Venezuela is facing a crisis. What began as a failed state under the Nicolás Maduro regime has metastasized into a functional criminal machine that threatens regional stability. Such is the assessment of the transformation and its geostrategic implications provided by Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, director of the Inter-American Institute for Democracy (IID) and former Bolivian Defense minister, in an exclusive interview with Diálogo.
Drawing on years of regional monitoring and verifiable facts, Sánchez Berzaín asserts that Venezuela has consolidated itself as a criminal state, surpassing the threshold of a narco-state through the capture of its institutions by corruption and drug trafficking networks, co-option of the Armed Forces, and dependence on illicit economies that now sustain the regime’s permanence in power.
The scope, he warns, is hemispheric. Maduro has projected a transnational crime network that operates in alliance with Colombian cartels, irregular armed groups, terrorist organizations, and extra-regional actors such as China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea. This consolidated structure, built over the last decade, constitutes a strategic threat that has turned Latin America into a battleground dominated by criminal governance networks.
Diálogo: You have described narco-terrorism — the alliance between terrorist violence and criminal drug trafficking economies — as the cruelest form of aggression against the peoples of Latin America in the 21st century. However, this threat is not new. What has changed compared to 20th-century narco-terrorism, and why do you consider it to be the greatest threat to the region today?
Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, director of the Inter-American Institute for Democracy and former Bolivian Defense minister: In the 1980s, we saw the emergence of narco-terrorism in Latin America with guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the M-19, and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia, which transitioned from being ideological guerrillas to becoming drug producers, protectors, and traffickers.
The same transformation happened in Peru with the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and Shining Path. These are the clearest examples of 20th century narco-terrorism. What characterized that narco-terrorism? It was a localized phenomenon. These organizations could control small or even large areas, engaging in armed violence, kidnappings, and murders, but they remained confined to specific territories. Despite their capabilities, they never controlled any state or country.
What changed in the 21st century? Narco-terrorism ceased to be a localized phenomenon and supplanted politics through criminal activity, occupying the representation of entire countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador.
Consequently, criminal actors began to operate as subjects of international law, enjoying diplomatic immunities and privileges, yet never ceasing to be narco-terrorist structures.
The best example is the Cartel of the Suns. The recent shift in U.S. foreign policy has been precisely aimed at restoring its criminal character and withdraw its status as Venezuela’s international representative.
This shift has had a huge impact on the security and democratic stability of the region. In 1994, when the first Summit of the Americas was held, there were 34 democracies and only one dictatorship, Cuba, which was also in its last legs. But with the arrival of Chávez in 1999, the 21st century became a period of expansion for that dictatorship, which not only replicated itself but also created narco-states and criminal networks that presented themselves as legitimate governments. From that position, they wage direct aggression against the democracies of the region.
All of this falls within the framework of a contemporary concept known as hybrid warfare. Narco-terrorism is one of its expressions, along with forced migration, the penetration of common crime, human trafficking, and even the financing of political candidates who respond to these criminal structures.
Diálogo: Within this framework, Venezuela has been identified by various experts as a cocaine hub, a result of the close relationship between the state and criminal organizations, consolidating the Maduro regime as a true narco-state or “criminal state.” How does this influence project itself on neighboring democracies? What are the mechanisms through which it erodes or destabilizes their institutions, and what risks does it pose to regional security?
Sánchez Berzaín: The Venezuelan case is, above all, the result of the expansion of the Cuban dictatorship. Venezuela is a narco-state satellite of Cuba’s dictatorial system, and this is not conjecture; it is an objective reality, verified and verifiable on multiple levels.
When Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, he came to the aid of a dying Cuba that was going through its “Special Period.” From that moment on, a kind of troika was formed in which Chávez contributed capital in the form of Venezuelan oil and wealth, while Fidel Castro contributed the know-how of a regime that, since 1959, had accumulated decades of repression, executions, guerrilla warfare, invasions, protection of terrorists, aircraft hijackings, and proven links to drug trafficking. Cuba was, in fact, the first narco-state in the hemisphere.
With Chávez, the 21st century began under the narrative of a supposed “Bolivarian movement,” which in reality ended up being the international expansion of the Cuban dictatorship. Paradoxically, the best thing that happened to that project was Chávez’s death. While he was alive, he was the undisputed leader thanks to the resources he controlled. That wealth financed mechanisms such as Petrocaribe, which guaranteed the votes of Caribbean countries in the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations.
They advanced on South America with the same strategy: Kirchner in Argentina, Lugo in Paraguay, Mujica in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador, Ollanta Humala in Peru, and a growing influence in Colombia with Juan Manuel Santos. This is the political map of 21st-century socialism.
Two events are key to understanding this 25-year history. First, Chávez’s death, which unleashed an internal dispute between “Venezuelan Castroism” — represented by Nicolás Maduro — and the “Venezuelan Chavism” of Diosdado Cabello. Maduro won. And from that moment on, Venezuela formally became a political colony of Cuba, something that had not happened while Chávez was leading the project. Just look at the images from that time: Castro looked like Chávez’s assistant, not the other way around.
In this new context, Venezuela becomes Cuba’s geopolitical and logistical platform, taking advantage of its geographical position, infrastructure, and wealth. From there, the cocaine hub is built — a transnational operation coordinated with the FARC in Colombia, the Correa government in Ecuador, the Evo Morales regime in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and, of course, Cuba.
There are documented facts that confirm this. During the Chávez administration, and while Evo Morales governed Bolivia, it was revealed and published in the international press that Bolivian Air Force planes were transporting cocaine directly to the presidential ramp at Maiquetía, Venezuela. This was corroborated by a Bolivian [Air Force] officer, then Colonel [Marco Antonio] Rocha Venegas, who testified in the United States, where he now lives under protection.
This is how narco-states operate. And this is also how narco-terrorism is consolidated, which arose when 21st-century socialism took control of much of the region.
It is in this context that narco-states and the strategy of narco-terrorism developed, where drug trafficking is conceived as a weapon of aggression. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara said it back in the 1970s: drug trafficking was an instrument of struggle.
From the Cold War, we moved on to subversive warfare, then to irregular warfare, and today to hybrid warfare.
And in this context, attacks against democracies in the region such as Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile are materializing in the form of forced migration, drug trafficking, terrorism, gang operations, and the Tren de Aragua.
Today, the threat has crossed all borders, with the enemy already identified and operating in a hybrid war that points to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia as the main epicenters of this aggression.
Diálogo: At what point did Venezuela cease to be a problem of internal politics or a border or regional concern, and become a direct threat to international stability?
Sánchez Berzaín: Venezuela became an international threat when oil money began to run out. Venezuela was a very rich country, but the expansion of the Castro-Chávez project, which sought to control all of Latin America politically, demanded enormous resources.
When oil revenues are no longer sufficient, a decisive mechanism of transnational corruption emerges, illustrated by the Lava Jato case. [Lava Jato was the largest anti-corruption investigation ever conducted in Brazil, which brought to light a huge bribery and money laundering scheme centered on the state-owned oil company Petrobras, construction companies, and high-level politicians].
When that avenue also runs dry, the regime resorted to the most profitable route: drug trafficking, because no other business can compete with it, especially when it is operated from within the government itself. Then a key phenomenon occurred: It is not that “the drug traffickers took power,” but rather that those who were in power became the mafia. They subordinated themselves to organized crime and went on to lead that criminal conglomerate to sustain their political project.
This happened because the expansion of 21st-century socialism required an ever-increasing amount of money, not only to finance Petrocaribe, but also for gigantic operations such as sustaining various [political] campaigns. It was a transcontinental project that needed unlimited resources.
Ultimately, the expansion of narco-terrorism has a logic, which is none other than to weaken democracies, attack democratic leadership, destroy party systems, and simultaneously, finance the rise of its own leaders. When legal money is no longer sufficient, drug trafficking becomes the main source.
Venezuela was already a narco-state under Chávez, but the breaking point came with his death. When Cuba assumed total leadership of the project, drug trafficking deepened, became systematized, and institutionalized. That is when Venezuela definitively ceased to be an internal matter and became a global threat.
Diálogo: Venezuela has set alarming precedents by providing passports and identity documents to agents from outside the region, creating channels for identity laundering and covert mobility. What patterns of criminal facilitation are being replicated in the region based on the Venezuelan model, and what risks does it pose for Latin American states to become transit hubs for operations of this type?
Sánchez Berzaín: This is not new. Cuba did exactly the same thing in the 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. What seems novel in Venezuela today is simply the open — and now institutionalized — replication of a historical practice of Castroism.
For decades, Cuba was a refuge for terrorists and international fugitives. In the 1980s and 90s, a Cuban passport could “convert” anyone’s identity, and the island charged for protecting criminals. Venezuela did not invent this; it reproduces it because Cuba orders it to. Since Maduro came to power, he has acted as a puppet of the Cuban regime, and that is why all of Cuba’s historical criminal practices — false identification networks, protection of terrorists, identity laundering — now appear to be a “Venezuelan creation,” even though they are not.
The history is clear. Who protected the Colombian narco-terrorist guerrillas in the 21st century? Cuba. Where was the agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government signed after the people rejected the pact in the plebiscite? In Havana. What is happening in Venezuela is simply a transfer of the criminal axis: The hub moves from Cuba to Venezuela, where it becomes more visible because Venezuela is a large, strategically located, rich country with international influence.
This pattern is not only replicated in Venezuela: It extends to Bolivia, Nicaragua, and other regimes in the same bloc. In Bolivia, Iranians are “re-identified,” drug traffickers are protected, and documents are issued with absolute discretion. There are documented cases: one of Chapo Guzmán’s sons had an accident in Santa Cruz while training to be a civilian pilot. Last year [2024], a scandal erupted when it was discovered that a drug trafficker — Masset, still at large — was living in Santa Cruz, owned a soccer team, and participated in activities with high-ranking government officials. When the press exposed him, the authorities facilitated his escape.
Shortly thereafter, the second-in-command of the Red Command, Brazil’s second most powerful narco-terrorist group, appeared in Santa Cruz. And in Argentina, Minister Patricia Bullrich denounced the arrival of Iranians with Bolivian passports who did not even speak Spanish. It is a complete system: forged documents, criminal protection, covert mobility, and transnational networks that operate under the guise of legality.
What is the greatest risk? That political power will be supplanted by organized crime. That is the core of the problem. What is predicted? That this year the Cartel of the Suns will lose its ability to subjugate the Venezuelan people, and that this will trigger the fall of the other centers still active: Cuba and Nicaragua. Bolivia is in the process of dismantling, but it needs support.
When these four narco-terrorist dictatorships disappear as “subjects of international law,” the structure that gives them power will also fall. I am referring to diplomatic immunities, embassies turned into centers of conspiracy, espionage, and criminal protection. The Cuban embassies have always operated this way; now so do those of Venezuela and Nicaragua. Given this, how can a democracy defend itself if it must recognize diplomatic privileges for those who are attacking it?
The example is clear: During Correa’s time, Ecuador was involved in the “narco suitcase” case, a diplomatic suitcase sent to London with cocaine. That is the level of criminal penetration that has become institutionalized under this model.
Diálogo: Given the unprecedented level of coordination between criminal state actors and transnational crime, this year we have seen an increase in terrorist designations against transnational criminal organizations, from Mexican cartels to the Tren de Aragua and the Cartel of the Suns. This marks a turning point in the confrontation between criminal states and the region’s democratic and security architecture. What are the practical implications of this change?
Sánchez Berzaín: The real turning point is not in the designations, but in the change in U.S. foreign policy, which is producing a change in geopolitics — the policy applied to the territory of the Americas. The United States is redrawing the regional map with countries such as Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and even Bolivia aligning themselves with this strategy. Although others remain on the sidelines, the geopolitical shift is already underway.
And the consequences are evident in simultaneous anti-narcotics operations. We are faced with an inescapable dilemma: Either governments protect narco-terrorism, or they fulfill their basic duty to enforce the law.
That is the first change, the geopolitical reconfiguration of the hemisphere.
The second is the recovery of democratic pillars. This involves restoring the freedoms and rights currently violated by narco-terrorism; rebuilding the rule of law demolished by infamous laws designed to shield mafias; recovering judicial independence; and guaranteeing free political organization so that criminal structures cannot become parties or instruments of power.
Unlike in the 1990s, when drug traffickers financed politicians, as happened in Colombia with Ernesto Samper, today drug traffickers are the power. Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo in Nicaragua are not infiltrators; they are leaders of narco-terrorist structures. Pablo Escobar’s dream has come true; we no longer talk about contaminated politicians, but about states captured by crime.
Designations, in that sense, are only the surface of a much deeper change. For the first time in many years, the region has clearly identified the adversary, and that adversary is narco-terrorism, with Maduro’s regime as its operational hub.
What matters now is not rhetoric, but results. And these are already beginning to be seen. The most obvious case is Chile, where, following the assassination of Venezuelan Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda Moreno, an opponent of the Nicolás Maduro regime, at the hands of the Tren de Aragua, the state reacted forcefully and adopted a genuine strategy to combat transnational organized crime. In the end, what will be decisive is measuring actions, not just designations.
Diálogo: The Caribbean is often left out of the debate, but it is a strategic area for transnational criminal networks. Has the Caribbean become a mirror of the advance of organized crime linked to these regimes? What are the most obvious signs that the region is absorbing the consequences of this criminalization of politics?
Sánchez Berzaín: The Caribbean is, in fact, a direct reflection of what is happening on the continent. If Central or South America catches a cold, the Caribbean gets pneumonia. That is the magnitude of the impact. Today, the region is immediately experiencing the consequences of a transnational criminal ecosystem.
The key to reversing this trend is to remove organized crime from political power and return it to its rightful place, which is none other than law enforcement. When crime is no longer embedded in government structures, no state is subordinate to these mafias, and law enforcement becomes possible and effective.
That was the scenario in the 1990s, with specific, identifiable narco-terrorism that could be attacked within the legal framework. Today, however, the law faces obstacles such as “diplomatic immunities” that protect criminal operators.
The truth is that the Caribbean and the entire hemisphere will be in a better position when crime leaves politics. Today, organizations such as the Tren de Aragua operate under the protection of the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. A member of the Tren de Aragua seeking refuge can go to a Cuban, Venezuelan, or Nicaraguan embassy.
When crime returns to its true dimension, which is criminal, and ceases to be protected by state structures, law enforcement will no longer be an impossible battle and will regain its effectiveness. That is the path that must be followed.
PART II
In the second part of this interview, Carlos Sánchez Berzaín examines how Venezuela, along with other allied regimes, has become a central stage for global hybrid warfare. From the operational penetration of Iran and its terrorist networks to the strategic influence of China and Russia in infrastructure, technology, and critical resources, the region, Sánchez Berzaín warns, is now a strategic hub of transnational destabilization.
