INTRODUCTION
In 2020, the Brazilian Navy (MB) consolidated its high-level strategic planning in a realistic and innovative way with the approval of the Navy Strategic Plan 2040 (PEM 2040). Conditioned by high-level Defense[1] documents and guided by the Brazilian Navy’s[2] mission, this document presents a body of knowledge that guides the planning of MB’s sectors, while at the same time encouraging the participation of society and government bodies in decision-making processes and political and strategic management related to Maritime Power.
In PEM 2040, we identified an unprecedented emphasis on two aspects of the defense function performed by the Maritime Power: maritime security and naval diplomacy. With regard to the first aspect, maritime security, PEM 2040 addresses definitions that complement the contents of Naval Policy and Naval Military Doctrine (DMN), presenting the aspects of safety (security of waterway traffic) and security (maritime protection), and introduces “Combat at Sea” as a new strategic maritime-naval concept intrinsically linked to the complex and multiple threats that affect good order at sea and, therefore, maritime security in its essence. In the context of the use of Naval Power to support Foreign Policy, an integral part of the MB’s mission and an attribution included in the National Defense Strategy (END), the PEM 2040 broadens the understanding and formulates perspectives on naval diplomacy, a concept which until then had only been addressed, in a limited way, in Chapter 5 of the DMN.
In the same year that the Naval Force’s strategic planning demonstrated significant progress in the fields of maritime security and naval diplomacy, there was the withdrawal of Brazilian naval and air assets and the change of command of the Maritime Task Force (FTM – Unifil). Over the course of nearly 10 years in command of that FTM, MB accumulated significant operational and tactical experience in the field of maritime security, building a solid reputation for its ability and willingness to lead a multinational naval Task Force (FT), which contributed to increasing the positive perception of Brazil in the international system.
These factors, combined with MB’s growing contribution to the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) coalition, led Brazil, through the MB, to accept the invitation to command Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for the first time in 2021, one of the four TFs subordinate to the CMF, responsible for repressing piracy in that important maritime area. With this initiative, although it does not include the deployment of naval assets, the MB would mitigate a gap by creating conditions to increase its improvement in the field of international maritime security, while at the same time contributing to Brazil’s projection abroad and maintaining its image as a relevant player in global security and stability.
The MB is starting to prepare for the third command of CTF 151, to be held from January 2024, after concluding the second command on February 16, 2023, without a piracy incident having occurred in the area of responsibility of this FT. At this point, the author draws attention to the need to discuss the role of MB’s participation in the CMF, in order to improve the preparation and use of Naval Power in the fields of maritime security and naval diplomacy[3]. It should be emphasized, however, that the text is not intended to minimize the precedence of classic naval defense to the benefit of Naval Power’s other fields of action.
Considering the context presented, the central purpose of this argument is to maintain that the real and potential gains related to maritime security and naval diplomacy, at the political-strategic, operational, and tactical levels, resulting from the MB’s outstanding participation in the CMF, justify the MB’s continued exercise of leadership in a multinational naval TF, mainly through the assumption of its Command. Furthermore, such a TF could be in a maritime area of national interest, not exclusively within Brazil’s strategic environment, nor necessarily with the use of MB’s naval assets. The aim is therefore to propose measures to boost this activity.
The arguments are based on the author’s experiences directly related to CTF 151: initially, as Chief of Operations, during the MB’s first command, and, more recently, as a COMPAAz officer, when he worked as a collaborator in the preparation stage and monitored the performance, at the operational level, of the second command.
Following this contextualization, the next section will analyze the results achieved with the MB’s participation in the CMF, as well as identifying potential opportunities that the author sees, to be explored in the next Brazilian command of CTF 151, scheduled for the period from January to June 2024. In the third and final section, the author will summarize the partial conclusions that support the argument and propose measures to maximize the positive effects for national interests resulting from the MB’s leadership role in a multinational naval FT, as well as to broaden the external perception of these effects.
MB’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CMF – RESULTS, PROSPECTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES
Before analyzing the results achieved by MB in its first two commands of CTF 151, the prospects and opportunities, in the author’s view, to be explored in the next Command, the first subsection will contain a brief explanation of the CMF and its subordinate TFs, as well as the gradual progression of MB’s participation within that combined maritime force. In order to organize the reasoning, keeping it connected to the object of analysis, the following subsections have been organized according to the fields of action of the Naval Power directly related to the MB’s participation in the CMF, namely maritime security and naval diplomacy.
Understanding the CMF’s mission and a retrospective of the MB’s contribution
The CMF was established in 2001, in the wake of the international community’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on the initiative of 12 countries, led by the United States. Its headquarters are located in Manama, the capital of the Kingdom of Bahrain, on the same premises as U.S. Central Command’s Naval Forces Command and U.S. Fifth Fleet Command. The Vice Admiral of the U.S. Navy holds the aforementioned commands. The deputy commander of the CMF is a commodore in the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy.
The CMF is a multinational maritime partnership “of the willing[4],” currently made up of 34 member countries and four partners[5], Brazil being the only one from Latin America. Its primary mission is to defend the rules-based international order by combating illicit activities conducted by non-state actors in parts of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf and to promote security, stability, and prosperity in approximately 3.2 million square kilometers of international waters, as illustrated in Figure 1. This vast maritime area, under the responsibility of the CMF, is equivalent to around 60 percent of our Blue Amazon[6] and covers some of the most important maritime routes in the world.
The CMF comprises four CTFs, with different mandates and areas of activity. CTF 150, created in 2002, has the mission of suppressing illicit activities by criminal and terrorist organizations, conducting maritime security operations in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. CTF 151 was established in 2009 to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery in the CMF’s area of operations, excluding the Persian Gulf, to protect global maritime trade and free navigation. The other two, CTF 152 (created in 2004) and CTF 153 (created in 2022), have the same mission as CTF 150, but operate in different geographical areas, the first being restricted to the Persian Gulf and the second to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It should be noted that, unlike the CMF, which has command and sub-command permanently assigned to the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, the commands of the subordinate TFs are rotated among the member countries for a period of four to six months, upon expression of interest or invitation by the CMF.
The MB’s presence in the CMF began in 2013 with a senior officer sent to act as an observer. From 2015 onwards, the senior MB officer became Senior National Representative (SNR). In the following years, in addition to the SNR, the MB sent other officers to take on specific roles in the CMF’s organizational structure. Since 2018, the MB has contributed to the mission of CTF 151 by sending an officer to join its General Staff, taking on a role defined in an invitation from the country in command of that TF. The MB expanded its participation in CTF 151 in 2021, through a general officer taking command and sending military personnel to make up around 50 percent of its General Staff, which was repeated in 2022 and will most likely be repeated in 2024.
On the other hand, there is no history of MB participation in the other CTFs. The justification for Brazil’s position in relation to MB’s participation in CTF 151, to the detriment of the others, lies in the fact that this FT is the only one in which the United Nations National Council (UNSC) has legitimized action. Efforts to suppress piracy and protect vulnerable ships transiting the maritime region of the so-called Horn of Africa are in line with a series of UNSC resolutions, the most recent being 2,608, approved on December 3, 2021[7].
Based on the situation presented in this subsection, the subsequent analysis will cover aspects at different decision-making levels — political-strategic, operational, and tactical — related to the results achieved with the MB’s assertive participation in the CMF, in the fields of maritime security and naval diplomacy. It will also cover the potential new benefits to be sought by the MB in the short and medium term, especially during the third command of CTF 151, scheduled for January next year.
Analyzing aspects of maritime security
MB’s expectations of the results of holding the two CTF 151 commands were predominantly focused on the direct application of knowledge acquired on maritime security at the tactical and operational levels. The orientation of the High Naval Administration for the first contingent sent to Bahrain was to acquire knowledge about the repression of piracy, maritime security operations, the interaction and battle rhythm of a multinational staff, and the interoperability of a Combined Task Force, in order to apply and disseminate it in the Operational Sector.
Similarly, this expectation applied to the second command. In a report published by MB’s Navy News Agency (Agência Marinha de Notícias) on August 19, 2022[8], then commander of Naval Operations and current commander of the Navy, Admiral Marcos Sampaio Olsen, said: “[…] This is a unique opportunity to consolidate knowledge at the operational and tactical levels, thus improving doctrine and procedures relating to Security Operations, Defense, and Maritime Traffic Control, among others.”
In fact, it can be seen that the expectations were significantly met. The increase in the practice of operations to suppress piracy, achieved during the first command of CTF 151, directly influenced improvements in the planning and execution of MB maritime security operations, especially Guinex[9] operations. The intense participation of Brazilian military personnel in the CMF (operational level) and CTF 151 (tactical level) battle rhythms, structured around a maritime operations center, made it possible to make a significant contribution to the adjustments and adaptations needed to implement these concepts in the MB’s Operational Sector, which materialized through the preparation of a specific doctrinal note by the Naval Warfare Doctrinal Development Center (CDDGN) and the implementation of a battle rhythm in the Maritime Operations and Protection of the Blue Amazon Command (COMPAAz).
There are also other examples of positive results for the MB’s Operational Sector. The internalization of modern Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) applied by Navies and Coast Guards operating naval and aerial assets in the CMF area of responsibility, especially by the U.S. Coast Guard’s advanced interdiction teams, contributed to the content of the new Approach Activities Manual, approved by the Naval Operations Command in December 2022. The experiences and knowledge gained in the two CTF 151 commands also supported advances for the MB in operational intelligence activities — greater understanding of regional actors, characteristics of the area of operations, capabilities, and limitations of foreign assets — and maritime intelligence, with an emphasis on intensifying the use of network-based maritime situational awareness tools, such as Seavision[10], and exchanging information with international and regional maritime security centers.
However, the analysis should not be limited to the benefits already achieved at these two decision-making levels but should include an assessment of new opportunities to be exploited to improve maritime security in the MB. The reality of the region, characterized by a multiplicity and diversity of actors and complex, multifaceted threats, causes constant transformations and adaptations within the CMF, particularly in legal aspects, military technology, and the TTP of the naval forces that furnish the CMF’s TFs. This unstable and changing operational environment brings prospects for learning in areas such as operational law — interpreting different national mandates for mission accomplishment, implementing new rules of engagement, advising on the capture and transfer of detainees and the prosecution of crimes under national or international law, among other implications. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations to suppress piracy in the CMF’s area of responsibility, both to gather information and to support tactical actions at the scene of action, is another issue to be investigated for direct application in drawing up the TTPs for Sarp-E, recently incorporated by MB.
As the analysis progresses, it is possible to see that the results achieved in the field of maritime security go beyond the strategic level, given that the work of CTF 151 contributes to the safe and unimpeded navigation of maritime trade of national interest along the Maritime Lines of Communication (LCM) that cross that complex region[11]. It should be noted that, according to statistics from the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC), around 10 percent of Brazilian agribusiness exports and around 60 percent of our oil imports use these LCMs within the CMF’s area of operations[12]. This understanding is in line with one of the National Defense Objectives described in the PND, which is to safeguard people, goods, resources, and national interests located abroad.
In fact, this strategic implication of Brazil’s presence in the CTF 151 for the interests of the Brazilian state and society, in terms of maritime security, has already been perceived outside the Naval Force. After a preliminary experience in the area of maritime intelligence during the first Brazilian command of CTF 151, Transpetro and CTF 151, under the MB’s second command, carried out an exercise on the chart, known as tabletop (TTX), in February 2023, simulating a pirate attack on a Brazilian-flagged ship transiting through the FT’s area of operations, in order to test Transpetro’s organizational response structure and its interaction with CTF 151. On that occasion, then commander of CTF 151, Rear Admiral Nelson de Oliveira Leite, pointed out that “this type of exercise contributes to strengthening Brazilian maritime power and guaranteeing Brazil’s commercial interests in international waters[13].” It is desirable, therefore, that there should be coordination at a strategic level so that this perception is extended to other actors who, directly or indirectly, contribute to Brazilian maritime power.
There is therefore an opportunity to improve interoperability between Transpetro and MB in the third Brazilian command of CTF 151 and the prospect of greater interaction in other activities, such as maritime intelligence. This desirable synergy would reinforce the desired effect at the strategic level, which could be materialized in the future by an agreement or other type of agreement, with possible financial and/or material compensation that would help with the expenses of the MB personnel involved.
Finally, the results achieved and potential in the field of maritime security resulting from Brazil’s command of CTF 151 (completed and future) at the three decision-making levels in the Gulf of Guinea should be projected. The significant volume of oil and fertilizers imported into Brazil from countries located in that maritime area, which are considered strategic products for the country; the need to crack down on piracy and armed robbery that afflict maritime trade in that maritime area; the UNSC’s renewed interest in the problem, reflected in Resolution 2.634 (2022); and Brazil’s notorious interest in being a protagonist in its strategic surroundings would be the foundations for an eventual decision on the MB leading an FT similar to CTF 151 in the Gulf of Guinea.
Analyzing aspects of naval diplomacy
Among the activities carried out by the MB in the field of naval diplomacy, which to some degree generate political and strategic influence, directly or indirectly, the PEM 2040 gives greater importance to the use of naval resources. According to the document, the favorable conditions for international projection through naval presence are due to the characteristics of mobility, flexibility, versatility, and permanence of a Naval Force, associated with freedom of movement in international waters or under the auspices of international organizations. The PEM 2040 also stresses that the use of resources for naval diplomacy should prioritize Brazil’s strategic environment as defined in the PND, with a focus on the South Atlantic. In fact, in 2020, the MB ended the participation of its ships and aircraft in the FTM-Unifil and, the following year, began using them in maritime security operations in the Gulf of Guinea.
Although it was not accompanied by the use of Brazilian naval assets and took place outside Brazil’s strategic surroundings, this author believes that the presence of MB military personnel in the CMF and CTF 151, which was accentuated during the periods of Brazilian command of that TF, is in line with the national defense objective, described in the PND, of intensifying Brazil’s projection in the concert of nations and its greater insertion in international decision-making processes, and with the naval objective, defined in the Naval Policy, of participating in international operations, with the aim of contributing to world stability and the well-being of peoples. This preliminary analysis could lead to the understanding that this presence, per se, is enough to exercise naval diplomacy, when it is not possible to use naval means. However, the author defends a broader interpretation, which includes more proactive naval diplomacy, as presented below.
Without minimizing the naval presence as MB’s main instrument for supporting Brazilian foreign policy and considering the understanding that any sailor working abroad is a potential diplomat, it is argued that the participation of MB military personnel in the CMF, made up of 34 member countries and four partners, mainly in leadership positions in their TFs, offers a rare opportunity to contribute to maintaining, building, developing or improving international relations with this multiplicity of countries. It is also worth noting the interaction within the scope of the CMF’s mission, albeit indirectly, with international and regional organizations, independent actors — especially China, India, and Russia — and the international maritime community. The argument becomes more relevant if we consider the current financial, logistical, availability of resources, and even political restrictions, which jeopardize the deployment of our ships outside Brazilian jurisdictional waters.
One of the lines of effort in the CMF’s operational design, which is reflected in those of its TFs, is to conduct engagements, in the form of protocol visits and meetings, with representatives of countries or institutions of interest, civilian or military, with the aim of promoting the continuity or expansion of their contributions to the coalition, or to encourage new partners to join the shared effort. Although the CMF suggests priority engagements for the commanders of the subordinate TFs, there is ample freedom of action for each of them to adjust their agenda to the national interests of their respective countries, as well as their diplomatic priorities and limitations and the financial capacity to cover any expenses arising from these engagements. This is a huge and valuable opportunity for Brazil to promote its interests in the region.
In fact, the MB itself has already made a move in this direction. As a result of a suggestion made at the end of the first Command, the Navy General Staff (EMA) advised the second Brazilian commander of CTF 151 on military-naval interests in international relations with coalition member countries and other regional players, ranking them in three groups, according to the MB’s priority.
It is likely that engagements conducted with this orientation in mind will have positive repercussions for the MB at the operational and tactical levels in the short and medium term. However, the author argues that the planning and execution of these interactions need to be conducted at a higher level, so that it is possible to promote future strategic partnerships between Brazil and other countries or economic cooperation between the respective defense industries and in any other areas of national interest, without interfering with or harming the interests of the CMF. In other words, maximizing the value of naval diplomacy within the scope of an international maritime coalition such as the CMF requires coordination at levels above the Naval Force.
The case of Mozambique, a major focus of interest for the CMF, can illustrate this point. This is a country that has part of its northeast coast within the CMF’s area of operations, but which is not one of its members. In addition, the sea route used by traffickers to bring contraband from Asia to Islamic insurgents in Cabo Delgado province crosses the CMF’s area of operations, impacting the fulfillment of its mission. It is hypothesized that there would be a high probability of success in negotiations to encourage Mozambique to begin a preliminary association with the CMF, for example, in the form of sending a Liaison officer, through the interaction of a Brazilian CTF 151 commander with high-ranking military and political authorities in that country, in coordination with the Brazilian diplomatic representation. This engagement would be designed to build on the cultural, historical, and linguistic ties between Brazil and Mozambique, the basis for the two countries recognizing each other as privileged partners with converging interests within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP).
Similarly, this understanding can be applied to the process of deciding which countries would be invited to make up the staff of a Brazilian TF command and which countries could be chosen to carry out capacity-building activities, another line of effort within the purview of the CMF.
CONCLUSION
The author’s analysis was based on his observation that the MB’s participation in leadership positions in naval TFs, in areas of national interest, even outside its geographical surroundings and without the use of naval assets, like the CTF 151 commands, contributes to maintaining good international order at sea, which is vital to national interests, and to building a positive perception of Brazil in the international system.
In addition, the analysis of Brazil’s forceful participation in the CMF, from the perspectives of maritime security and naval diplomacy, at the three decision-making levels, made it possible to point to immediate positive effects for the MB and new opportunities for gains to be exploited.
It is understood that the MB’s progressive role in the Gulf of Guinea, resulting from the guidelines contained in the PND, END, Naval Policy, and PEM 2040, should not overshadow its consolidated role in CTF 151. Considering the similarities between the situations existing in the context of the CMF area of operations and in the Gulf of Guinea, as presented in this argument, combined with the absence of a requirement for Brazilian naval assets to be deployed in the CMF, it is feasible for the MB to maintain both fronts, enhancing the positive effects in the fields of maritime security and naval diplomacy, without taking the focus off the preparation and deployment of Naval Power in the field of naval defense.
From the military point of view, opportunities for international leadership in a naval operational environment are scarce and become even rarer when they are not linked to the deployment of naval assets from the leading country to the area of operations covered. In this context, we suggest evaluating the possibility of expanding the MB’s contribution to CTF 150 and 153. Participation in operations to combat threats other than piracy would open new doors of operational and tactical knowledge. However, the fact that the mandate of these TFs includes combating terrorism, with implications that could run counter to Brazilian legislation and international treaties ratified by Brazil, must be dealt with in depth. Nor should such an assessment be conducted outside the current context, in which the Russian-Ukrainian war has brought up the discussion about prioritizing the fight against state-generated threats over non-state ones.
A negative aspect pointed out in the analysis was that the good results achieved are not recognized or are underestimated, especially externally to the Naval Force. An exception was the case of Transpetro. It is therefore up to the MB to articulate this issue at the political-strategic level of the Brazilian government, especially with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to provide greater transparency about the benefits for society and the Brazilian state of MB’s actions in the Middle East. One way to achieve this is by improving strategic communication.
From a three-dimensional perspective in terms of international relations, in which diplomacy, security, and development are the three pillars of government actions related to global challenges, the author has shown that the MB’s leading role in the FMC could contribute, to some degree, to these three dimensions. To achieve more effective and lasting results, a more comprehensive approach is recommended, which considers the synergistic action of other government sectors interested in Brazilian foreign policy, such as foreign affairs, industry, and development, in order to articulate plans and priorities for the engagement of MB personnel in the CMF and CTF 151 with the other countries that make up that coalition and regional actors.
Finally, it is proposed that the MB conduct a doctrinal review, either in the next version of the DMN or in another document, in order to expand, update, and create concepts related to the fields of action of the Naval Power dealt with in this work: maritime security and naval diplomacy. In addition, it is recommended that the strategic-naval objectives and guidelines, to be outlined in the Navy’s Strategic Conception, in the Maritime Defense Strategy, and in a future revision of the PEM, with regard to these two fields of action, be in line with these doctrinal concepts. In particular, in the list of naval diplomacy activities contained in the strategic planning documents, it is suggested to include the MB’s exercise of leadership in a multinational naval FT operating in a maritime area of national interest, mainly through the assumption of its Command.
This Article was presented to Brazil’s Naval War College with the original title “The Navy’s Participation in Combined Maritime Forces: Results, Perspectives, and Opportunities in the Fields of Maritime Security and Naval Diplomacy” for the completion of the Maritime Policy and Strategy Course (C-PEM).
Brazilian Navy Captain Luciano Calixto de Almeida Junior served as a Liaison Officer at the United States Naval Forces Southern Command (2018-2020) and Chief of Operations for Combined Task Force 151 (May to November 2021). He is currently a C-PEM student officer.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government, Diálogo magazine, or its members. This article was machine translated and edited.
[1] National Defense Policy (PND), National Defense Strategy (END), National Defense White Paper (LBDN), National Maritime Policy (PMN) and Naval Policy.
[2] The MB’s mission is to prepare and employ the Naval Power in order to contribute to the defense of the Homeland; to guarantee the constitutional powers and, at the initiative of any of them, law and order; to carry out the subsidiary duties provided for by Law; and to support Foreign Policy.
[3] On the occasion of the Inaugural Lecture of the Maritime Policy and Strategy (C-PEM) and General Staff Courses for Senior Officers (C-Emos), delivered on February 3, 2023, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral José Augusto Vieira da Cunha de Menezes, presented the Naval Power fields of action, to be considered in the new Maritime Defense Strategy, such as: Naval Defense, Maritime Security, Naval Diplomacy, and Support for State Actions.
[4] The CMF is a flexible organization, in which its members are not bound by a fixed political or military mandate. Each country’s contribution varies according to its will, capacity and availability at any given time.
[5] The member countries of the CMF are: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, USA and Yemen. The partner countries are: Djibouti, Oman, Kenya and India.
[6] The political and strategic concept of the Blue Amazon is contained in Chapter 1 of the EMP 2040.
[7] The UNSC Resolutions are available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0. Accessed on: Feb. 16, 2023.
[8] Available at: https://www.marinha.mil.br/agenciadenoticias/brasil-assume-comando-de-forca-tarefa-maritima-internacional . Accessed on: 15 Feb. 2023.
[9] Available at: https://www.marinha.mil.br/agenciadenoticias/guinex-ii-operacao-no-golfo-da-guine-visa-aumentar-seguranca-maritima-no-atlantico. Accessed on: Feb. 16, 2023.
[10] Seavision is a tool developed jointly by U.S. civilian and military agencies and that currently has more than 4,500 active users from more than a 100 partner nations.
[11] The CMF/CTF 151 area of operations encompasses LCMs through which more than 30 percent of the world’s oil and around 20 percent of the world’s maritime trade are transported. The complexity of this area lies in the existence of three vital sea passages (chokepoints), which in turn are also sites of significant activity or danger (hotspots) of maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea.
[12] Available at: http://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/pt/geral. Accessed on: Feb. 15, 2023.
[13] Available at: https://www.defesaemfoco.com.br/combined-task-force-151-e-transpetro-realizam-o-primeiro-table-top-excercise/. Accessed on: 13 Feb. 2023.