As part of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) — the plan launched by Xi Jinping in 2022 that uses security as a lever for geopolitical influence — state-owned defense corporation China North Industries Group (Norinco) is rapidly expanding its presence in Latin America. The company is not limiting itself to selling weapons and designing production plants; its goal is to establish itself as the main supplier to the regional military market.
In April 2025, during LAAD, one of Brazil’s most important defense and security trade shows, Norinco presented a wide range of its arsenal to Latin American armed forces, including advanced anti-tank and air-to-ground missile systems.
The risks associated with this expansion are numerous, ranging from the establishment of a strategic dependency trap to the marketing of systems that can be managed or monitored remotely, as well as quality issues that could compromise the defense capabilities of purchasing countries.
“Norinco suffers because of the quality of its products, and especially because of its after-sales service and logistical support,” Argentine defense expert Ricardo Runza told Diálogo.
In 2003, Norinco was sanctioned for having materially contributed to Iran’s program to develop missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Weapons manufactured by the Chinese company are also used by the terrorist organization Hamas, while, according to a Reuters investigation, components attributable to Norinco have been identified in Russian weaponry used in the war in Ukraine. In Venezuela, the company has supplied the Nicolás Maduro regime police forces with military-grade riot control equipment.
The case of Brazil
According to Brazilian daily Estado de São Paulo, in May 2025, reports surfaced detailing Norinco’s plan to set up a center in Bahia state dedicated to the production of military equipment for all of Latin America.
“China promotes partnerships with countries to which it wants to sell weapons in order to manufacture them wholly or partially on site, facilitating maintenance and the opening of workshops,” says Runza.
This initiative is part of a broader strategy by the Chinese government to strengthen military cooperation with Brazil in exchange for access to territory, resources, and strategic infrastructure, such as the Alcântara Launch Center in Maranhão state, one of the most strategic space bases in the world, located just over two degrees south of the equator. This access would allow Beijing to reduce satellite launch costs by up to 30 percent and secure a privileged position in the South Atlantic.
According to Brazilian news site Sociedade Militar, in exchange for access to the Alcântara base, China has offered the Brazilian Armed Forces a complete military package, including Norinco VT-4 tanks, VN-20 infantry vehicles, 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, and even the Chengdu J-10 supersonic fighter jet. The J-10 was proposed as a temporary solution, designed to bridge a capability gap until the Swedish Gripen E — Brazil’s official choice for modernizing its Air Force — is fully operational.
The offer would also include technical assistance, personnel training, and a partial transfer of technology, with the prospect of future local assembly in Bahia state. In the first half of 2025, Norinco has reportedly expressed interest in acquiring a stake in Avibras, Brazil’s leading manufacturer of heavy defense systems, specializing in missiles and rocket artillery for the country’s Armed Forces.
Peru
The Peruvian Ministry of Defense has purchased two state-of-the-art drones equipped with advanced three-dimensional mapping systems from Norinco, intended for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions against illegal activities.
The agreement also provides for the training of 20 Peruvian military operators in the use of drones and the Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system. This forces a reliance on the Chinese navigation system for operation, which experts warn creates a “digital backdoor.”
According to Reuters, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is investing in increasingly autonomous technologies driven by artificial intelligence. Analysts warn that Norinco drones, by relying on BeiDou, centralize sensitive intelligence with Beijing and create vulnerabilities to data leaks, backdoors in the firmware, and other cyber threats that could allow remote control of the device or manipulation of the information collected.
“What can be risky is geopolitically associating with China, given that China always asserts its political, economic, and commercial power asymmetry over weaker countries. In societies prone to corruption, this is what is truly dangerous and what needs to be strengthened,” says Runza.
For years, China has been building a network of relationships with Latin American armed forces to support its commercial interests in the defense sector. Back in 2018, Beijing launched a program offering military officers from the region luxury stays in China for themselves and their families, as part of training courses designed to strengthen strategic ties with Latin American countries.
Fueling organized crime
Weapons manufactured by Norinco are also feeding the region’s illegal markets, creating a security dilemma where the supplier of the solution (Norinco) also supplies the means for the problem. According to several organized crime reports, rifles such as the Norinco CQ (a copy of the M16) have been trafficked through international networks to groups such as Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). These military-grade weapons, along with sophisticated equipment, are contributing to the growing militarization of criminal activities in countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, and Brazil.
An investigation by Peruvian news site Ojo Público revealed that, since 2010, thousands of Chinese-made rifles have entered Colombia, becoming a key element in the rearmament and expansion of criminal gangs, paramilitary groups, and other non-state armed organizations.
In Brazil, several police operations have also documented the purchase of Norinco weapons by local criminal groups. In March 2025, the Brazilian Federal Police dismantled a military weapons trafficking network led by Álvaro Malaquias Santa Rosa, known as Peixão, one of the leaders of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) criminal faction. The group illegally imported heavy weapons, ammunition, grenades, and anti-drone equipment from Paraguay and China using international courier services. In addition, in 2024, a joint operation by Rio de Janeiro security forces led to the seizure of eight Roni kits from China, accessories capable of transforming semi-automatic weapons into much more powerful ones, including those with burst-fire capability.
The popularity of Norinco weapons among cartels and criminal groups is due to their affordable prices and ease of acquisition (often even by mail). This lack of effective control and transparency in Chinese military exports acts as a force multiplier for organized crime, raising serious concerns about the stability of the region.
The convergence of these factors — Norinco’s aggressive sales tactics, the associated technical vulnerabilities, and China’s strategic military diplomacy — creates a fundamental security dilemma for Latin America. The problem extends far beyond illegal arms trafficking: By relying on state-subsidized Chinese defense equipment, purchasing nations risk falling into a strategic dependency trap, potentially compromising their long-term defense capabilities and limiting their independent foreign policy options. The use of technology like the BeiDou system in military assets introduces a persistent digital backdoor, exposing sensitive national intelligence to external monitoring. Ultimately, Norinco’s expanded footprint represents a complex, systemic threat that endangers regional stability, promotes the militarization of organized crime, and erodes national sovereignty.
