El Salvador has taken a significant step toward the development of renewable energy by signing a contract with the Chinese state-owned company PowerChina for the construction of a 30 MW photovoltaic project in the municipality of Conchagua, La Unión department. The agreement marks China’s official entry into El Salvador’s renewable energy sector, expanding Beijing’s presence into another strategic area of the country’s long-term development and reinforcing its growing footprint in critical infrastructure.
Announced in March, the contract includes the design, construction, supply, installation, testing, and commissioning of the solar plant, as well as a new 34.5/115 kV electrical substation in the strategic La Unión Bay area. The project represents China’s first direct participation in electricity generation infrastructure in El Salvador, adding the energy sector to a broader portfolio of investments that analysts say can increase long-term dependence on Chinese financing, technology, and technical expertise.
The plant’s location further underscores its strategic importance. Conchagua is emerging as one of the focal points of development in eastern El Salvador, where major infrastructure initiatives converge, including the Pacific Airport project and the modernization of the Port of La Unión through a partnership between the state-owned Autonomous Executive Port Commission (CEPA) and Yilport Holding. As eastern El Salvador develops into a key logistics and commercial corridor, analysts warn that China’s growing presence in strategic infrastructure warrants closer scrutiny because of its potential implications for economic security, national sovereignty, and long-term strategic influence.
China’s expansive strategy in strategic infrastructure
China’s involvement in Latin America extends beyond infrastructure construction. According to energy analyst Ramsés Pech, Chinese companies increasingly seek participation across the entire energy value chain, including generation, transmission, distribution, and supporting infrastructure.
“It’s not just the acquisition of resources; it’s the operational control of essential infrastructure,” Pech explained to specialized publication Energía Hoy.
Analysts argue that China’s approach is designed to secure a lasting presence across multiple layers of strategic infrastructure rather than through isolated investments. As Chinese state-owned enterprises expand from transportation and logistics into energy generation and transmission, they become increasingly embedded in sectors that governments depend on for long-term economic growth and national development.
PowerChina’s record in Latin America
PowerChina’s expansion in Latin America is marked by a series of controversies.
In Ecuador, Sinohydro, a subsidiary of PowerChina, built the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, which began operations in 2016. The approximately $3 billion project has since become one of the region’s most controversial infrastructure developments after thousands of structural cracks were detected and Ecuador initiated arbitration and settlement negotiations over defects. The project has also been linked to severe erosion along the Coca River that contributed to the disappearance of the San Rafael waterfall and damage to surrounding infrastructure.
In Bolivia, PowerChina also faces criticism for environmental and social impacts associated with its projects. In Cochabamba, the construction of the Ivirizu hydroelectric plant affected 18 communities and destroyed 280 hectares of Carrasco National Park. Labor disputes and questions about the quality of the completed works have also been reported.
In Colombia, the company has also encountered contractual disputes and financial penalties related to delays in major renewable energy projects, underscoring concerns surrounding project execution.
Growing concerns over strategic dependence
China’s growing role in Latin America’s strategic sectors continues to raise concerns among security analysts.
María Isabel Puerta, a political scientist and Ph.D. in Social Sciences, believes that Chinese investments can create long-term dependency risks for countries in the region.
“The Chinese regime’s grip seeks to weaken Latin American countries to foster dependence,” Puerta told Diálogo. She stressed the importance of strengthening legal and institutional safeguards capable of protecting national interests when negotiating agreements that may prove unfavorable in the long term.
Similar patterns are emerging elsewhere in the region. In Cuba, Chinese-backed solar and energy cooperation has expanded amid a worsening energy crisis driven by deteriorating infrastructure, chronic shortages, and years of economic dysfunction under the Cuban regime. Analysts warn that Beijing’s growing role in strategic sectors could help sustain the regime’s operational resilience while deepening Havana’s long-term dependence on China.
China’s growing presence in energy, transportation, and other strategic sectors across Latin America reflects a broader effort to establish long-term influence through critical infrastructure. While these investments may provide short-term economic opportunities, critics warn that increasing dependence on Chinese state-owned enterprises in sectors essential to national development can create lasting vulnerabilities affecting transparency, strategic autonomy, and national sovereignty.
