The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a series of global initiatives to appear to be responding to today’s global challenges. However, as they advance in Latin America, these strategies prioritize Beijing’s geopolitical interests over principles such as transparency, human rights, and democracy.
“The CCP presents a discourse that sounds attractive: It shows a country that achieved success without relying on traditional structures and without ordering the global economy,” Vladimir Rouvinski, director of the Department of Politics and International Relations at ICESI University in Colombia, told Diálogo.
Until 2021, China’s foreign policy revolved around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Starting that year, Beijing launched new proposals: the Global Development Initiative (GDI) in 2021; the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022; and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) in 2023, to contribute to “better global governance.”
The book, China as a Rising Norm Entrepreneur, published by the Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) of Singapore’s Ministry of Education, argues that these initiatives seek to create an international environment that supports the stability of the Chinese regime and favors its development and security interests. Within this framework, Beijing is promoting a redefinition of global norms away from prevailing democratic standards.
What do these initiatives propose?
The three initiatives are part of an effort by the CCP to strengthen its internal legitimacy and external influence. The GDI promotes an agenda based on human development, innovation, and sustainability. Unlike the BRI, which focuses on large infrastructure projects, the GDI proposes “small and useful” projects aimed at improving everyday life, according to ISEAS.
For its part, the GSI promotes a vision of shared security, with an emphasis on cooperation over confrontation between blocs, although it lacks clear operational mechanisms. The GCI proposes respect for cultural diversity, dialogue between civilizations, and the defense of common values, although without structure or verifiable goals. Its orientation aims to broaden acceptance of the Chinese communist system within the international order, ISEAS notes.
A useful facade
Although China presents these proposals as a coherent plan for global cooperation, in practice they respond to opportunities that its companies, large and small, know how to exploit, Rouvinski said. The official narrative serves as a backdrop to justify investments or contracts in Latin America.
“China is very skilled at using this discourse. It uses it when it needs to legitimize its actions or reinforce its presence. But we are not looking at a Marshall Plan or an alliance for progress,” Rouvinski said. “There is no clearly defined strategy, nor is there any transparency about the true intentions behind these proposals.”
According to Rouvinski, although there may be some internal action plan within the CCP, it is not public. “What is clear is that these initiatives serve as a facade, giving China ample room to maneuver to consolidate its geopolitical and economic influence in Latin America.”
Despite the cooperation rhetoric, these initiatives generate tensions. International organizations like the International Service for Human Rights Projects call attention to projects funded by Chinese capital in strategic sectors such as mining, energy, and infrastructure, and document cases of human rights violations and lack of prior consultation with indigenous communities in countries including Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
The CCP’s cooperation model, as outlined by Latin American platform Diálogo Político, relies on bilateral agreements, soft power, limited public oversight, and opaque processes. This model often ties Chinese investment to the recipient country’s support for Beijing’s political tenets, such as the “one China,” policy. According to Mexican daily Excélsior, this conditionality limits the autonomy of recipient countries and creates governance tissues.
Latin America at a crossroads
“The CCP strategically invests in universities and think tanks in Latin America to improve its image in the region,” Rouvinski said. “Through academic funding, it promotes spaces that, although not very visible to the public, indoctrinate experts who advise governments, draft public policy documents, and provide consulting services. This tactic allows it to indirectly influence key decisions without direct exposure.”
According to Rouvinski, a concrete case can be seen in Colombia, where the construction of the Bogotá metro, carried out by Chinese companies, is presented as a solution to decades of urban transport delays. “Now China has arrived, and they are going to solve our problems,” some people say, alluding to how China’s presence is sometimes associated with visible results.
Other examples include the Port of Chancay in Peru, which seeks to transform regional maritime trade, and the electricity grids in Brazil, where priority is given to ensuring a stable supply. Both are generating debate and uncertain expectations among the population.
Serious risks
“The GDI, GSI, and GCI initiatives pose serious risks for Latin America, as many countries are becoming increasingly dependent on an opaque actor such as China, unlike other international institutions, however criticized they may be, which maintain clear rules and transparent processes,” Rouvinski said. “With China, on the other hand, the terms of the agreements are rarely known.”
The loans and projects promoted by Beijing operate with little transparency and without environmental safeguards or governance standards, stressed investigative journalism platform Expediente Público. Many are developed under “turnkey” schemes, with Chinese personnel and materials, which then compete with local companies.
For Rouvinski, this lack of transparency entails risks such as over-indebtedness and loss of control over strategic assets. “This is happening before our very eyes, but neither decision-makers nor public opinion seem to realize the scope,” he said.
Imagined vision
“What we are seeing with these initiatives is the construction of an imagined reality. A narrative that, although attractive sounding on paper and presented as an alternative, does not reflect what is happening in practice,” said Rouvinski. “The risk lies in taking that image as true and making decisions based on it, which will lead to bigger problems.”
While many nations in the Northern Hemisphere are cautious about China’s expansion in the region, “there is still no common strategy in Latin America,” Rouvinski concluded. “Many countries remain trapped in this idealized vision of what Beijing represents. Unfortunately, in the short and medium term, everything indicates that its influence and initiatives will continue to grow.”
