Originally conducted in mid-2025, the following conversation offers a timely look at the structural shifts in hemispheric relations that continue to define the current landscape.
As China’s presence in Latin America has expanded, so too have the tools it uses to entrench influence beyond traditional diplomacy and investment. In the first part of this exclusive interview with Diálogo, Eric Farnsworth, partner at Continental Strategy — a consulting firm specializing in U.S.-Latin American policy and trade — and former vice president of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, outlined how Beijing’s engagement has evolved from transactional trade into a multidimensional strategic presence.
In this second part, Farnsworth delves into how China deploys sharp power through media, education, political networks, and proxy actors, as well as its close ties to authoritarian regimes such as Venezuela and Cuba. He also analyzes early signs of regional recalibration — from Panama’s withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative to growing debates over transparency and investment screening — and what these shifts suggest about Latin America’s capacity to recognize risk, defend democratic norms, and assert strategic autonomy.
Diálogo: Beyond the strategic investments we have already discussed, you have consistently emphasized in your articles and interviews China’s use of what is known as “sharp power” to expand its influence in Latin America. Could you briefly explain how this strategy operates in practice and which tools China most commonly employs?
Eric Farnsworth partner at Continental Strategy and former vice president of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas: Sharp power is a concept developed by the National Endowment for Democracy. It differs from soft power, a term popularized by Joseph Nye, who unfortunately passed away recently. Soft power is about culture, arts, and the attraction that comes from values and history, and have people respect you. Sharp power, by contrast involves the insertion and promotion of specific ideas within democratic societies. This can occur through media, through educational institutions such as Confucius Institutes, through people-to-people exchanges, and similar mechanisms. And the ultimate idea is not to expose people to China from an objective perspective, but rather to expose people to China’s worldview and push that narrative into democratic societies. The ultimate goal is to suggest that China’s system is equivalent to liberal democracy, or that democracy is no better, only more complicated and disorderly, while China’s model is more efficient. This narrative argues that people in China are happier and wealthier, and it carries real political implications geopolitically.
Leaders may begin to argue that there is no meaningful difference between the Chinese system and Western systems. Of course there are fundamental differences, and one system is clearly superior to another. But China has been very effective at trying to win hearts and minds in emerging markets, convincing people that the Chinese model is somehow better. When people are asked to choose, they may conclude that “they’re all the same.” That conclusion is incorrect, but you can see how it takes hold. And if that is the result, it represents a strategic victory for China. Never before would the idea have taken root in Latin America that a Chinese Communist system is equivalent to liberal democracy. If that mindset becomes established across the region, that is precisely what China is working toward.
So the sharp power techniques very well sophisticated, they are educational and training exchanges, media exposure trips to China, all framed through a carefully curated narrative. In the media sector, for example, China often produces stories that are then placed in newspapers or broadcast outlets stories that emphasize the failures of the United States or Europe and the successes of China. These efforts are not about neutral exposure; they are designed to change minds so that China’s worldview is broadly accepted as equivalent to liberal democracy.
Diálogo: China’s close relationships with authoritarian regimes, such as with Venezuela and Cuba, have also played a strategic role in the regional agenda. How do these relationships serve Beijing’s broader goals, and what risks do they pose to regional stability and democratic governance?
Farnsworth: The risks are very real. Latin America and the Caribbean are entering a period of intense electoral activity, and some of the influence operations China has demonstrated, particularly through Venezuela, are being exported across the region. These efforts aim to undermine democratic candidates and promote outcomes convenient to authoritarian allies. Cuba operates in a similar way. What makes this especially effective is that Venezuelans or Cubans are native Spanish speakers who understand the region deeply. They can influence elections in ways Chinese operatives simply cannot, due to linguistic and cultural barriers. Acting through regional proxies is incredibly powerful. We saw a preview of this in 2019, before the pandemic, when widespread unrest erupted across Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. On the surface, these protests appeared spontaneous, driven by legitimate grievances. But closer examination revealed external actors working to amplify and manipulate the unrest. In some cases, this involved Russia, in others, Venezuela played a role, applying training, techniques, and technologies it had acquired. These risks are fundamental, and people need to be fully aware of them.
Diálogo: Despite China’s extensive influence, we are beginning to see some reassessment across the region. Panama’s decision to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative is one example. How widespread is this rebalancing, and where might it lead?
Farnsworth: I think we are at the very beginning of that cycle. There is growing recognition of the risks involved. Take Chile, for example. It has had a long-standing and robust relationship with China, copper is its top export, and China is its main market. Yet Chile insists that all investors operate under the same transparent, enforceable rules of law. There are no special deals and no secret contracts. Whether the investor is Chinese, American, Canadian, or European, the rules are the same. This reduces corruption and favors higher-quality investment, precisely because enforcing those standards disadvantages China, which is unwilling to play under such rules. Most countries in the region are not yet there, but they recognize the need for a better investment framework. Another important tool is investment screening. In the United States, we have CFIUS [the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States], which evaluates whether foreign investments align with national security interests. Latin American and Caribbean countries increasingly need similar mechanisms. An investment may create jobs and appear attractive, but it may still undermine national interests. Most countries in the region lack a system to say, “this investment does not serve us, and we will not accept it,” and that needs to change.
Diálogo: Countries that switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, particularly in Central America, are now realizing that many of Beijing’s promises were not fulfilled. What should they realistically expect going forward?
Farnsworth: Yes, the inducements and the promises. We’ve seen in case after case, that countries are dissatisfied with what they’ve actually received from China. Grand promises of infrastructure and billions of dollars in investment often failed to materialize. What we have to remember again is that China’s interest in Latin America has nothing to do with Latin American development. It has always been about China’s interests: access to natural resources, strategic positioning, the deployment of excess capital held in China’s central bank and building global influence. At the end of the day, there is no genuine development agenda for the region, and there never has been. People are beginning to question this and, frankly, are getting disturbed by it.
Diálogo: The Caribbean appears to be taking a different path and has become more deeply embedded in China’s influence strategy lately. What are the geopolitical and security implications of this expanding relationship?
Farnsworth: The Caribbean is a unique environment, with its own mix of opportunities and challenges. It is one of the regions where Taiwan has traditionally received much of its diplomatic recognition, so China’s engagement has been heavily focused on persuading countries to shift recognition toward Beijing. Based on that you have seen a lot of Chinese engagement often taking the form of projects such as stadiums, libraries, and public buildings. It is not necessarily about developing Caribbean agriculture, advancing clean energy, or developing Caribbean infrastructure. It is about giving gifts to win influence, and once it’s done, the engagement doesn’t necessarily continue, with the exceptions perhaps of Cuba, where China really has more of a stake. The Caribbean basin traditionally does not have abundant resources. These are small economies with limited tax bases and little capacity to raise capital. Since independence, they have relied heavily on the international community, and in that context China’s willingness to engage is seen by many of these countries as both attractive and convenient. And on the security side, that does have implications particularly potential intelligence-gathering activities.
Diálogo: Beyond the Taiwan factor, what is China’s primary strategic goal in a resource-scarce region like the Caribbean? Is there a military or security calculation behind their presence?
Farnsworth: It’s hard to say definitively. The Caribbean does possess one asset that every sovereign country has which is votes at the United Nations (UN), the Organization of the Americas States (OAS), and other multilateral institutions. These forums are central to China’s long-term strategy of expanding its global influence and increasing its weight in multilateral decision-making. If China can exert influence over individual countries — even in institutions where it is not a member, such as the OAS — it can still advance its interests through what you might call proxies. That is very much part of what is going on.
The idea of China establishing military bases in the Caribbean is, at this stage, highly speculative and that approach does not align with China’s typical strategy. China’s approach tends to operate far more subtly such as developing relationships, quietly building economic and political ties, and embedding itself in local communities. One day, countries may realize that China is deeply engaged in their national life, without a single dramatic or overtly militarized move. That is very different from the kind of approach historically associated with Russia, and it reflects a distinct strategic style.
Diálogo: To conclude, I’d like to return to where we began, to your article from 2017. At the time, you warned that Latin Americans themselves should be concerned about the nature of Beijing’s growing influence, noting that changes on the ground were already dramatic and, at times, unsettling. Looking at developments since then, do you believe those concerns have intensified? What has made the situation more delicate or dangerous or not? Can you give some concrete examples?
Farnsworth: First of all, I’m glad that prediction has played out, not because I’m happy about it, but because it turned out to be accurate. From that perspective, at least, there is some value. And yes, I do think those concerns have intensified.
China saw opportunity and moved in, continuing to expand its presence until some form of resistance emerged. And it has been quite effective, though more in some countries than in others. China has been very savvy in terms of what they’re looking for, such as access to natural resources, infrastructure investment, and platforms for strategic activities.
If you look at where China has concentrated most of its investments, it is exactly where you would anticipate it, in the largest economies in the region. Brazil is a huge example.
What we are seeing, overall, is a strategy that has come to fruition. Addressing it now requires showing Latin Americans and their leaders that there are real alternatives.
Diálogo: Would you say the situation has intensified from China’s point of view, and has Beijing become more aggressive as a result?
Farnsworth: I would say it has very much intensified, but in a specific way. China’s engagement has become more comprehensive, and in some cases more aggressive. A clear example was Panama’s decision to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative, which elicited an unusually strident and accusatory reaction from Beijing.
And I think we could anticipate that this will continue because China has developed a real interest in the region, interests that it sees as fundamental to its own security and long-term well-being. Beijing does not want to see those interests eroded. As countries begin to reassess risk and attempt to rebalance their relationships, China has reason to be concerned, and that concern is likely to shape its behavior going forward.
Diálogo: Does this mean greater risks for the region? Are we likely to see more sharp power from China?
Farnsworth: Probably. There could also be some increase activity on the military side, although I am not predicting incursions or anything of that sort. China is developing a blue-water navy and the capacity to make port calls, whether in Peruvian waters, for example, to protect fishing fleets, project power, or even conduct humanitarian operations. Whether that qualifies as sharp power is debatable. The real impact is longer-term. It is about demonstrating partnership and reliability, so that later, when China asks for support in multilateral forums or asks countries to remain silent on issues like Tibet or the Uyghurs it becomes easier for leaders to comply. That silence, in itself, represents a strategic win for China.
This does not mean we should expect overt military confrontation in the region, but it does mean leaders are increasingly confronted with having to address this.
Diálogo: What, then, should Latin American governments be most aware of as this relationship evolves?
Farnsworth: They need to start with transparency and a clear-eyed understanding of the real risks involved. Those risks have changed over time. Years ago, cyber risk was barely part of the discussion. Today, it sits at the center of the relationship.
Cyber threats do not require warships or troops. They come from Beijing, from Russia, from Iran. So there is a different threat profile that has emerged overtime, and the question is whether regional security services fully understand it and whether their responses remain consistent with democratic values and the rule of law.
And that is the piece that is really complicated, because it is easy to have a security reaction, but the question is whether your security reaction is consistent with democratic values. But that challenge is unavoidable and requires far more focus and understanding going forward.
