway line will link Sinop, in Mato Grosso state, with Itaituba, in Pará state, and will split several indigenous reserves in two. “This railroad will affect our region just like the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant, which is wiping out the Xingu Park. We were not even consulted,” Patkore Mekraknotire, one of the indigenous leaders leading the protests, told the press. The Belo Monte hydroelectric complex on the Xingu River, in Pará, has been the subject of indigenous protests since 2011, when its construction began. Some 10,000 families have been displaced. Indigenous communities denounce the environmental impact the river’s water flow diversion has on local flora and fauna and, consequently, on their subsistence activities, such as fishing.
In addition, in 2023, Governor of Pará Helder Barbalho signed an agreement with the CCCC to build the Pará Railway. This 1,400 km line will connect Marabá with the port of Vila do Conde, in Barcarena. However, no details were given as to how it will be built, with what materials, nor labor.
“We should look to Ecuador, which is an important lesson for Brazil. Just like in some African countries, in Ecuador some Chinese infrastructure projects have shown poor quality, resulting in long-term unsustainable structures that require constant maintenance or even total reconstruction, generating additional costs and perpetuating environmental and social problems. In Brazil, we still have time to avoid this,” Lasmar said.
The infrastructure that China is building in the Amazon will also further its mining interests. One example is the exploitation of niobium, of which Brazil holds 90 percent of the world’s reserves, including in two Amazonian states, Amazonas and Rondônia. Since 2011, China has been penetrating and buying market shares of Brazilian niobium production, first with the China Niobium Investment Holdings Ltd. consortium, and then, in 2016, with China Molybdenum Corporation (CMOC).
“The most significant risk is the economic one, as China can decide the price and influence the market, but also the military one. Niobium is an example of a crucial resource for various technological industries, such as the production of superalloys used in aircraft engines, communication infrastructures, and even space and military technologies. Chinese control over these resources could give China a technological and military advantage, while limiting Brazil’s ability to develop its strategic industries,” Lasmar said.
The deposit located in Amazonas, near São Gabriel da Cachoeira, where there are an estimated 2.9 billion tons of niobium, is within an indigenous reserve. The mining process is currently at an impasse, amid a tug-of-war between the politicians who have granted the mining licenses and the local indigenous communities who oppose them. A frightening precedent is the Chinese niobium mine in Catalão, in Goiás, where inhabitants have been denouncing for years the pollution and damage to their health.
Power transmission networks
In the Amazon, China is also expanding through electricity transmission networks. In December 2023, State Grid Corporation of China won Brazil’s largest electricity transmission auction, obtaining the rights to build more than 4,471 km of new lines to transport wind and solar energy generated in the northeast. The concession will last 30 years, with an expected investment of $3.2 billion. The power grid will cross a large part of Brazil, from the Amazonian states of Maranhão and Tocantins to Goiás, Minas Gerais and São Paulo. The project also includes the construction of 1,513 km of transmission lines and maintenance of another 1,468 km in Maranhão, Tocantins, and Goiás.
“The control of a country’s power grids is usually covered by the so-called Golden Power, that is, the ability of a state to protect its strategic sectors from foreign intervention. The fact that China has come to control essential parts of our power grid demonstrates the need to strengthen our regulatory system in this area. It also exposes Brazil to risks, from cyberattacks to sabotage, as Chinese state-owned companies respond to the strategic interests of the Xi Jinping government,” Lasmar said.
The electric grid that State Grid will build in the Amazon uses a technology that is almost exclusively Chinese worldwide, Ultra High Voltage (UHV). This allows power grids to operate at 800,000 volts and above to transport electricity over long distances. In a 2023 report, China’s Global Energy Interconnection, RAND warns of the risk of technological monopoly, as China holds 942 UHV patents, the highest number in the world.
“The introduction of proprietary technologies into power grids is a danger because it creates a technological dependency that makes it difficult to maintain and operate grids without Chinese assistance or input. This dependence can be exploited geopolitically to influence political and economic decisions in Brazil, making it difficult for the government to take measures that may be contrary to Chinese interests,” Lasmar said.
Technological control
Beijing has been investing in the region’s technological sector for years. On the east coast of the island of Marajó, the largest fluvial-marine archipelago on the planet, in Pará state, Chinese telecommunications company Huawei recently launched the Tech4Nature project, with the declared intention of providing internet connectivity and environmental monitoring in the region. The paradox is that in this part of the Amazon, illegal Chinese fishing is one of the main causes of environmental problems.
“Projects such as Huawei’s can be used for other purposes, such as espionage, allowing China to monitor the territory and its resources, control industrial and military activities, and obtain sensitive data to the point of compromising the country’s security,” Lasmar said.
The archipelago is one of Brazil’s largest fishing areas and richest in flora and fauna. Marajó Mayor Carlos Augusto Gouvêa told Infobae that “Chinese ships fish illegally in the region” and take “large quantities of the best fish species.” Gouvêa also complained that large Chinese freighters approach the coast of the archipelago, in the Amazon estuary, to steal fresh water. “They take it to the Middle East. It’s cheaper to make that water potable than to desalinate the water there.”
Among China’s most recent technological investments is the CBERS-6 satellite, manufactured jointly with Brazil, which will go into orbit in 2028 and will allow monitoring of the Amazon even in the presence of important cloud formations typical of the region.
In 2014, Huawei donated a supercomputer to the National Institute for Amazon Research (INPA) to store all available research data on the Amazon. The equipment communicates with another supercomputer also donated by Huawei to the Federal Institute of Education, Science, and Technology in the northeastern state of Pernambuco, a strategic region for Beijing, especially because of its ports.
Huawei’s technology is also used by the main public agricultural research institution, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA). China is interested in Brazilian agriculture in the Amazon, as it is the world’s largest importer of soybeans and Brazil its largest producer.
Possible measures
Faced with this scenario, there are several possible measures. “Firstly, the vulnerability of dependence on a single country such as China must be reduced. Diversifying partnerships, strengthening relations with other countries that share common interests, such as the United States and other Latin American countries, is a must,” Lasmar said.
Strengthening national legislation on the so-called Golden Power, imposing greater control, and requesting greater transparency and compliance from Chinese companies can also help preserve the Amazon from inevitable environmental impacts and protect Brazil’s sovereignty, Lasmar concluded.
