In this in-depth interview with Diálogo, Ryan C. Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), discusses how China’s engagement with Latin America has evolved from a seemingly benign economic partnership into a complex web of strategic, political, and security entanglements.
Over two decades after Beijing’s first major push into the region, China’s influence now extends beyond trade, reaching into ports, space infrastructure, telecommunications, and even domestic politics. Berg sheds light on how the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “hide and bide” strategy has enabled it to quietly expand its footprint while maintaining the image of a cooperative partner.
Diálogo: On several occasions, you’ve mentioned that China has been very good at following Deng Xiaoping’s advice, later echoed by Xi Jinping, to “hide your strength and bide your time.” Two decades after China’s initial aggressive foray into Latin America, marked by major loans and its portrayal as a reliable trading partner, has the country revealed its strength?
Ryan C. Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): China has been exceptionally good at using rhetoric that’s disarming, like language centered on multilateralism, cooperation, and “win-win” partnerships. But in reality, what they’re doing is highly strategic. It’s not “win-win;” it’s “win-lose,” or at best, “win-win” where China wins twice.
They’ve mastered the art of projecting soft, friendly rhetoric while pursuing an aggressive, calculated strategy. Today, they still benefit from being perceived as less confrontational, using softer language that appeals to the region’s desire to remain non-aligned and avoid a single hegemony, yet behaving very much like one. They’ve balanced these two faces remarkably well, appearing benign while acting strategically. That’s the strength they’ve concealed and are now beginning to reveal.
What always strikes me is how quickly the economic relationship opens the door to everything else. You start with a major trade deal or infrastructure investment, and within a few years, you see Confucius Institutes established, political exchanges with the CCP’s International Liaison Department, and even security cooperation, including the deployment of surveillance systems like Safe Cities. So, the door opens for economic reasons, but it swings wide open. And China moves fast. They rush in through every possible avenue like education, politics and security. The initial approach may be economic, but the endgame is always strategic.
Diálogo: Investigations have revealed that in countries like the United Arab Emirates and Equatorial Guinea, China has financed port projects designed with specifications that could facilitate military access. In Latin America and the Caribbean, China has invested in nearly 40 ports. What does this reveal about China’s broader strategy?
Berg: Part of China’s “hide and bide” strategy is precisely to avoid establishing a visible global basing network that would draw attention or alarm. Instead, Beijing has chosen an approach that raises fewer suspicions and provokes less pushback, focusing on the construction of infrastructure, particularly ports, that appear to be purely commercial. These facilities operate as civilian ports 90 to 95 percent of the time, yet in the event of a conflict or crisis, they can quickly be repurposed for military functions such as logistics, resupply, or naval support. That dual-use capability is no coincidence, it is deliberately built into this design. It is part of the “hide and bide” approach which is to frame these projects as purely commercial while keeping their strategic potential quietly in reserve.
When critics highlight the potential military implications, Beijing dismisses them as geopolitical paranoia. The official line is always that these are commercial investments promoting development. But the military potential is there waiting to be activated if needed. China is deliberately shifting flows from a traditional north–south orientation to an east–west axis connecting Latin America directly to Asia.
That’s precisely the purpose of Peru’s Chancay Port. It’s meant to serve as a hub linking Pacific ports in Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia, as well as overland routes from Brazil and Argentina. By channeling exports through Chancay, shipments to Shanghai can be shortened by about 10 days, reducing dependence on the Panama Canal or U.S. ports like Long Beach. In short, China is reducing its own strategic vulnerabilities while deepening its footprint across the hemisphere.
Diálogo: China’s growing role in space infrastructure has raised additional concerns. South America now hosts more Chinese space assets than any other region outside China. While these initiatives are framed as scientific cooperation, projects like the Espacio Lejano Station in Argentina’s Patagonia have faced scrutiny for potential military use. Is Latin America becoming more cautious about such partnerships in critical infrastructure?
Berg: Yes, I do think Latin American countries are becoming more aware, partly due to stronger messaging highlighting the sovereignty and security risks associated with such projects. Take Chile’s case for example. The Atacama observatory project was nearly complete when Chilean authorities halted it, citing the lack of a proper state-to-state agreement. That kind of decisive action would have been unthinkable years ago. It signals a new level of scrutiny and awareness about the strategic implications of Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors like space and communications. These aren’t just scientific partnerships, they can affect regional security and national sovereignty, and Latin American governments are beginning to recognize that.
Diálogo: Several countries have banned or restricted chinse companies such as Huawei and ZTE from their 5G networks over security and privacy concerns. Yet China’s digital presence continues to grow in the region. What risks does this pose?
Berg: The risks are significant, not just to data privacy but to democracy itself. Chinese digital infrastructure has helped entrench authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Cuba, and we’re likely to see similar patterns in Nicaragua. These systems can shut down social media, messaging platforms, and protest coordination tools, silencing dissent at critical moments. That’s a profound threat to democratic governance. Citizens must demand communication systems that governments cannot manipulate or shut down. Allowing an authoritarian partner to build your digital backbone gives them the means to control information and that has lasting consequences for freedom and democracy.
Diálogo: China’s influence in Latin America also extends deeply into the energy sector. Today, it controls 100 percent of energy distribution in Lima, Peru’s capital, and around 12 percent of Brazil’s energy value chain. Should this growing control over such a critical sector by an authoritarian regime raise alarm?
Berg: It’s deeply concerning because energy is the economy’s lifeblood. Without it, there’s no industrialization, no economic activity. That’s why it is so surprising to see state-owned enterprises, like State Grid in Brazil, move so aggressively into this space, and even more surprising, to see governments allow the, to acquire such critical asset.
While I don’t think Beijing would literally “turn off the lights,” the potential disruption, even hypothetical, gives China leverage. That possibility alone can influence political decisions. Governments might restrain certain diplomatic or security moves, of fear that Beijing could retaliate through its control over key infrastructure. So, while direct interference may never happen, the threat itself serves as a deterrent, a subtle yet powerful form of influence.
Part II:
In the second half of our conversation, Berg explores one of the most consequential, yet often overlooked, dimensions of China’s expanding footprint in Latin America. He argues that China’s rise has coincided with a challenging period for democracy in the region, and delves into the mechanisms of influence that range from economic dependency to sharp power and regime protection. Berg illustrates these dynamics with striking examples, such as how Latin America’s biggest economy supported Huawei’s 5G bid out of fear of losing access to Chinese markets.
