This article was adapted from a piece published on The Diplomat on February 23, 2024.
Introduction
Activities by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the security and defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean are a small, but strategically significant portion of its engagement with the region. The PRC has openly acknowledged its interest in engaging with the region on security matters in the 2008 and 2016 China-Latin America Policy White Papers, as well as in the 2022-2024 China-CELAC plan. That interest is also reflected in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs white paper elaborating China’s Global Security initiative.
The security dimension of PRC engagement in the region has been highlighted by the head of U.S. Southern Command and other senior U.S. defense officials, as well as occasional coverage in the media and academic works, generally with a focus on the threat. The present work compliments those writings by providing a brief overview for a general audience, of the characteristics and trends in PRC security engagement in the region, and how it is evolving, focusing on seven major trends:
- Focus of Arms Purchases on Anti-U.S. Populist States
- Chinese Use of Gifts to Develop Security Relationships
- Procurement and Quality Difficulties
- Setbacks in PRC Arms Sales to Democratic States
- Increasingly Persistent PRC military presence in Latin America
- Expanding Activities by PRC-Based Private Security Companies in Latin America
- Increasing Training of Latin American Security Personnel in the PRC
Focus of Arms Purchases on Anti-U.S. Populist States. To date, the principal purchasers of PRC military equipment in Latin America have been anti-U.S. populist regimes, including Venezuela (under Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro), Bolivia (under Evo Morales), and Ecuador (under Raffael Correa).
Venezuela’s purchases from the PRC during those periods include 25 Hongdu K-8W fighter aircraft (18 in 2008 and 7 more in 2010), as well as military radars. They also include Chinese armored vehicles such as the VN-4 purchased for the Venezuelan Naval Infantry beginning in 2012, and the ZBL-09 Armored Personnel Carriers, as well as Chinese riot control vehicles, purchased for the Bolivarian National Guard beginning in 2013. The PRC has also sold Venezuela C-802 anti-ship missiles (beginning in 2020), DJI Mavic Air UAVs (since 2014), and at least 215 SAIC/IVECO military ambulances, among other items.
With respect to Bolivia, the PRC sold the Morales regime 6 K-8W fighters, 6 H-425 military helicopters, and 31 armored vehicles, as well as donating a number of dual use vehicles and equipment over the years.
The PRC sold the anti-US populist regime of Rafael Correa in Ecuador 709 military trucks, a CETC radar system, and 10,000 assault rifles, albeit with substantial problems, as discussed later.
China has had some success in military sales to less anti-US regimes. PRC military-affiliated industries have also had some success selling non-military goods to governments in the region.
Chinese Use of Gifts to Develop Security Relationships. The PRC has regularly donated vehicles and equipment to Latin American military and police forces as part of its efforts to curry goodwill and build relationships.
Such donations often concentrate on dual use vehicles and engineering equipment, rather than weapon systems, per se. They have also included military transport aircraft.
PRC donations of security equipment to the region have focused on police forces, with whom Chinese engagement may appear less strategically challenging, yet where the sheer needs of the beneficiaries magnify the good will purchased by the PRC investment.
Procurement and Quality Difficulties. Latin American countries across the political spectrum have had significant difficulties with their arms purchases and gifts from the PRC. At least four of the K-8W fighters Venezuela purchased from the PRC had crashed by 2022, with some problems attributed to errors arising from poorly translated Chinese technical manuals. In Bolivia, two of the six Chinese K-8Ws have similarly crashed.
In Ecuador, problems with the performance of the radars led the PRC-sympathetic government of Rafael Correa to return them, ultimately devolving into a protracted legal dispute.
Both Argentina and Peru have had difficulties with poor quality of Chinese munitions, leading to the jamming of guns and the endangering of personnel firing them, particularly in combat situations.
Military trucks given to Peru by the PRC had problems violently shaking at road speeds. The effects were reportedly so severe that the Peruvian military wanted to return the donated vehicles. A Y-12 transport aircraft donated to Colombia had to be taken out of service after flying through inclement weather rendered it unairworthy.
In the case of both Peru’s purchase of the Chinese Type-90B MLRS, and Bolivia’s purchase of the H-425 helicopters, suspicion of corruption in the acquisition contract, including inflation of the purchase price, led to investigations by the governments buying the equipment.
Setbacks in PRC Arms Sales to Democratic States. Although the PRC continues to pursue arms sales in the region, including regular engagement with Latin American defense organizations, participation in miliary trade shows, and the previously noted use of gifts, among other techniques, it has experienced an increasing number of setbacks in those efforts, particularly among democratic states.
In Argentina, in 2023, the outgoing PRC-sympathetic Peronist government of Alberto Fernandez decided to purchase U.S.-made Danish F-16 fighter aircraft, instead of Chinese JF-17s. The latter would have been the most sophisticated Chinese aircraft sold to the region to date. The rejection of the PRC offer came on top of an Argentine decision not to pursue a Chinese armored vehicle to replace problematic WMC-551 Chinese armored vehicles, and the prior government’s purchase of a French patrol boat instead of a Chinese one being considered.
Also in June 2023, the center-right Uruguayan government of Luis Lacalle Pou decided to withdraw from the purchase of Chinese offshore patrol vessels for “geopolitical” reasons,” although the PRC had twice lowered the price in an effort to save the deal. A supporting 2017 PRC-Uruguay defense agreement was blocked in June 2022 by the Uruguayan parliament.
In Brazil, participation by PRC-based vendors in a bid for Brazil’s future frigate program and its surveillance architecture Sisgaaz have not advanced.
Increasingly Persistent PRC Military Presence in Latin America. Since at least 2019, the PRC has had personnel at the electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Lourdes, Cuba. It has reportedly also been negotiating an agreement to train Cuban military personnel on the island on an ongoing basis. Such activities suggest increased Chinese willingness to risk provoking the United States by establishing a low-level ongoing presence close to the US mainland.
Growing presence in the region also includes periodic deployments by its hospital ship “Peace Arc” to the region (in 2011, 2015 and 2018-2019), the visit of two Chinese missile frigates to Chile, Argentina and Brazil in 2013, and a port call by a PRC military ship to Havana Cuba in 2016.
PRC delegations periodically come to the region. In June 2023, the Political Comisar of the Chinese Navy Fleet Admiral Yuan Huazhi visited the leadership of the Brazilian Navy. In August 2022, a delegation from the PRC participated in a military sharpshooting exercise hosted by Venezuela. In 2023, as well as in prior years, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) sent uniformed members to participate in Mexico’s Independence Day Parade.
The PLA, in principle, has a position as observer at the Interamerican Defense Board and Interamerican Defense College in Washington DC, although it has not regularly sent persons there in recent years.
The PLA has also regularly sent military delegations to visit Latin American military institutions. In recent years, they have visited, and even attended key Latin American training schools, including Colombia’s Lanceros special forces school in Tolemaida, Brazil’s Jungle Warfare School in Manaus, and the latter’s well respected peacekeeping school, CCOPAB.
PLA representatives are further beginning to be included at forums in the region in which the US is present. In November 2023, for example, the head of the PLA Naval Infantry Zhu Chuansheng attended the 4th Naval Infantry symposium in Rio de Janeiro, also attended by his US counterpart, Marine Corps General David Bellon, as well as senior military leaders from Portugal, Argentina, Colombia, South Korea and France.
Expanding Activities by PRC-Based Private Security Companies in Latin America. As PRC-based firms expand their operations in dangerous parts of the region, Chinese private security companies (PSCs) are increasingly following them there (albeit not yet to the same degree as in Asia or Africa). In Peru, China Security Technology Group provides security services in the mining sector. In Argentina, Beijing Dujie Security Technology Company has an office in Buenos Aires. In Panama, China’s Tie Shen Bao Biao advertises Personnel protection services. The PRC-based security company Zhong Bao Hua An represents itself as having business in Panama, El Salvador and Costa Rica. In Mexico, the “Mexico-Chinese Security Council,” created in 2012 by former PRC government official Feng Chengkang, represents itself as protecting Chinese business personnel from gang violence.
Increasing Training of Latin American Security Personnel in the PRC. Latin American military personnel have long traveled to the PRC to participate in courses in China’s National Defense University in Changping, as well as other professional military education programs. They have also served in the PRC as defense attaches, and in other capacities. Such activities are gradually broadening.
Beyond traditional military engagement, the Chinese government is expanding opportunities for Latin American law enforcement personnel to visit the PRC. In September 2023, for example, the PRC hosted the “Global Public Security Cooperation Forum” in Lianyungang, attended by senior police leaders of Suriname and Nicaragua. There, Nicaraguan Police Chief Francisco Diaz reportedly discussed training of Nicaraguan police personnel in China.
Implications and Conclusions
Two decades of PRC security engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean has already borne fruit in the knowledge of the region, and in the relationships the PLA has built with its security sector counterparts.
Expanding security engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean supports the PRC relationships with, and influence over, partners there, including improved ability to protect PRC-based companies operating in the region. Even more importantly, in the event of a war between the PRC and the United States, PLA relationships with Latin American defense personnel and familiarity with its strategic geography from operating there improves the speed and effectiveness with which the PLA can launch military operations in the region, from small scale intelligence and special forces operations, to the projection of military force against the United States and its allies from facilities in the region.
While many Latin American and Caribbean states seek to avoid involving themselves in what they regard as “great power competition,” it is important for them to consider how security engagement with the PRC could unintentionally position them as candidates for Chinese military initiatives in time of a global conflict arising from PRC aggression toward Taiwan, or other issues. Even in time of peace, the record of Chinese training programs that are more about Chinese recruitment than imparting skills, poor performance of Chinese military systems, from trucks to radars to bullets, to PRC contracting practices that have led to corruption investigations tainting their Latin American purchasers, should all be a cautionary tale for governments in the region seeking the best for their armed forces.
Evan Ellis is research professor at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed herein are strictly his own.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government, Diálogo magazine, or its members.