Brazil faces an alarming phenomenon: the sophistication of the illegal arms market. Security forces have ramped up efforts to curb the expansion of a criminal arms industry that, according to Brazilian magazine Fórum, has moved beyond the traditional model of smuggling finished complex weapons. Criminal networks have migrated to a more advanced, industrialized model. Now, clandestine workshops assemble weapons from fragments and loose parts, incorporate 3D-printed components, and employ their own logistics chains that resemble industrial production lines.
From smuggling to domestic production: the rise of “ghost guns”
The severity of this transformation is undeniable. “The evidence is unequivocal. Recent seizures — which include not only complete weapons manufactured in illegal industrial plants, but also large quantities of parts, conversion kits, and 3D-printed parts, point to a clear transition,” Roberto Uchôa, a researcher at the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, told Diálogo. “The ability to assemble, modify, and even manufacture weapons within the national territory, so-called ghost guns, represents a new and dangerous military autonomy for these organizations.”
An emblematic case occurred in late October 2025, when the Rio de Janeiro Civil Police carried out a precise operation against the organized crime group Red Command (CV). In the Alemão and Penha favela complexes in Rio de Janeiro, they seized 120 rifles assembled with parts from both contraband and legal purchases on the internet, O Globo reported. The group was supplied by a network of clandestine factories in Minas Gerais and São Paulo states.
Criminal modernization and industrial scale
The growth of the illegal arms industry in Brazil is not new, but it has taken on new dimensions. “2017 was a year of widespread expansion of organized crime and gang wars. The result was a significant increase in the demand for weapons […], but at that time, criminals did not have good local alternatives for obtaining rifles. Homemade weapons had the advantage of being cheaper and untraceable,” Bruno Langeani, senior consultant at the Sou da Paz Institute in Brazil, told Insight Crime. Starting in 2023, the emergence of clandestine factories with sophisticated machinery, including 3D printers, enabled the industrial production of rifles. “This new method does not depend on external parts; criminals produce everything in their factories,” Langeani emphasized.
In 2023, the Federal Police detected a clandestine rifle factory equipped with industrial machinery in Belo Horizonte, operating under the guise of a carpentry shop. The discovery opened up new lines of investigation, and on October 15, 2025, the police dismantled a criminal structure with the capacity to manufacture 3,500 rifles per year, using high-precision equipment and components imported mainly from China.
The CV is not the only group exploiting this trend. The First Capital Command (PCC), Brazil’s largest and most powerful criminal organization, is also highly capable of utilizing these domestic ghost gun networks. The PCC’s strength lies in its transnational, corporate structure, which allows it to secure massive funding and logistics. For instance, major operations in 2025, such as Operation Carbono Oculto (Hidden Carbon), targeted the PCC for infiltrating Brazil’s fuel sector to launder billions, demonstrating the deep financial resources available to fund both large-scale arms trafficking and the sophisticated domestic manufacturing of illegal weapons.
The prevalence of this new domestic manufacturing relies heavily on the ease of importing components through legal trade channels. The U.S. Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) provided a revealing figure that illustrates this massive volume: In September 2025 alone, China exported weapons, ammunition, and accessories worth $956,000 to Brazil. This large-scale, legitimate flow provides ample cover for criminal networks to secretly import the sophisticated industrial components, machinery, and parts needed for their ghost weapon factories.
Deficiencies in data recording and intelligence
A crucial obstacle to tackling the illicit arms market is the lack of structured data on seizures. The study Blind Fire: The Rise of Military-Style Firearms Amid Regulatory Failures and Data Gaps in Brazil, published in London by the Journal of Illicit Economics and Development, points out that data on seized weapons is not adequately collected or organized, limiting efforts to diagnose and combat the illegal market.
The research, which focuses on southeastern Brazil between 2019 and 2023, highlights the need for interagency cooperation, centralized intelligence, and the strengthening of forensic units, especially in light of the proliferation of ghost guns and handmade submachine guns.
Two major limitations affect data production: First, the lack of collection and organization of key information, especially on private or modified weapons; and second, quality issues in existing data, such as inconsistent records and unstructured databases. These shortcomings make it difficult to understand and effectively combat the illicit market.
Weapons as a strategic asset
“Weapons are no longer merely a tool of defense in illicit transactions; they have become the main strategic asset,” Uchôa emphasizes. “The ostentatious rifle is not just a weapon of war; it regulates social life in communities, ensures extortion, payment for services such as gas, internet, and ‘security,’ and silences the population.”
Crucially, the demand for these domestically produced and smuggled arms is inextricably linked to the region’s narco-state crisis. Both the PCC and CV rely on the international cocaine pipeline originating in the Andean region. The expansion of these Brazilian groups into the Amazon and the border areas directly exploits the instability and corruption along the Venezuelan frontier, where the Cartel of the Suns provide transit and impunity for drug shipments. The arms-for-drugs trade and the ability to secure the border region are therefore fundamental to the survival and industrial growth of Brazil’s criminal factions.
Strategies for a comprehensive approach
Combating the violence stemming from the rise of high-powered homemade weapons requires a multifaceted approach. In the short term, Uchôa recommends “the creation of permanent task forces dedicated exclusively to controlling the flow of weapons, auto parts, and ammunition, with an emphasis on financial investigation to track funds and decapitalize buyers.” In addition, he suggests massive investment in control technology, such as non-intrusive scanners at ports, airports, postal distribution centers, and highways, as well as rigorous control of public arsenals and legal trade to curb the diversion of resources.
One step in this direction is the recent creation of the Emergency Office for Combating Organized Crime, which seeks to reduce bureaucracy, improve state intelligence, and launch integrated operations to dismantle criminal leaders, Agência Brasil reported.
The arms business is no longer a simple appendage of drug trafficking; today, Brazil faces an autonomous, technologically advanced criminal industry with its own investments and increasingly decentralized production. Given the transnational nature of Brazil’s major criminal organizations and their deep reliance on the Andean drug trade, this domestic manufacturing capability poses a proliferation threat across the South American region.
