China is rapidly expanding its footprint in Latin America’s space sector, now operating more space facilities than anywhere else outside its own territory. In an exclusive interview with Diálogo, Guido Torres, a national security expert and executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI), a collaborative space to bridge the gap between academia and military professionals, unpacks the strategic implications of this expansion, highlighting the dual-use potential of these installations and the risks they pose to regional sovereignty and security.
Torres reveals how these facilities could be used to track satellites, intercept sensitive data, and even guide hypersonic missiles reshaping Latin America’s security landscape. Transparency, oversight, and strategic vigilance are no longer options, they are essential warns Torres.
Diálogo: What is China’s strategy behind prioritizing Latin America for its space infrastructure development?
Guido Torres, executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI): Space is important for China, but it’s just one piece of a much broader strategy they have developed. We often hear about the Belt and Road Initiative, but there is also the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative — and, in the realm of space, the Space Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road. All of these initiatives are part of Xi Jinping’s overarching global strategy, anchored in economics and extending across multiple domains.
Now, when we look at why China has established so many space stations in Latin America — particularly in South America — we have to ask: What’s the real purpose? A benign explanation is coverage. China has already secured the Eastern Hemisphere, and now they seek to extend coverage to the Western Hemisphere.
However, when you examine China’s strategies and plans closely, a clear pattern emerges. What they want is to interconnect the world, with space as just one component of that vision. While this may serve scientific goals, nothing that China does has a single purpose. There’s always a secondary objective behind everything they do.
That’s why this raises an important question: What are the risks associated with the expansion of these space stations for the host nations themselves? What does it mean for their sovereignty when they agree to host these Chinese space facilities?
Diálogo: And that’s the central question. While this space infrastructure is often presented as a form of scientific collaboration, many of these facilities are managed, directly or indirectly, by organizations linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and are, by nature, dual-use. What specific technologies, capabilities, or operational features enable these facilities to serve both civilian and military purposes?
Torres: That’s a very challenging question, because in space, almost everything can be dual-use in nature. You really have to peel back the layers. And a lot of times, what we hear is: “Where’s the evidence? Where are the facts that these sites are being militarized?”
One good example is the Neuquén station in Argentina. What’s interesting about this space facility is that although it is supposed to be scientific, the company that runs it, CLTC [China Launch and Tracking Control General], has direct links to the PLA. That’s the first red flag.
Second, Argentine officials must give several days’ advance notice before they can even access the site. If it’s purely scientific, why the need for such restrictions?
Third, when you compare the Chinese version of the agreements with the Spanish or English versions, the language doesn’t always align — and the differences tend to favor China.
Finally, and this is rarely discussed, there’s a contractual element that raises concern: Many of these agreements include a “cross-default clause.” This means that if a host country withdraws from one project — whether it’s a space station, a port, or another infrastructure venture — it could trigger defaults across all other agreements with Chinese companies or state-owned enterprises. That makes it extremely costly and risky to exit.
All of this reflects how interconnected China’s approach is. The Chinese Communist Party coordinates the scientific, commercial, and military dimensions of its projects. When you start pulling at the threads, you see how tightly they are woven into a single strategic design.
Diálogo: Given that these facilities often restrict host-country access and that their agreements frequently tilt in China’s favor, what does this mean in practical terms from a defense and sovereignty standpoint? How could such limitations and contractual clauses translate into real strategic risks for the nations that host them?
Torres: First, it’s important to note that legitimate scientific cooperation is characterized by transparency, meaning host countries can freely access facilities, observe operations, and openly share data.
When you compare that to certain Chinese-operated facilities, whether it’s Neuquén in Argentina, Cerros Ventarrones in Chile, or the China-Argentina radio telescope, you start to see irregularities. Why the restricted access? What activities require such secrecy? From a sovereignty perspective, that alone should raise concern.
But it goes deeper. Imagine a hypothetical conflict between China and the West. These facilities are dual-use. Today, they might be focused on peaceful space science, but under China’s National Intelligence Law and National Security Law, any Chinese entity, whether an academic institution, a state-owned enterprise, or a private company, can be compelled to act in service of the state.
This means that in a crisis, facilities presented as scientific could rapidly be repurposed for military or intelligence operations, leaving host nations entangled in a great-power confrontation. That’s why transparency and oversight are not just good governance practices, they are essential safeguards to protect national sovereignty and mitigate strategic risk.
Diálogo: Given the fine print in the contracts you mentioned and the lack of transparency, how can China specifically leverage these dual-use space facilities to influence or exert pressure on host countries in South America and the broader region?
Torres: In some countries, their space programs are closely linked to their communications systems, for example, if they rely on Chinese platforms like Baidu. In those cases, China could potentially shut down or deny access, which is already a significant risk.
But looking at the bigger picture and how everything is interconnected, imagine a scenario where a country decides it doesn’t want to be caught in the middle of a conflict. That country might try to restrict access to these dual-use facilities, for example shut off power or prevent operations at the site.
What could China do in response? Let’s take Chile as an example. China reportedly owns a significant share, possibly over 50 percent of Chile’s power grid. So, China could theoretically “pull the lever” and cut power, which raises serious sovereignty concerns.
Beyond energy, China could also use economic tools like trade embargoes or other forms of pressure to influence the host country.
Diálogo: Can you identify strategic locations in the placement of Chinese space facilities across the region, and explain the geopolitical or military factors that make these sites particularly significant?
Torres: Some of the key sites are part of Chinese projects known as the ION Project and the Sitan Project. Globally, there are five planned sites. Originally, these included Australia — which later withdrew — as well as South Africa, Chile, and Mexico. Collectively, these five facilities could scan the Earth every 30 minutes, allowing China to observe virtually anything it needs, something that raises clear concerns from an espionage standpoint.
One of the most important sites under construction is the one in Chile, Cerros Ventarrones, which is strategically prized for its exceptionally clear skies, making it ideal for astronomical observation and space surveillance.
Additionally, moving further south to regions closer to Antarctica holds significant importance for low Earth orbit (LEO). Due to orbital mechanics, polar-adjacent locations allow more frequent passes and better coverage, this is very significant as well.
In short, geography plays a crucial role in space-based observation. Factors such as elevation, sky clarity, and proximity to certain latitudes all directly affect a site’s strategic value. We need to be aware of the potential implications of these developments.
PART II
In the second part of this interview, Torres explains a theoretical but plausible link between China’s space facilities in Latin America and the guidance of hypersonic glide vehicles, which could be used to deliver devastating strikes from southern vectors that bypass traditional defenses.
