In this exclusive interview with Diálogo, Vladimir Rouvinski, director of the Laboratory of Politics and International Relations (PoInt) at Icesi University in Cali, Colombia, offers a clear-eyed assessment of China’s growing influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Rouvinski warns that Beijing’s presence, which began with trade and infrastructure, extends deep into the region’s most sensitive sectors, raising long-term implications for sovereignty, security, and democratic governance.
Diálogo: Two decades after China’s aggressive initial foray into Latin America, what has time revealed about Beijing’s deeper strategic interests? Has the nature of China’s engagement fundamentally changed?
Vladimir Rouvinski, director of the Laboratory of Politics and International Relations at Icesi University: China’s strategic interest in Latin America is primarily due to its geographical location. China is, of course, interested in the region in terms of trade and investment, but it also seeks to have a long-term presence and influence in the region. At the beginning, China’s engagement with Latin America was mostly about trade and commerce. It was about promoting this narrative of mutually beneficial relations. But now, increasingly, we see that China is also focusing on security cooperation. It’s building links of dependency in very sensitive areas for many Latin American countries. And we’re also increasingly seeing what I would call a clear example of elite capture, where China works to establish strong relationships with political elites, posing a potential security threat to the Western Hemisphere.
Diálogo: How are China’s strategic interests currently materializing on the ground, through infrastructure, surveillance or political alignment?
Rouvinski: China promotes itself as a reliable alternative to traditional partners like the United States or Western Europe, particularly in very sensitive areas. It understands Latin America’s urgent infrastructure needs and offers quite attractive investment conditions that, under other circumstances, are not always easy for governments to secure. The problem with these investments, however, is the lack of transparency. China operates in highly sensitive sectors, and these projects have long-term consequences. China might say it plays by the rules, that it does not intend to interfere in local affairs, and simply wants to help Latin America benefit from its economic growth. But if we look closer, China’s intent is to create long-term dependency on Chinese-sponsored infrastructure. And we know there is very little transparency in how these initiatives are being carried out.
Diálogo: China has invested in nearly 40 ports in Latin America and the Caribbean, controlling nearly 100 percent of operations in places like Kingston Freeport in Jamaica and Chancay in Peru. What do these patterns suggest about China’s long-term objectives and geopolitical ambitions beyond commercial interests? What are the risks to national sovereignty and regional security?
Rouvinski: We have to start with the understanding that China is not just any other country. Things that are happening in China and what China does abroad is totally controlled by its government. We should never forget this. That’s why, when we look at what China does in infrastructure, like building ports, we need to consider the broader picture. China is not just building infrastructure to facilitate the shipment of goods produced in China. There is a much deeper strategic layer. Because there is such a strong link between Chinese companies operating abroad and the Chinese government, there’s a real risk that, at any moment, this infrastructure could be used for military purposes, as no Chinese company is in a position to say, “You shouldn’t do this — it’s for trade and commerce only.” That’s the main risk when it comes to China investing in infrastructure.
Diálogo: Another critical area is space infrastructure with South America now hosting more Chinese space assets than any other region outside China. Many of these facilities are linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with limited transparency and oversight. How are these dual-use installations serving military or intelligence operations and what are the implications for national sovereignty?
Rouvinski: China has found in Latin America a very convenient testing ground for the dual use of these technologies. In the region, there’s very little public scrutiny when it comes to space exploration and China’s space installations. I believe that China intends to take full advantage of that vulnerability, feeling it has free rein to operate as it wishes. They already have a physical presence in Latin America and are likely to expand it through more installations, representing a long-term risk for the region.
Diálogo: China has also expanded its footprint in Latin America’s energy sector. In Peru, it controls 100 percent of energy distribution in Lima; in Brazil, 10 to 12 percent of the entire energy value chain; and in Chile about two-thirds of all energy. Could China leverage control over this infrastructure for political pressure or restrict energy access amid diplomatic tensions?
Rouvinski: Energy is a powerful instrument of political influence, and there’s no doubt that control over it matters. China is likely to seek even greater dominance over Latin America’s energy supply, precisely because of how it approaches business. Such control would give Beijing leverage for political pressure — and there’s little doubt it would use it, especially in situations where it feels other tools have failed.
Diálogo: China has reshaped the region’s trade dynamics, prioritizing raw material exports and infrastructure financing over industrial diversification. What is the risk that this reinforces economic asymmetries rather than foster sustainable development?
Rouvinski: It’s precisely the deep asymmetry in this relationship that makes China the dominant player. China decides what to do, when to do it, and with whom. If China suddenly loses interest in a project or stops purchasing a key commodity, Latin American countries are left with nothing. That’s how China is doing things.
Diálogo: While countries like Panama are reconsidering their involvement with China, others, such as Colombia, are actively pursuing closer ties. What drives these different approaches and what does Colombia hope to gain?
Rouvinski: One important point is the lack of awareness about the true nature of China’s interests. Panama has had to open its eyes to the implications of this kind of engagement. In Colombia’s case, two key factors stand out. First, China has expanded its soft power, notably through the Bogotá metro project, which significantly improved public perception. Second, the Colombian government has a limited understanding of what China represents and ultimately seeks. While some organizations have made efforts to address these issues and provide critical information, the government unfortunately doesn’t seem to be listening. A possible consequence of Colombia’s deepening ties with China is the weakening of its traditional alliance with the United States. This is a very dangerous trend, as behind these supposedly beneficial relationships with China lies a long-term strategic risk for national security and Colombia’s broader engagement with other countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Diálogo: this points to a lack of informed public debate and understanding of China’s model and strategic interests. What is missing from the region’s discourse that prevents a comprehensive assessment of these implications?
Rouvinski: What we need is a broad public debate. Latin America suffers from a lack of interest in critically examining China’s role. It’s not enough to simply say “China is a great partner” or “China has money, so we will benefit.” Beyond this narrative, often embraced by some political leaders who see China as an alternative, there is little to no public debate. We don’t see congressional hearings or sufficient journalistic investigations about China’s role. As a result, we are facing a troubling scenario in which China benefits greatly from the absence of public scrutiny in the region.
Part II
In the second part of this interview, Rouvinski unpacks the mechanisms behind China’s growing ideological and political influence, highlighting its strategic use of academia, media, and electoral processes, while also warning of the deepening economic dependencies that now give Beijing significant leverage to pressure governments across the region.
